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Discussion: Species Are Individuals—Or Are They?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Thomas A. C. Reydon
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Abstract

Recently Coleman and Wiley presented a new defense of the species-are-individuals thesis, based on an analysis of the use of binomial species names by biologists. Here I point out some problems in their defense and I argue that although in some domains of biological science species are best understood as individuals, Coleman and Wiley fail to establish that this is true for the whole of biology.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 1 , January 2003 , pp. 49 - 56
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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