¹ Japan, Rikugun Sambo Hombu, Dai-ichibu Kenkyuhan, Nampo sakusen ni okeru senryochi tochi chian yokoan, March, 1941, n.p. Marked “Top Secret.” Hereafter, JRSH.

² Japan, Rikugun Daihon'ei, Marei gunsei yoko, October 21, 1941, n.p. Marked “Top Secret.”

³ Ibid. Also see. Principles Governing the Administration of the Occupied Southern Areas, adopted at the government-military liaison conference or November 20, 1941.

⁴ “Nampo ni okeru senryochi keiei no tame jizen jumbi ni kansuru iken.” in JRSH, Nampo sakusen ni okeru senyochi tochi.

⁵ See my forthcoming book, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937–1941.

⁶ Sadao, Tarora, “Nampo-gun kimitsu-shitsu,” Shukan Yomiuri (December, 1956), p. 100Google Scholar; Interview with Tarora Sadao, November 26, 1968.

⁷ Lebra, Joyce C., Chandra Bose to Nippon (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1968), p. 4.Google Scholar

⁸ Jwaichi, Fujiwara, F Kikan (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1966), pp. 44. 60Google Scholar; Interview with Maniyuna Shizuo (a former Asahi war correspondent), August 5, 1966.

⁹ Taisuke, Suzuki, “Kaisen zenya fuun no Bankkoku,” Shukan Yomiuri (December, 1956), p. 65Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Naosada, Koshiba, Kaisen zengo no Suwato, Taikoku ni okeru Kalgun no Ichi kakyo kosaku (unpublished manuscript), June, 1968, pp. 24–25, 43Google Scholar; Interview with Koshiba Naosada, December 2, 1968.

¹¹ Interview with Takase Toru, August 30, 1966; Low, N.L. and Cheng, H.M., This Singapore (Singapore: City Book Store, 1947), p. 39Google Scholar.

¹² Fujiwara, F Kikan, p. 139; Interview with Fujiwara Iwaichi, August 17, 1966.

¹³ Ibid., p. 145; Interview with Fujiwara, August 17, 1966.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 146. According to Fujiwara, Manaki did not permit Chinese to display Japanese and Chinese flags together.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 146–147.

¹⁶ Correspondence with Manaki Keishin, May 27, 1967.

¹⁷ kaigi, Daihon'ei Renraku, Nampo senryochi gyosei jisshi yoryo, November 20, 1941, in Japan, Hombu, Sambo, ed., Sugiyama Memo I (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1967), p. 527Google Scholar. The English title is cited in footnote 3. An English translation of this document in Benda, Harry J., et al. , Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents (New Haven Conn., Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1965), p. 2Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Interview with Takase, August 30, 1966.

¹⁹ “Taiwanjin Marei e shuppatsu meirei,” January 6, 1942, Riku A Mitsu Dai Nikki I, 1942, No. 32, F31102, Reel 18 in Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy and Other Government Agencies, 1868–1945, microfilmed.

²⁰ Watanabe Watam, Nichi-Bei-Ei senso sanka Nisshi, January 10, 1942 (unpublished). Hereafter Watanabe Nisshi.

²¹ Interview with Watanabe, July 9, 1966; Rikugun Daigakko, Senryochi tochi (chian shukusel) ni konsuru Watanabe Taisa koen sokki roku. May 7, 1941. In this speech before students at the Army War College, Watanabe described the character of the Chinese as being “too old a bird to be caught with chaff” and “obedient outwardly but rebellious inwardly.”

²² Interview with Watanabe, July 16, 1966.

²³ Kushida Masao, Kushida Nikki, January 17, 22, 1942 (unpublished). Colonel Kushida was a senior officer of the First Bureau (Operations) in the General Staff.

²⁴ Watanabe Wataru, Daitoa senso ni okeru Nampo gunsei no kaiko (unpublished), pp. 27–29. Hereafter Watanabe Memoirs.

²⁵ Sambo Hombu Nijuppan, Kimitsu senso Nisshi, January 17, 1942.

²⁶ Kushida Nikki, February 3, 1942.

²⁷ Sambo Hombu, Kimitsu senso Nisshi, February 14, 1942.

²⁸ Japan, Koain Seimubu, ed., Dai 77-kai, 78-kai, 79-kai Taikoku Cikai Shina kankei shitsugi oto shu. May, 1942, p. 308.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 312. In another committee hearing, Finance Minister Kaya Okinori expressed similar idea. Ibid., 316.

