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Through the Fractured Looking Glass

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Sandra D. Mitchell
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Abstract

I argue that diversity and pluralism are valuable not just for science but for philosophy of science. Given the partiality and perspectivism of representation, pluralism preserving integration can increase accuracy. Perspectivism is often supported by appeal to visual representation. I draw further insights from multimodel sensory integration for understanding experiment-based predictions of protein structure. The epistemic lessons learned from the scientific case also apply to philosophy of science itself. Finally, I suggest that a critical, nuanced philosophical view of legitimate sources of pluralism in science has an important role to play in public discourse.

Type
Presidential Address
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 87 , Issue 5: PSA 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II Symposia Papers , December 2020 , pp. 771 - 792
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

This article is a revised version of the presidential address I delivered at the PSA 2018 biennial meeting in Seattle, Washington. The presented version can be viewed at https://spark.adobe.com/page/AiXfAUmLTaEbB/. It takes the contributions of many to ensure a successful meeting and an effective organization. I want to thank PSA 2018 program chairs Kevin Elliott and Doreen Fraser and the members of the PSA Governing Board, PSA committees, and PSA members for their commitment and skill at navigating the complexities and coordination problems involved. I especially want to thank our extraordinary executive director, Jessica Pfeifer, for her wise and inspired leadership.

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