² Hermansen, Marcia K. (translation), The Conclusive Argument from God: Shāh Walī Allāh of Delhi's al-Bāligha, Ḥujjat Allāh (Islamabad, 2003), p. 72Google Scholar; Allāh, Shāh Walī, Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bāligha (Cairo, 1952–53), pp. 52–53Google Scholar. Subsequent references to the Ḥujja are to the English translation in Hermansen (Ḥujja) and/or to the first volume of the Cairo edition, the latter indicated by “Ar.”

³ Ḥujja, p. 144; Ar. p. 104.

⁴ Yasien Mohamed, surveying both classical and modern uses of fiṭra, points out that classical authors never really touch upon the issue of mutability, as it is “probable that they understood […] la tabdīl li khalq'illāh (30:30) in the absolute sense, meaning that there shall be no change in Allah's creation”; Mohamed, ‘The interpretations of fiṭrah’, Islamic Studies XXXIV, no. 2 (1995), pp. 129–151, at p. 142. Nevertheless, we can “safely assume that they (with the possible exception of Qurṭubī) accepted it as immutable” (ibid.). Qurṭubī may have been one of the few classical thinkers who argued that the fiṭra can be “corrupted or altered” (ibid., p. 137). While the majority of classical writers most likely did not support mutability of the fiṭra, Mohamed notes that although most modern thinkers, including Shāh Walī Allāh, did not “address […] the issue [of mutability] in any way” (ibid., p. 142), a few (such as Asad and the mufti Shafīʿ) did argue in favour of mutability.

⁵ On the history of the ʿālam al-mithāl from Ibn Sīnā to Walī Allāh, see Rahman, F., ‘Dream, imagination and ʿālam al-mithāl’, Islamic Studies III, no. 2 (1964), pp. 167–180Google Scholar.

⁶ Iqbal, Muhammad, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought (Stanford, CA, 2012), p. 136Google Scholar.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 136–137.

⁸ Most prominently, these scriptural references are Qur'an 30:30 (“So [Prophet] as a man of pure faith, stand firm and true in your devotion to the religion. This is the natural disposition God instilled in mankind — there is no altering God's creation — and this is the right religion, though most people do not realize it” (M.A.S. Abdel Haleem [trans.], The Qur'an [New York, 2010], p. 258–59); and variants of the ḥadīth report quoted in the beginning of this article, stating that every child is born upon the fiṭra and it is merely their parents who turn them to other faiths. These imply, as Jon Hoover has noted, that “Islam is the universal religion at birth” (‘Fiṭra’, Encyclopedia of Islam, THREE). There are, however, several other prophetic utterances in other collections that also use the term fiṭra; see Gobillot, Genevieve, La fiṭra: la conception originelle; ses interpretations et fonctions chez les penseurs musulmans (Damascus, 2000), pp. 32–45Google Scholar. See also pp. 7–14 of the same work for a discussion of the linguistic origins of the root f-ṭ-r.

⁹ Hoover, ‘Fiṭra’. Hoover also refers to Gobillot's monograph La Fiṭra.

¹⁰ See Hoover, ‘Fiṭra’, as well as Adang, Camilla, ‘Islam as the inborn religion of mankind: The concept of fiṭrah in the works of Ibn Ḥazm’, al-Qantara XXI (2000), pp. 391–410Google Scholar.

¹¹ For more details on this use of fiṭra, see Griffel, Frank, of, ‘Al-Ghāzālī's use “original human disposition” (fiṭra) and its background in the teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicenna’, Muslim World CII (2012), pp. 1–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹² This knowledge still needs actualisation and proper perfecting. For more details on Ibn Taymiyya's views, see Hoover, Jon, Ibn Taymiyya's Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism (Leiden, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar as well as M. Sait Özervali, ‘Divine wisdom, human agency, and the fiṭra in Ibn Taymiyya's thought’, in Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law: Debating Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, (ed.) Birgit Krawietz and Georges Tamer (Berlin, 2013), pp. 37–60 and Holtzman, Livnat, ‘Human choice, divine guidance and the fitra tradition: The use of hadith in theological treatises by Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’, in Ibn Taymiyya and His Times, (ed.) Rapoport, Yosef and Ahmed, Shahab (Karachi, 2010), pp. 163–188Google Scholar.