³⁰ Sambo Hombu, Kimitsu senso Nisshi, February 14, 1942.

³¹ For a full text of the Principles, see Sugiyama Memo II, pp. 28–29.

³² See footnote 91.

³³ Saburq, Kawamura, Jusan kaidan wo noboru (Tokyo: Ato Shobo, 1952), p. 163Google Scholar. The book it a collection of Kawamura's letters written as his will to his family in order to tell “the truth” of the sook ching.

³⁴ Interview with Manaki Keishin, July 10, 1966.

³⁵ Kawamura, Jusan kaidan, p. 164; International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Proceedings, pp. 5627–5628; Defense Document 1921 (Exhibit No. 3069), Affidavit of Colonel Kazuji Sugita: Dai-ni Yasen Kempeitai, Mareia kyosanlo hatten narabi kodo jokyo: Ko-Nichi kyosamo (fukumu boryaku teki) chian jokyo shiryo (January 8-February 28, 1942), March 8, 1942. Marked “Top Secret”; Correspondence with Onishi Satoru, December 10, 1966. Sugita was a staff officer of the Twenty-fifth Army in charge of intelligence. Onishi was an officer of the Second Field Kempeitai.

³⁶ As to who first proposed and supported strongly the implementation of the sook ching policy remains still in dispute, although two names appear prominently in interviews. The responsibility for the decision, of course, rests upon Yamashita.

³⁷ Poh, Nanyang Siang, ed., Nanyang Nien-chien 1951 (Singapore: Nanyang-pao she Co., 1951)Google Scholar, Chapter 6; Tsung-hui, Nan ch'iao, ed., Ta-chan yu Nan ch'iao (Ma-lai-a chih pu) (Singapore: Nanyang chu-pan she, 1947), pp. 68–69, 93–97, 99, 102, 107, 113–114, 136, 148–150, 157, 164, 166, 182, 201–202, 209Google Scholar; Onn, Chin Kee, Malaya Upside Down (Singapore: Jitts & Co., 1946), pp. 99–101Google Scholar; Low and Cheng, This Singapore, pp. 15–22; Ch'uen, Hsu, “Chao-nan shih tai chien cheng ta t'u sha shih mo chi,” Nanyang Tsa-chih (Nanyang Miscellany) I, No. 6 (April, 1947), pp. 115–118Google Scholar.

³⁸ Kawamura, Jusan kaidan, pp. 163–164, 166. Sugita also reportedly shared Kawamura't conclusion. Interview with Tarora, November 26, 1968.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 166.

⁴⁰ Interview with Manaki, July 10, 1966.

⁴¹ Correspondence with Onishi. December 10, 1966; with Jo Tomotatsu, August I, 1966.

⁴² Low and Cheng, This Singapore, pp. 18–19; Kawamura, Jusan kaidan, p. 167; Hsu, Nanyang Tsa-chih I, p. 116.

⁴³ Colonel Watanabe, a very close friend of Colonel Oishi, was not told anything about the execution. Watanabe became aware of it only when scores or Chinese came to the gunseibu pleading to find their missing kins. Others like Syonan Mayor Odachi Shigeo learned of it when bullet ridden and mutilated bodies were awashed on the shores. First several issues of the Shonan Times were full of notes of missing persons asking readers to help find their whereabouts.

⁴⁴ New York Times, September 16, 1946, May 10, 1947; Nanyang Siang Poh, Nanyang Nienchien 1951, Chapter 6, Sec. 10, p. 36. Kempei officer Onishi contends that these figures produced by British and Chinese sources were exaggerated.

⁴⁵ New York Times, April 3. 1947; Hsu, Nanyang Tsa-chih I, p. 117.

⁴⁶ Low and Cheng, This Singapore, pp. 17, 48; Chin, Malaya Upside Down, p. 106; Nan ch'iao Tsung-hui, Ta-chan yu Nan ch'iao, p. 99.

⁴⁷ Some prominent Chinese community leaders and Communist party officials including Lai Tek, party secretary general, were captured. Lai Tek turned against his comrades by serving as kempeitai double agent.

⁴⁸ Interview with Manaki, July 10, 1966; Correspondence with Onishi, December 10, 1966.

⁴⁹ Keijiro, Otani, Dai Nij'igo-gun Marai Sumatora gunsei ni okeru jakkan no shiryo, (unpublished), 1962, pp. 62–65Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Interview with Ogata Shin'inchi, August 27, 1965.

⁵¹ Watanabe Nikki, February 19, 1942.

