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Involuntariness in negligence actions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 August 2022
Abstract
In a negligence action against a defendant suffering from a mental disorder or an incapacity, a key but neglected question is what we mean by involuntariness. Although involuntariness is an accepted response, its relationship to mental or physical incapacity is poorly understood. The existing authorities offer only basic instruction about what is meant by involuntariness. Moreover, there is a suspicion that involuntariness undermines the objectivity of the standard of care. However, in this paper, it is argued that involuntariness can be better defined and a clearer understanding can be gained of how responsibility operates within tort law. By relating the case law and commentary on involuntariness to a choice theory of responsibility and arguing that this operates at a foundational level which is analytically prior to questions of breach, this paper tries to illuminate how tort law – like other areas of law – makes fundamental assumptions about the capacity of individuals to whom duties are expected to apply. None of this will necessarily increase the volume of claims or unsettle well-worn authorities but it does ensure both consistency and fairness and argues for a deeper appreciation of agency within how tort law characterises the applicability of duties.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Society of Legal Scholars
Footnotes
†
I am indebted to Professor James Chalmers, Dr Mat Campbell and particularly Dr Triantafyllos Gkouvas for their insightful comments on a previous iteration of this paper. I also benefited greatly from the suggestions made by two anonymous reviewers, for which I am very grateful. Lastly, my thanks are due to Dr John Macleod who suggested this topic to me many years ago and to Professor George Pavlakos for our continuing discussions about responsibility.
References
1 Terms such as ‘lunatic’, ‘lunacy’, ‘insanity’ and ‘insane’ are used throughout the case law, yet I have opted to use mental disorder or incapacity.
2 Carrier v Bonham & Another [2000] QDC 226; Fiala v MacDonald (2001) ABCA 169; Town of Port Hedland v Recce Williams Hodder (No 2) [2012] WASCA 212; Dunnage v Randall & UK Insurance Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 673; and Stephanie Tang Swan Leen v Tan Su San [2018] SGDC 218. For Scotland, see J Blackie ‘The interaction of crime and delict in Scotland’ in M Dyson (ed) Unravelling Tort and Crime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) p 374.
3 Fanning has considered this question, yet his approach investigated the cognitive side of mental disorders rather than the control side, which left the question of involuntariness relatively unexamined: Fanning, J ‘Mental capacity as a concept in negligence: against an insanity defence’ (2017) 24(5) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 694Google ScholarPubMed.
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22 Ibid.
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39 Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd, above n 2, at para 31 per Lord Scott.
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43 Dunnage, above n 2, at para 46 per Lady Justice Rafferty per 106.
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49 (1946) 4 DLR 721.
50 Buchanan, above n 47, at 3.
51 Dunnage, above n 2, para 148 per Lady Justice Arden.
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54 Carrier v Bonham (2001) QCA 234; Donaghy v Brennan (1900) 19 NZLR 289; Slattery v Haley [1923] 3 DLR 156; White v White [1949] 2 All ER 339; Adamson v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust (1957) 58 WALR 56; Roberts v Ramsbottom, above n 11; Beals v Hayward [1960] NZLR 131; and Williams v Williams [1964] AC 698.
55 MA Jones et al Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 23rd edn, 2020) para 5–62.
56 Eg see the Indian case of Ranganagulu vs Mullackal Devaswam AIR 1974 Ker 25, and also, recently confirmed by the High Court in Lewis-Ranwell v G4S and Others [2022] EWHC 1213 (QB) at paras 70–73 per Mr Justice Garnham.
57 In doing so, Cane's analysis is invaluable demonstrating that intention can have different meanings within the construction of different intentional torts: P Cane ‘Mens rea in tort law’ (2000) 20(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 533.
58 Ibid.
59 Dunnage, above n 2, para 109 per Lady Justice Rafferty; paras 123–126 per Lord Vos; paras 150–153 per Lady Justice Arden.
60 1943 SC 3.
61 Goudkamp, J ‘Insanity as a tort defence’ (2011) 31(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 727CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 731.
62 Dunnage, above n 2, at para 77 per Rafferty LJ.
63 Ibid, at para 78 per Rafferty LJ.
64 For a similar warning against conflation of different senses of subjectivity, albeit in relation to criminal law, see Hart, above n 36.
65 Dunnage, above n 2, para 125 per Vos LJ.
66 Of note is that Hart suggests you answer the breach question before the capacity question, but it is not entirely clear why. See Hart, above n 35.