¹³ On the close relationship between the concepts of fiṭra and sharīʿa in Walī Allāh's thought, see Mohamed El-Tahir al-Mesawi, ‘Human nature and the universality of the sharīʿah: Fiṭrah and maqāṣid al-sharīʿah in the works of Shāh Walī Allāh and Ibn ʿĀshūr’, Al-Shajarah XIV, no. 2 (2009), pp. 167–205. He also notes that, generally speaking, fiṭra in Walī Allāh's view “pertains mainly to the principles and essence of good and evil […] and not to their details and particular details and applications” (ibid., p. 176).

¹⁴ Ḥujja, p. xv.

¹⁵ It is this sense of “change” that I take issue with: adding something not originally envisaged by God. This is not the same as adding desirable character traits or qualities to one's personality and thus realising the broad demands the fiṭra makes for the four qualities.

¹⁶ Ḥujja, p. xxi.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ One may note that if Walī Allāh did indeed posit a mutable fiṭra, one would expect him to address the question of divine freedom, will, and knowledge, since such a position would impact our understanding of God's mind. However, none of these issues are addressed in the first part of the Ḥujja.

²⁰ Ḥujja, p. xxii.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ The members of this Highest Council consist of the most excellent humans and angels, and the very best of them form the Holy Enclave. I discuss the Holy Enclave in greater detail in section iii below.

²⁴ Ḥujja, p. xxiii.

²⁵ Hermansen, Marcia, ‘Shāh Walī Allāh of Delhi's “Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bāligha”: Tension between the universal and the particular in an eighteenth-century Islamic theory of religious revelation’, Studia Islamica LXIII (1986), pp. 143–157CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁶ Hermansen, ‘Shāh Walī Allāh’, p. 154.

²⁷ However, Hermansen never explains what it means for events to become “embodied in [humanity's] ultimate destiny”, or how the process of “naturalisation” works.

²⁸ Hermansen, ‘Shāh Walī Allāh’, p. 156.

²⁹ Ḥujja, p. 144; Ar. p. 104.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 143; Ar. p. 104.

³¹ Cf. Ḥujja, p. 144; Ar. p. 104.

³² Ḥujja, pp. 84–86; Ar. pp. 82–85.

³³ Ḥujja, pp. 84–85 (modified); Ar. p. 62.

³⁴ Ibid., Ar. p. 62; cf. p. 84 of Hermansen's translation.

³⁵ I will return to this question of the relation between nature and habit, or first and second nature, and the question of substantial change below when discussing Aristotelian thought.

³⁶ Ḥujja, p. 58; Ar. p. 42.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 57; Ar. p. 41.

³⁸ This division of the soul suggests that a human being shares the properties of the animals through his or her animalistic side but also goes beyond them in rationality and speech (Ḥujja, p. 61; Ar. p. 44). Every species has been assigned a “specific form” by its maker (ibid.), and hence we ought to know that “God has designed and regulated every species”, including humanity (ibid., p. 62; Ar. p. 44). Humans come in many shapes and forms but generally are more capable and “nobler” than animals (ibid., p. 63; Ar. p. 45). Humans are able to gain knowledge about themselves and their destiny in rare cases but for the most part require a leader, without whom “man's preordained perfection would not be effected” (Ḥujja, p. 65; Ar. p. 48).

³⁹ Ḥujja, p. 66; Ar. p. 49.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 37; Ar. p. 27.

⁴¹ According to Walī Allāh, God “created the world into species and genera and made certain specific properties particular to each species and genus” (Ḥujja, p. 33; Ar. p. 24).

⁴² In Walī Allāh's conception, the four worlds, from the highest to the lowest, are lahūt, the level of divine existence; jabarūt, the level of divine command; malakūt, the realm of images and angels; and nasūt, the level of manifestation and human existence.

⁴³ Ḥujja, p. 150; Ar. p. 107.

⁴⁴ Ibid.; Ar. p. 107, my translation.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 153; Ar. p. 109.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 159; Ar. p. 114.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 161; Ar. p. 114.

⁴⁸ Ḥujja, p. 163; Ar. p. 116. We may note that the two options, intellectual and practical, map onto the discussion of the qualities in the Ḥujja's chapter on psychological states, discussed earlier (see also ibid., p. 284 [Ar. p. 203] on the acquisition of the qualities through practice).

⁴⁹ Ḥujja, p. 163; Ar. p. 116.

⁵⁰ The title of the chapter (number 34) in which this discussion is found — “The veils preventing the manifestation of the sound original nature (fiṭra)” (Ḥujja, p. 165; Ar. p. 117) — is revealing, as it makes clear that each individual strives for the realisation of the four qualities and thus a healthy fiṭra that is congruent with the one pre-ordained by God. By implication, an unsound fiṭra is one that does not fully exhibit the qualities in accordance with the archetypal form. This point highlights the difference between individual fiṭar striving to attain the form and the perfect form itself.