⁵² Low and Cheng, This Singapore, pp. 33–34; Y.S. Tan, “History of the Formation of the Overseas Chinese Association and the Extortion by J.M.A. of $50,000,000 Military Contribution from the Chinese in Malaya,” Journal of the South Seas Society III, Part I (September, 1946), p. 1; Osaka Mainichi, February 28, 1942.

Shinozaki Mamoru who was to become section chief of Syonan city's welfare department, persuaded Dr. Lim to accept the post. Shinozaki was said to have taken the Strait-born Chinese under his wings. With the outbreak of the war, the British police arrested him as a spy but left him alone in Changi Gaol, while they shipped all other Japanese to Australia.

⁵³ Low and Cheng, This Singapore, p. 35; Tan, Journal of the South Seas Society III, p. 2. Wee Twee Kim posed as friend of and protector of the China-born Chinese.

⁵⁴ Interview with Takase, August 30, 1966.

⁵⁵ Dai Nijugo-gun Cunseibu, Kakyo kosaku jisshi yoryo, April 19, 1942. Marked “Secret.” An English translation of the document is found in Benda, et., Japanese Military Administration, pp. 178–181.

⁵⁶ The same idea was recorded in Watanabe Memoirs, pp. 27–29, 36 and his speech at the War College, Rikugun Daigaku, Senryochi tochi Watanabe Taisa koen.

⁵⁷ Interview with Watanabe, July 9, 1966. Otani drafted for Watanabe post-war plans for the administration of Malaya, Draft Plans for the Disposition of the Malay Peninsula. In this draft, however, there was no mention of extorting money from Chinese communities. See, Otani Kozui, Marei Hanto zengo shori hoan, n.d. Marked “Secret.”

⁵⁸ Nakayama wrote a pamphlet, Policy Suitable for the Southern Area, which he dedicated to Watanabe. Beside recommending Watanabe for raising money from the Chinese, Nakayama urged him to take stern suppressive measures against hostile Chinese.

⁵⁹ Ishii Akiho, Nampo gunsei Nikki (unpublished), p. 146. Hereafter Ishil Nikki.

⁶⁰ Watanabe Memoirs, pp. 29, 54; “Kakyo kenkin,” Tomi Shudan Sambocho yori [Rikugun] Jikan, [Rikugun] Sambo Jicho, March 17, Showa 17-nen Riku A Mitsu Dai Nikki XI, 4–1.

⁶¹ Ishii Nikki, pp. 146–147; Otani, Dai Nijugo-gun Marei Sumatora gunsei, p. 67.

⁶² Ishii Nikki, p. 147.

⁶³ Nijugo-gun Gunseibu, Marei zaisei no short yoko, n.d. Marked “Top Secret.”

⁶⁴ For the reconstruction of the story, I have relied on the following sources: Low and Cheng, This Singapore, pp. 33–45; Chin. Malaya Upside Down, pp. 72–83; Hsu, Journal of the South Seas Society III, pp. 1–12; Nanyang Siang Poh, Nanyang Nien-chien 1951, Chapter 6; Interview with Takase, August 30, 1966; Nan ch'iao Tsung-hui. Ta-chan yu Nan ch'iao, pp. 32, 73, 115; Naosaku, Uchida, “Shusen zengo no Tonan Ajia kakyo no doko,” in Gakkai, Nippon Gaiko, ed., Taiheiyo senso shuketsuron (Tokyo: Nippon Gaiko Gakkai, p. 843Google Scholar; “Kakyo kenkin,” Showa 17-nen Riku A Mitsu Dai Nikki XI. 4–1).

⁶⁵ Takase originally intended to demand $100 million. Interview with Takase, August 30, 1966. $50 million represents about one fourth of ih” currency circulated at that time. Throughout the text Straits currency denotation is used. The Japanese yen was at par with the Straits dollar.

⁶⁶ The Chinese in Sumatra and North Borneo were also levied to donate $30 to $40 million as were the Chinese in the Dutch Indies. Per capita allocation for the Chinese in Sumatra was much higher than the Chinese in Malaya because of the wealth of the former group. The Chinese in the Philippines were ordered to make a gift of 24 million peso but it never materialized. Dai Nijugo-gun Gunseibu, Sumatora Kakyo taisaku May 1, 1942. Marked “Secret;” “Kita Boruneo Kakyo kenkin no toriatsukai,” [Rikugun] Jikan yori Nampo-gun Sosambocho, Nada Butai Sambocho, August 17, 1942, Showa 17-nen Riku A Mitsu Dai Nikki XXXV, 3–2.

