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Fodor on Cognition, Modularity, and Adaptationism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Samir Okasha
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Abstract

This paper critically examines Jerry Fodor's latest attacks on evolutionary psychology. Contra Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, Fodor argues (i) there is no reason to think that human cognition is a Darwinian adaptation in the first place, and (ii) there is no valid inference from adaptationism about the mind to massive modularity. However, Fodor maintains (iii) that there is a valid inference in the converse direction, from modularity to adaptationism, but (iv) that the language module is an exception to the validity of this inference. I explore Fodor's arguments for each of these claims, and the interrelations between them. I argue that Fodor is incorrect on point (i), correct on point (ii), partially correct on point (iii), and incorrect on point (iv). Overall, his critique fails to show that adopting a broadly Darwinian approach to cognition is intellectually indefensible.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 1 , January 2003 , pp. 68 - 88
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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