⁵¹ Ḥujja, p. 143; Ar. p. 103. By this he presumably means elements that do not promote the desired qualities but rather lead communities away from their divinely ordained perfection.

⁵² Ḥujja, p. 142; Ar. p. 103.

⁵³ The fiṭar of people influenced by such conventions are not perfect, in that they do not correspond to the form that constitutes the goal of human development; however, this shortcoming does not essentially change what the ideal fiṭra is.

⁵⁴ Ḥujja, p. 144 Ar. p. 104.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 142; Ar. p. 103.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 142–143; Ar. p. 103.

⁵⁷ Ghulam Husain Jalbani notes that for Walī Allāh, the “definition of virtue and vices goes by the name of ‘fiṭrat’ which is not subject to any change. The laws of ‘fiṭrat’ deal with the principles and the universals of virtue and vice and not with their consequences and particulars. And this is the standard by which every man or group can be tested” (Jalbani, Teachings of Shāh Walīyullāh of Delhi [Lahore, 1967], p. 163). Similarly, S. Iqbal quotes Walī Allāh's assertion that there is no change in the original nature, which compares the likelihood of such change to the likelihood of a mountain's shifting (Islamic Rationalism in the Subcontinent [Lahore, 1984], p. 106).

⁵⁸ Ḥujja, p. 73 (slightly amended); Ar. p. 54.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 72; Ar. p. 53.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ḥujja, p. 69; Ar. p. 50.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ḥujja, p. 69; Ar. p. 51.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid. There is an interaction at this level between the highest and the lower angels: “just as these beams descend to what is below, likewise a coloration ascends to the Holy Enclave from the angels. This prepares for the emanation of an attitude which will be known as mercy, pleasure, anger and cursing” (ibid., p. 70; Ar. p. 51). The level of malakūt thus communicates with that of jabarūt, as “the preparation of petitionary prayer leads to the response” (ibid.).

⁶⁶ Shāh Walī Allāh seems to be unconcerned with the accessibility of these feelings, portraying this kind of angelic perception as unclouded.

⁶⁷ Ḥujja, p. 69; Ar. p. 51.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ḥujja, p. 69; Ar. p. 51.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 70; Ar. p. 51.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ḥujja, p. 72; Ar. p. 53.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 71; Ar. p. 52.

⁷⁴ According to Johannes Baljon, the instantiations created in the blessed night are particular to that time and that revelation and are thus cognizant of a particular people and their circumstances. As he puts it, “legislation sees to it that man's angelic and bestial potentialities function properly and remain in a state of equilibrium so that bliss will ultimately become his share in the hereafter. With this end in view, divine Providence prepared two kinds of directives: 1. measures designed for situations, actions and ethical qualities which are not conditioned by time. […] 2. rules adapted to changes of time and place. For that purpose various sharīʿas were revealed in the course of history” (Baljon, Religion and Thought of Shāh Walī Dihlawī (1703–1762) [Leiden, 1986], p. 160). As Baljon further clarifies, a particular sharīʿa is developed with “existing local practices and religious observances” in mind Religion and Thought, p. 160, and it is thus mindful of what could be described as custom (see also ibid., pp. 171–172).

⁷⁵ If these customs are “true in their basic premise” (Ḥujja, p. 142; Ar. p. 103) and aimed at “comprehensive beneficial purposes” (ibid., p. 143; Ar. p. 103) rather than any individual interest, they can have an efficacy on the human form through the Enclave.

⁷⁶ Ḥujja, 72; p. Ar. 53. This equation of fiṭra and dīn is widespread, supported in the commentary tradition on both sūrat al-Rūm 30 and the ḥadīth in Bukhārī and Muslim on the islām of all humans.

⁷⁷ Ḥujja, p. 173; Ar. pp. 120–121. Conversely, sin “is every act which man does as a result of his obedience to the devil and which results in his surrendering to his purpose, every act which is rewarded by evil in this world and the next […]” (ibid., p. 173; Ar. p. 121).

⁷⁸ Ḥujja, p. 173; Ar. p. 121.

⁷⁹ Ḥujja, p. 173–174; Ar. p. 121.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 142–144.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 174; Ar. p. 121.

⁸² Ḥujja, p. 285; Ar. p. 204.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 361; Ar. p. 263.