⁶⁷ Tan, Journal of the South Seas Society III, p. 8; Low and Cheng, This Singapore, p. 41.

⁶⁸ Syonan Times, April 16, 1942; Osaka Mainichi, March 30, 1942.

⁶⁹ According to Colonel Otani, one of the reasons why Chinese communities had difficulty in collecting money was thai Dr. Lim Boon Keng did not have political skill and command over them in the same degree that Tan Kan Kee had enjoyed. Otani, Dai Nijugo-gun Marei Sumatora gunsei, p. 72.

⁷⁰ Former governor Kubota Shun of Perak said that one of the difficulties for Chinese in Perak to raise money was that many Chinese were unable to use inheritance money for the contribution unless law was revised. The state issued a special decree enabling Chinese to use this inheritance money. Interview with Kubota, August 30. 1966.

⁷¹ Chin, Singapore Upside Down, pp. 76–82.

⁷² Syonan Times, June 20, 21, 1942.

⁷³ Ibid., June 26, 1942; Tokyo Asahi Shimbun. June 28, 1942. The amount each Chinese Association borrowed from the Yokohama Specie Bank is as follows: Syonan, $1,350,000; Penang, $4,650,000; Perak, $4,250,000; Malacca, $3,350,000; Johore, $1,000,000; Selangor $6,000,000; Negri Sembilan, $700,000. Uchida. Taiheiyo senso shuketsu ron, p. 844.

⁷⁴ Interview with Tsurumi Ken, August 10, 1966.

⁷⁵ Kankokai, Odachi Denki, Odachi Shigeo (Tokyo: Odachi Denki Kankokai, 1956), p. 183Google Scholar; Watanabe Memoirs, p. 72. Watanabe liked neither Odachi nor Otsuka because they advocated a moderate policy to deal with the indigenous people.

⁷⁶ “Kakyo kenkin shori,” [Rikugun] Jikan yori Nampo haken-gun Sosambocho, Dai Nijugo-gun Sambocho, March 21, 1942. Showa 17-nen Riku A Mitsu Dai Nikki XI. 4–1 ; Interview with Tarora, November 26. 1968. Tarora said that some in the central Army authorities in Tokyo voiced their objection saying that they would not accept the contributed money.

⁷⁷ “Kakyo nokin,” Tomi butai Sambocho yori [Rikugun] Sambo jicho, Heitan sokambu Sambocho, March 27, 1942, Showo 17-nen Riku A Mitsu Dai Nikki XI, 4–1.

⁷⁸ “Kakyo kenkin shori,” March 21, 1942, Showa 17-nen Riku A Mitsu Dai Nikki, XI, 4–1.

⁷⁹ “Kakyonokin oyobi kokubohi futan,” [Rikugun] Jikan yori. Oka, Tomi butai Sambocho, March 28, 1942. Showa 17-nen Riku A Mitsu Dai Nikki, XI, 4–1; “Marci kakyo nokin shito,” [Rikugun] Jikan yori Oka butai Sambocho, May 22, 1942, Ibid., IXX. 3–1.

⁸⁰ Watanabe Memoirs, pp. 28–29, 36.

⁸¹ Interview with Takase, August 30, 1966.

⁸² Otani, Dai Nijugo-gun Marei Sumatora gunsei, p. 74. Otani's police intelligence reports indicated that sentiments were widespread among Indians ahd Eurasians that “the Japanese Army came to Malaya for exploiting us in the place of the British. The Chinese had exploited us, and now the Japanese were squeezing them. We were delighted to [see Chinese being bled white], but at the same time we were afraid that similar misfortune might befall upon us someday.”

⁸³ Chin, Singapore Upside Down, p. 83.

⁸⁴ Syonan Times, June 20, 27, August 30, 1942.

⁸⁵ Watanabe replaced Manaki in late spring.

⁸⁶ Takushiro, Hattori, Dailoa senso zenshi (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1968), p. 319Google Scholar.

⁸⁷ Kushida Nikki, May 9, 21, 23, July 2, 1942.

⁸⁸ Sambo Hombu [Dai Ichibu] Dai Juyonka, Daitoa minzoku shido yoko (an), August 6, n.p. Marked “Top Secret.”

⁸⁹ [Nampo] Sokambu, Gunsei, Gunsei Sokan shiji, August 7, 1942, Marked “Top Secret;” Hattori, Daitoa senso zenshi, p. 320Google Scholar.

