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William James on Time Perception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Gerald E. Myers
Gerald E. Myers*
Affiliation:
City University of New York
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Extract

James argued that time is a sensation, and the main point of this paper is to deny that claim. The concept of the specious present is explained, indicating how it clarifies the concept of “the present moment.” But neither it nor an argument used by Mach and James show time to be a sensation. The analysis presented here requires distinguishing concepts of sensation from concepts of temporal relations. James' view is really a theory that time-as-duration is sensed. But this assumes that the description of time as sensed is also a description of time as an objective property of independent events. This is nowhere established, and making it plausible is a recurrent problem for philosophies like neutral monism and radical empiricism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 38 , Issue 3 , September 1971 , pp. 353 - 360
Copyright
Copyright © 1971 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

[1] Boring, E. G., Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology. New York; Appleton—Century, Crofts, 1942.Google Scholar
[2] James, W., The Principles of Psychology, vol. I. New York; Henry Holt & Co., 1890.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] James, W., The Principles of Psychology, vol. II. New York; Henry Holt & Co., 1890.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4] James, W., Psychology (Briefer Course), New York; Henry Holt & Co., 1892.CrossRefGoogle Scholar