⁸⁴ The continued emphasis on direction underlines this impression of the unchangeable fiṭra further since God's creation is oriented through his management (tadbīr). Thus, anything that occurs in the world happens “in conformity with the system which His Divine wisdom approves, so that it will attain the beneficial purpose (maṣlaḥa) which His Divine generosity required” (Ḥujja, p. 34; Ar. p. 25). I discuss this emphasis on direction further below.

⁸⁵ Ḥujja, p. 45; Ar. p. 33.

⁸⁶ Ibid.; Ar. p. 32.

⁸⁷ Ibid.; Ar. p. 33. The actions of the Enclave in the process of requital are highlighted also in ibid., p. 274 (Ar. p. 196), where we read that there are “angels of God whose utmost concentrated resolve is praying for the one who strives to improve the world, and against the one who tries to corrupt it, and their invocation knocks on the door of divine generosity and is a cause for the descent of requital in some fashion”.

⁸⁸ “Sometimes in the Holy Enclave a consensus is reached to establish a means of saving human beings from the disasters of this life or the next world through the perfection of the purest man of the age and through causing his command to be implemented among the people” (Ḥujja, p. 47; Ar. p. 34).

⁸⁹ Ḥujja, pp. 49–50; Ar. p. 36.

⁹⁰ As mentioned before, on the broader concept of the realm of images, see Rahman's article ‘Dream, imagination, ʿālam al-mithāl’, in which Rahman traces the history of the concept of a realm between the spiritual and the physical.

⁹¹ Ḥujja, p. 67; Ar. p. 49.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Walī Allāh's mention of a concept of maximising benefit at ibid., p. 50 (Ar. p. 37) may be related to this point. He contends that if there is any kind of conflict, even of the kind of “the domain of material creation (khalq) over the domain of divine ordering (tadbīr)”, humans must assume, in spite of their lack of assured knowledge, that “only the most worthy thing will come into being”.

⁹⁴ This idea of the Holy Enclave's function is supported by Walī Allāh's reference to the work of prophecy in the same section, where he writes that Moses was “a means for fulfilling His will” (Ḥujja, p. 68; Ar. p. 49). Since prophecy is a means of requital, this point offers additional support for the idea that the natural senses of good and bad, the work of the angels, divine laws, and prophecy can all be understood as ways of implementing the divine will, that is, of moving humanity towards the actualisation of the state of the four qualities. This is the same goal that good customs, on my reading of Walī Allāh, can promote through their “being considered part of the original nature”.

⁹⁵ Ḥujja, p. 68; Ar. p. 50.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ The opposite appears to be true, since the emphasis on a stable human nature existing beyond time, besides being in accordance with Qurʾanic claims, opens up a space for human custom.

⁹⁸ One might, however, claim that conceiving of the universe as fundamentally oriented to a divine purpose diminishes human freedom. Be that as it may, my goal here is to show that although Shāh Walī Allāh does posit God as having the conclusive argument, he does not thereby render time and place irrelevant. Instead, it is because God the teacher, the doctor, the creator knows best that he is able to tailor his pedagogy to capacity, place, and time.

⁹⁹ Ḥujja, p. xxi.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 264; Ar. p. 188. The notion of capacity (istiṭāʿa) is also highlighted at p. 48 (Ar. p. 35) and probably merits more attention than I can give it in this article.

¹⁰² See also S. Iqbal's discussion of Walī Allāh's “evolutionary and natural conception of the Sharīah” in Islamic Rationalism in the Subcontinent, p. 131.

¹⁰³ Ḥujja, p. 268; Ar. p. 191.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.; Ar. p. 192.

¹⁰⁵ Ḥujja, p. 268; Ar. p. 192.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Ḥujja, p. 269; Ar. p. 193.

¹⁰⁸ Allāh, Shāh Walī, Tafhīmāt al-Ilāhiyya (Hyderabad, 1967–70), i, p. 92Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁹ Jalbani, G. H. (trans.), Altaf al-Quds (London, 1982), p. 25 (ch. 4)Google Scholar. That the four entities that Jalbani translates as “virtues” are our four qualities is clear, as they are named in the next paragraph as purity, humility, generosity, and justice (ibid.).

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 98.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 100.

¹¹³ Jalbani, G. H. (trans.), The Lamahat and Sataʿat of Shah Waliullah (London, 1980), p. 49Google Scholar.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 50. The levels of providence are also discussed in lamḥa 27, which denies the possibility of contradiction between heavenly and divine orders; rather, there is always a flow between the two. However, “sometimes one thing happens to be more strongly necessary and the other happens to be its supporter but not necessary. At times, one thing happens to be more strongly demanding than the other. At such a time, the Changer inclines the happening towards the stronger one. The truth is that the causes reinforce one another, but He [the Changer] desires to give due regard to the right of every rightful one” (pp. 31–32).