⁹⁰ Sambo Hombu Nijuppan, Kimitsu senso Nisshi, June 18, 1942: Interview with Tarora, November 26, 1968. Tarora enlisted Teo Eng Hock, a former chairman of the Kuomintang's Nanyang Office at Singapore, to persuade the gunseikambu to relax its hard-line policy. The gunseikambu did not listen to Teo Eng Hock.

⁹¹ Interview with Okada Yoshimasa, October 19, 21, 1968. The Koa Kikan, through the CEA headquarters, tried to utilize Aw Boon Haw's influence for overseas Chinese operation, but Colonel Ishii Akiho turned down the Koa Kikan's request. Ishii Nikki p. 93. In May, 1942, the CEA headquarters again requested the SEA headquarters through the Army vice minister that permission be granted to dispatch 50 trained Chinese to be used for the pacification of the Nanyang Chinese, but the SEA command turned down the request. “Kyomu koshuhan Nampo haken no ken,” Shina haken-gun Sosambocho yori [Rikugun] Jikan, May 2, 1942; Nampo haken-gun Sosambocho yori [Rikugun] Jikan, May 3, 1942. Showa 17-nen Riku A Mitsu Dai Nikki, XVI, 2–2.

⁹² Kushida Nikki. October, 1942; Sambo Hombu Nijuppan, Kimitsu senso Nisshi, October 3, 1942; Interview with Kushida, August 6, 1966.

⁹³ Kushida Nikki, October 8, 1942; Tsunezo, OtaBiruma ni okeru Nippon gunseishi no kenkyu (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1967), p. 58Google Scholar.

⁹⁴ Ota, Biruma ni okeru Nippon gunseishi, p. 57; Aziz, M.A., Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), p. 213.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Tomi shudan shirei. No. 28, November 9, 1942. Marked “Top Secret.”

⁹⁶ [Marei gunseikambu] Somubu, Minzoku laisaku sanko shiryo oyobi kaisetsu, November 28, 1942. Marked “Top Secret.”

⁹⁷ Lt. General Nishioeda Hitoshi, a new gunseikan who succeeded Lt. General Suzuki, and Watanabe reiterated the same theme at the November 27 governors' conference. Shonan gunseikambu. Marei Sumalora chiho kaigi kaido toji, November 27, 1942, n.p. Marked “Top Secret.”

⁹⁸ Tomoro, Yamagala, Marei kakyo hongoku sokin ni tsuite, chosa shiryo No. 22 (November, 1943), pp. 2, 84Google Scholar. As reported by the Japanese Consulate General at Amoy, families in China whose livelihood had been dependent upon remittances were in despair. In extreme cases, they were reportedly eating only one meal a day.

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 2, 80; Shonan gunseikambu, Senji Geppo, April 19, 1943, Marked “Military Secret;” Japan Daitoasho, Nampo keizai taisaku, rev. ed., July 31, 1943, pp. 267–269; “Nampo Ko-chiiki yori kakyo sokin ni kansuru zantei sochi,” [Rikugun] Jikan yori Shina haken-gun Sosambocho, Ko, Ro, Nobori, Nami kaku Sambocho, Honkon Sofokufu Sambocho, Nampo-gun gunsei sokan, Watari, Hayashi, Osamu, Tomi kaku gunseikan, oyobi Nada Sambocho afe, December 28, 1942, Showa 17-nen Riku A Mitsu Dai Nikki, LXIV, 2–2.

¹⁰⁰ Syonan Sinbun, March 29, April 1, 1943. According to Yamagata's report prepared on the basis of a Nampo Kaihatsu Ginko (South Seas Development Bank), only $452,627 were remitted to China in the period between June and September, 1943, or a monthly average of a little over $100,000. This contrasted sharply with a monthly average of $2–5 million before the war. Yamagata cited three reasons for the sharp decrease. (1) The average Chinese did not have enough money for remittances as a result of a decrease in their income; (2) a good part of Fukien province was still under enemy control; and (3) all Malay states had not yet started remittance services.

¹⁰¹ Watanabe was said to have been transferred because his gunsei philosophy was not compatible with the changing condition created by the war situation. Interview with Tarora, November 26, 1968.

¹⁰² Syonan Sinbun, March 31, 1943.

¹⁰³ [Marei] Gunseikambu, Keimubu, Marei ni okeru chianjo no ichi kosatsu, November 27, 1942, n.p. Marked “Top Secret.”