67 Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (20th edn, 2020) para 25-038 and Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (23rd edn, 2020) para 5–62 ff.
68 Raz calls this the ‘Rational Functional Principle’ whereas Gardner refers to it as ‘basic responsibility’. See Raz, J ‘Responsibility and the negligence standard’ (2010) 30(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Gardner, above n 35. NB MacCormick calls it, ‘the capacity to act’ in MacCormick, above n 4, p 90.
69 Hart, above n 35, at 360.
70 MacCormick, above n 4, pp 89–91.
71 Goudkamp, above n 61, at 730.
72 Ibid.
73 J Goudkamp Tort Law Defences (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) pp 48–49.
74 Goudkamp, above n 61, at 730.
75 Goudkamp, above n 73, p 49.
76 cf S Deakin and Z Adams Markesinis & Deakin's Tort Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 8th edn, 2019) p 25.
77 Stevens, above n 17, p 110.
78 J Gardner Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) p 132.
79 MacCormick, above n 4, p 90.
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81 Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 132 ER 490; Knox v Mackinnon (1888) 15 R (HL) 83; McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199; Terre Haute First National Bank v Stewart (1983) 455 NE 2d 362; Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 69; Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1987] QB 730; Mullins v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304; and Andrew v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2019] CSOH 31.
82 Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (20th edn, 2020) para 6-005. In Dunnage, above n 2, Lord Justice Vos also read Waugh in this light (at para 126). Lady Justice Arden (at para 147) too stressed that Waugh was about the negligence of stepping into the lorry cab not about whether his actions were voluntary. Neill J also noted this in Roberts v Ramsbottom, above n 11, at 831.
83 See also Stevens, above n 17, p 110.
84 1963 SC 175; 1964 SC (HL) 102.
85 DM Walker The Law of Delict in Scotland (Edinburgh: W Greens, 2nd edn, 1981) p 90; J McGuire et al Behaviour, Crime and Legal Processes (Oxford: Wiley, 2000) p 33; J Thomson Delictual Liability (London: Bloomsbury, 2004) para 5.2; B Phillans Delict: Law & Policy (Edinburgh: W Greens, 5th edn, 2014) 3–26; and D Brodie Reparation: Liability for Delict (London: Bloomsbury, 2020) A3-035. cf MA Jones et al (eds) Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 22nd edn, 2017) para 5-64; WE Peel and J Goudkamp (eds) Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 19th edn, 2014) para 25-038; and also see S Deakin et al Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7th edn, 2013) p 205.
86 For both the Outer House decision of Lord Migdale and the Inner House decision (given by Lord Cameron) see NAS, CS258/1963/3410. See the pleadings included in the bundle under NAS, CS258/1963/3410. As noted, Waugh is sometimes misrepresented: some take it to have established a precedent relating to incapacity and negligence rather than being concerned with, as explained, the negligence of driving whilst experiencing symptoms of a heart attack. Ironically, the historic position of Scots law, captured by the institutional writers, bares a close resemblance to the interpretation of involuntariness presented here: James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair The Institutions of the Law of Scotland (1693, reprinted University Presses of Glasgow and Edinburgh 1981) 1.1.9; Andrew MacDowall, Lord Bankton An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights (1751–53, reprinted Stair Society 1993–95) 10.1.1; and John Erskine An Institute of the Law of Scotland (1773, reprinted Old Studies in Scots Law 2014) 4.4.1.
87 Fiala v MacDonald, above n 2, para 13 per Wittmann J.
88 Ibid, para 14 per Wittmann J.
89 Ibid, para 16 per Wittmann J.
90 Although it could be said that negligence is an example of responsibility for an involuntary act, this is to misunderstand the nature of negligence. There are various responses. See for example Hart, above n 36; Raz, above n 68; and Gardner, J ‘The negligence standard: political not metaphysical’ (2017) 80(1) The Modern Law Review 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
91 Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 20th edn, 2020) para 6-001ff; Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 13th edn, 2014) para 3-73 ff; and Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 23rd edn, 2020) para 5-62 ff.
92 For further discussion see Gardner, above n 90.
93 Roberts v Ramsbottom, above n 11, at 832 per Neill J; Dunnage, above n 2, at para 100 per Lady Justice Rafferty. Also see Fiala v MacDonald, above n 2.