¹¹⁵ Lamḥa 17, pp. 13–14.

¹¹⁶ This seems to refer to Mulla Sadrā's thought (on this connection see S. Iqbal, Islamic Rationalism in the Subcontinent, p. 78).

¹¹⁷ Lamḥa 28, p. 33.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Lamḥa 40, p. 47.

¹²¹ Lamḥa 59, p. 72.

¹²² Lamḥa 48, p. 57.

¹²³ Lamḥa 47, p. 56.

¹²⁴ Ibid., pp. 56–57.

¹²⁵ Baljon, Religion and Thought of Shāh Walī Dihlawī (1703–1762), p. 55.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 55, n. 65.

¹²⁷ We might note that the notion that there are simultaneously universals and particulars, a stable human form and different ways of implementing general qualities, is found also in Walī Allāh's Saṭaʿāt: “Man is ordered to do certain actions and on doing them depends the pleasure of God […] and he is prohibited from certain actions and on doing them depends His displeasure […]. God says ‘The word does not change before me.’ After that on certain occasions and times and with certain persons and people this same summary sciences becomes detailed in this manner, that people should discharge those universal affairs in such-and-such way. The reference to the first is given in the verse: ‘He has established the same religion for you as He enjoined on Noah,’ while the reference to the second is made in the verse, ‘to each among you We have prescribed a Law and an Open way’” (Jalbani, Lamahat and Sataʿat, saṭʿa 15, p. 88).

¹²⁸ For a discussion of Aristotle on habit, see Lockwood, Thornston C., ‘Habituation, habit, and character in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics’, in A History of Habit, (ed.) Sparrow, Tom and Hutchinson, Adam (Lanham, MD, 2013), pp. 19–36Google Scholar.

¹²⁹ Peters, F. J. H. (trans.), The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 5th ed. (London, 1893), VII. 10, 4Google Scholar.

¹³⁰ Freese (trans.), Rhetoric (Cambridge, MA, 1967), 1370a5. On the concept of second nature in Aristotle, see Kelly, Donald R., ‘“Second nature”: The idea of custom in European law, society, and culture’, in The Transmission of Culture in Early Modern Europe, (ed.) Grafton, Anthony and Blair, Ann (Philadelphia, 1990), pp. 131–172Google Scholar.

¹³¹ See, for example, Summa Theologica, I.II q. 49 (Benziger Bros., 1947); translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province available at https://aquinas101.thomisticinstitute.org/st-index (accessed 9 December 2020).

¹³² For an extensive discussion of this concept, see Rahman, Fazlur, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā (Albany, NY, 1975), pp. 94–100Google Scholar.

¹³³ al-Kutubi, E., Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology (London and New York, 2015), p. 48Google Scholar.

¹³⁴ al-Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology (italicized), p. 48.

¹³⁵ Mullā Ṣadrā, Asfār, iii, p. 84, quoted and translated in al-Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology, p. 63.

¹³⁶ See also Ibrahim Kalin's discussion of the relation of permanence and change in Mulla Sadra (Oxford, 2014): “The principal of substantial motion turns the world-order into a continuously changing structure based on patterns of essential change and continuity” (p. 113; see also pp. 111–112). Similarly, Rahman speaks of “change-in-unity” (Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 103).

¹³⁷ Al-Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology, p. 63.

¹³⁸ Even here, there is what Kalin calls a “gradation of existence” (Mulla Sadra, p. 94) in which man as a contingent being occupies a middle space between higher and lower beings. (On the order and dependency of creation, see also ibid., p. 103).

¹³⁹ p. 116.

¹⁴⁰ Rahman draws attention to the fact that Mullā Sadrā's discussion of existence and essence leaves unclear which of the two is permanent and which changes (Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 106–107). What seems certain, however, is that for Ṣadrā everything, including all forms, exists in God's mind at once (ibid., pp. 148–149). In fact, the forms are part of His being, rather than separate entities (ibid., pp. 160, 242–243). Thus, whereas everything outside of God is subject to constant change and movement, “God has an eternal, unalterable will and knowledge” (ibid., p. 181). Beyond God there is the possibility of change, of multiple options and possibilities; this mix, contrasting with a fully determinate picture, allows the development and progress of the material world and thus its eventual redemption (ibid., p. 182).