To cope with the security problem created by Chinese, the gunseikambu promulgated Law and Order Preservation Act on February 1, 1943. The Act provided capital punishment. For the existing security, see Shonan gunseikambu, Shihobu, Shiho yoin kaido gijiroku 1, February, 1943; Slleman, Colin and Silkin, S.C., ed., Trial of Sumida Haruzo and Twenty Others (The Double Tenth Trial) (London: William Hodge and Co., 1951), xviii, p. 106Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁴ Marei Gunseikambu, Keimubu kaigi-kankei shorui toji. May 1, 1943, n.p. Marked “Top Secret.”

¹⁰⁵ Marei Gunseikambu, Marei kaku shu (shi) chokan kaigi kankei shorui toji. May 8–12, 1943, n.p. Marked “Secret.”

¹⁰⁶ Kawamura Naooka, Matei ni okeru gunsei shikko ni kansuru iken. May 8, 1943, n.p. The emphasis in the sentence is mine.

¹⁰⁷ Shang-ou, Hai, Ma-lai-a jin-min han-jih chun (Singapore: Hua ch'iao ch'u-pan she, 1945), p. 54Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁸ Hattori, Daitoa senso zenshi, pp. 448–449; Sugiyama Memo II, pp. 410–411.

¹⁰⁹ Nampo senryochi jumin no seiji sanyo til kansuru Ken, Rikugun soan, June 18, 1943, Reel S584, in Archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 1868–1945, microfilmed.

¹¹⁰ Sugiyama Memo II, pp. 436–437.

¹¹¹ Japan, Dai-ichi Fukuinsh, Shijilsu chosabu. Marel gunsei galyo 1946, n.p.

¹¹² Marei Gunseikambu, Marei kaku shu (shi) somubueho kaido kankei shorul toji, July 20, 1943, n.p. Marked “Top Secret.”

¹¹³ Inada Masazumi, Inada Nikki, July 26, 1943. (unpublished).

¹¹⁴ Itagaki Yoichi, “Maraya fukugo shakai ni okeru Nashonarizumu no hatten,” Keizaigaku Kenkyu, No. 6 (November 25, 1961), p. 17; Syonan Sinbun, October 3, 1943.

¹¹⁵ Elsbree, Willard H., Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940–1945 (Cambrige. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 142Google Scholar.

¹¹⁶ Itagaki, Keizaigaku Kenkyu, No. 6, p. 18.

¹¹⁷ For a list of Japanese companies operating in Malaya, see Chosaka, Nampo Kaihatsu Ginko, Nampo ni okeru hompo shihon ni yoru shuyo kaisha ichiranhyo, June 3, 1942, pp. 88–91Google Scholar.

¹¹⁸ Onn, Malaya Upside Down, pp. 88–91.

¹¹⁹ Interviews with Fujimura Masuzo, July 11. 1966; Ogata Shin'ichi, July 13, 1966; Tanabe Toshio (a Syonan gunsei staff officer), July 20, 1966; and Hatta Saburo (governor of Negri Sembilan) August 6, 1966; Correspondence with Hamada Hiroshi (Somubucho in 1944), July 23, 1966; Sugiyama Shuzo (an Ishihara Sangyo official), June 14, 1967; Kushida Nikki, January 7, 1942; Otani, Dai Nijugo-gun Marti Sumatora gunsei, pp. 102–103; Shozo, Mori, Sempu Nijunen, Kaikin Showa rimenshi (Tokyo: Masu Shobo, 1951), p. 158Google Scholar. Shizuo, Maruyama, Ushinawareta kiroku (Tokyo: Koraku Shobo, 1950), pp. 17–18Google Scholar; Hidetoshi, Kuroda, Gunsei (Tokyo: Gakufu Shoin, 1952), p. 70Google Scholar; “Midareta gunsei,” Hiroku Taiheiyo sensoshi VI (Tokyo: Fuji Shoen, 1953), p. 117Google Scholar.

¹²⁰ Japan. Fukuinsho, Dai-ichi, Nampo sakusen ni tomonau senryochi gyosei no gaiyo, 1946, p. 6Google Scholar; Japan, Dai-ichi Fukuinsho, Marei gunsei gaiyo, n.p.

¹²¹ Watanabe denied that he was responsible Tor bringing rikenyas. He said that he had neither power to appoint individual firms nor to give out concessions, because the Sixth Committee composed of members from the Ministry of Great East Asia and the military had such authority. Interview with Watanabe, July 16, 1966.

¹²² Interviews with Tarora, November 26, 1968; Mori Fumio (a gunsei staff officer), November 4, 1968.

¹²³ Marei Gunseikambu, Marei kaku shu (shi) chokan kaido kankei shorui toji, July 11, 1943, n.p.

¹²⁴ Correspondence with Hamada, July 23, 1966.

¹²⁵ It had become by this time the established policy of the Japanese government to “indigenize” the Chinese to the land they had adopted. The Japanese had abandoned their fond hope of using the Wang Ching-wei government to make an effective appeal to the Chinese. For example, Wans Ching-wei failed in his address at the Great East Asia Assembly held in Tokyo in November, 1943, to mention any connection between his regime and the Nanyang Chinese but stressed the advantages of alignment with the local administration and the Japanese. Showa 19-nen San gatsu somubucho godo kondan kenkyu jiko in Kushida Shiryo III, n.p. Marked “Top Secret;” Dai 84-kat Teikoku gikai, Shugiin yosan iinkai gijiroku (Dai 4-kai), January 14, 1944; Japan Foreign Affairs Association, Japan Year Book 1943–1944 (Tokyo: Japan Foreign Affairs Association, 1944), pp. 1055–1058Google Scholar. The Army General Staff and the War Ministry drafted a plan to discuss the question of granting citizenship to Chinese and making them equal with other indigenous groups. “Kongo torubeki senso shido no taido ni motozuku taigai seiryaku shido yoryo (an),” August 8, 1944, in Hombu, Sambo, ed., Haisen no kiroku (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1967), p. 36Google Scholar.

¹²⁶ Marei Gunseikambu, “Kakyo taisaku,” in Showa 19-nen San gatsu kaisai Marti kaku shu (shi) chokan kaigi kankei shorui roji, n.p. Marked “Top Secret.”

¹²⁷ Syonan Sinbun, May 31, 1944. The newspaper published the substance of Hamada's speech mentioning no name but “the commander of a certain unit of the Imperial Forces.” Nor did it editorialize the speech. These were an unusual departure from customary practice.

¹²⁸ Syonan Sinbun, June 3, 1944.

¹²⁹ The Collective Farms programme at Endau for the Chinese and at Bahau for the Eurasians had been underway before Hamada came to Malaya. After one year, 1,600 Chinese families mostly from Syonan settled at the colony, which began as a programme to thin out the city's population and to grow more food for economic self-sufficiency. The project largely did not achieve the objective, lt, however, contributed to the appearance of squatters who in postwar years helped the Communist guerrillas. The project was another example of discrimination toward the Chinese and Eurasians who were generally considered less cooperative than Malays and Indians.

¹³⁰ Gunseibu, Syonan, Shogakko saikai no ken, April 18, 1942Google Scholar; Yuji, Nayaga, “Marai ni okeru shiritsu gakko taisaku,” Chosabuho, No. 3 (June 5, 1944)Google Scholar, n.p. Later secondary and vocational schools reopened.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² [Marei Gunseikambu], Bunkyoka, Marei kyoiku jijo (March, 1943), pp. 26, 61–62. Many Chinese private schools were no more than terakoya-type schools of Tokugawa Japan (1616–1868). For instance, in pre-war years “in Malacca there were more than 200 registered Chinese schools, but only a hair of them might be justified as bona fide schools. Many were terakoya-type schools renting a space on the second floor of stores.” This led to a reduction of schools opened and students enrolled. Yuji, Nagaya, Senryogo no Maraya no show kyoiku, December, 1943, pp. 12–13, 18Google Scholar. Marked “Secret.”

¹³³ Nagaya, Chosabuho, No. 3, n.p.

¹³⁴ Kawamura, Marei ni okeru gunsei shikko ni kansuru iken, n.p.

¹³⁵ Perakku Shucho, Perakku-shu gaiyo, May, 1943, n.p. Marked “Top Secret.”

¹³⁶ Nagaya, Senryogo no Maraya no shoto kyoiku, pp. 11–19. A comparative list of percentage of schools reopened according to ethnic groups is as follows:

General Fujimura reported that as of January, 1945, only 20 to 30 per cent of Chinese schools had reopened, Japan, Dai-ichi Fukuinsho, Marei gunsei gaiyo, n.p.; cf. Nan ch'iao Tsung-hui, Ta-chan yu Nan ch'iao, pp. 103–104.

¹³⁷ Bunkyoka, Marei kyoiku jijo, pp. 62, 90. It should be mentioned that the disintegration of Chinese families, stagnant economic conditions, and high tuition fees charged in Malacca and Selangor (it was later abolished) delayed Ihe recovery of the Chinese education.

¹³⁸ Yuji, Nagaya, “Syonan kakyo shigaku chosa,” Chosabuho, No. 5 (July 5, 1944), n.p.Google Scholar The result of this language programme was unsatisfactory because of a woefully inadequate training of Chinese teachers in the Japanese language and lack of Japanese language textbooks and of challenge and incentives.

¹³⁹ Marei Gunseikambu, “Kakyo ni kansum bunkyo shisaku,” in Showa 19-nen San gatsu kaisai Marei kaku shu (shi) chokan kaigi kankei shorui toji, n.p.

¹⁴⁰ Nagaya, Chosabuho, No. 3, n.p.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., No. 5, n.p.

¹⁴² Marei Gunseikambu, “Kakyo taisaku,” in Showa 19-nen San gatsu kaisai Marei kaku shu (shi) chokan kaigi kankei shorui toji, n.p. In this policy it was stated that the Chinese would be recognized as citizens or Imperial Japan in the future. See, also 125n.

¹⁴³ Uchida, Taiheiyo senso shuketsuron, pp. 846–847; Yoichi, Itagaki, “Outline of Japanese Policy in Indonesia and Malaya during the War with special reference to Nationalism of Respective Countries,” The Annals of the Hitoisubashi Academy II, No. 2 (April, 1952), p. 188Google Scholar. Interviews with Kirita Naosaku, November 19, 1968; Hotta Takeo, December 13, 1968. Kirila and Hotta were members of the Epposho.

¹⁴⁴ Uchida, Taiheiyo senso shuketsuron, pp. 846–847.

¹⁴⁵ Correspondence with Hamada, July 23, 1966.

¹⁴⁶ “Penan Epposho setsuritsu,” Chosabuho, No. 4 (June 20, 1944), n.p. Some of the selected Chinese were Lin T'ing-shin, son of Teochiu financial tycoon Lin Lienleng: Lin Chien-hsiu, sen of Penang chief justice; Wang Tsung-ching, a medical doctor; Chou Kuo-chun; Lien Fu-k'un, chairman of the Chinese Association; Ch'iu Chi-fu; Lo Weng-yang; Chuang Jung-fu; and Ch'en Li-ch'an. Liu Ching-ts'ai and Sung Chen, both of whom were captured KMT intelligence agents, worked for the Epposho. Interviews with Kirita and Hotta, November 19, December 13, 1968.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Kirita, November 19, 1968.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.; Interview with Hotta, December 13, 1968.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Hotta, December 13, 1968; ltagaki. Keizaigaku Kenkyu, No. 6,. 18. Cooperation between the traditionally rival Army and Navy and good personal relations between Hamada and Hidaka appeared to have contributed to the Epposho's success in Penang.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Kirita, November 19, 1968.

¹⁵¹ Itagaki, Keizaigaku Kenkyu, No. 6, p. 18.

¹⁵² Correspondence with Hamada, August 4, 1966. In an interview, Fujimura did not elaborate why he acted as he did. Interview with Fujimura, July 11, 1966.

¹⁵³ Correspondence with Hamada, August 4, 1966.

¹⁵⁴ Itagaki. The Annals of Hitorsubashi Academy II, p. 189.

¹⁵⁵ Interviews with Kirita and Hotta, November 19, December 13, 1968.

¹⁵⁶ Uchida, Taiheiyo senso shuketsuron, pp. 847–848. Because Teochius in Penang and Syonan were prominent in the rice trade with Teochiu rice dealers in Thailand, this Japanese experiment helped the rise of the Teochiu pang (group) to leading position in postwar yean.

¹⁵⁷ Itagaki, The Annals of Hitotsubashi Academy II, p. 189.

¹⁵⁸ Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, p. 149; Harry Benda, “The Japanese Interregnum in Southeast Asia,” p. 77 in Goodman, Grant K., comp., Imperial Japan and Asia. A Reassessment (Occasional Papers or the East Asia Institute, Columbia University, New York, 1967)Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁹ Itagaki, The Annals of Hitotsubashi Academy II, p. 190.

¹⁶⁰ Nan ch'iao Tsung-hui, Ta-chan yu Nan ch'iao, p. 44,

¹⁶¹ Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, p. 149.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Japan, Dai-ichi Fukuinsho, Marei gunsei gaiyo, n.p.