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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
The article explores the issue of economic life within the theoretical tradition of the common good. To clarify the implications of the theory of the common good for economics, the economic philosophy of Yves R. Simon is presented. After clarifying the meaning of Simon's conception of the common good, the implications of the common good for Simon's economic thought are explored. It is argued that, for Simon, the economic system is a common good that undergirds the traditional Thomistic imperative that the use of goods be common. Some of the difficulties which Simon's thought has for market economics are then analyzed, and Simon's thought is used to suggest solutions. In this context, the roles of authority and virtue (particularly prudence) are treated.
The authors would like to thank Anthony Simon, Director of the Yves R. Simon Institute, Ralph Nelson, Terry Hall, Nelson Dometrius, Mark Somma, Charles Fox, Siegrun Fox, Evan Ringquist and three anonymous reviewers for helpful criticisms of earlier drafts of this article.
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2. Wilber, Charles K., “Argument that Pope ‘Baptized’ Capitalism Holds No Water,” National Catholic Reporter, 24 05 1991, p. 10.Google Scholar In this article, we will not be addressing the debates about Catholic social teaching specifically. Instead, we will focus on some of the theoretical issues involved in Yves R. Simon's treatment of authority, the common good and economic justice. The authors intend to bring Simon's insights to bear upon the debates over Catholic social teaching in a subsequent article.
3. Simon, Yves R., A General Theory of Authority, with introduction by Kuic, Vukan (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), p. 29.Google Scholar
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9. Simon, , The Tradition of Natural Law (New York: Fordham University Press 1965), p. 70.Google Scholar Simon's distinction between common and individual goods is in contrast to the notion of mutual benefit as understood by public choice theory. The latter theory, as far as we understand it, argues that people come together in politics as they do in the economic marketplace; in short, people come together in politics to pursue self-interest. This seems to imply that only particular, private goods are involved. Therefore, it seems to us that public choice theory reduces the political community to a partnership, contrary to Simon's position.
10. The following paragraphs draw on Cochran, Clarke E., “Yves R. Simon and The Common Good': A Note on the Concept,” Ethics 88 (1978): 236–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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15. ST-II q.91, a.3.
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23. ST II-II a. 2, 7.
24. It is certainly true that the common use principle is more widely recognized than the conclusion that the economic system is a common good; in this sense, the principle of common use is prior. However, it seems to us that a good argument can be made for the position that common use, philosophically speaking, is derivative in the manner suggested here.
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27. Simon's concern to consider needs when discussing distributive justice is not to be understood to mean that needs alone are relevant. In The Definition of Moral Virtue (Fordham University Press, 1986)Google Scholar, Simon states that distribution is also according to merit. While we are not sure exactly how Simon conceives of merit, here it seems fair to hypothesize, first of all, that Simon would understand merit as related to the common good. In other words, more merit would accrue to those who contribute more to the common good. Secondly, we doubt that Simon's understanding of merit would correspond to any purely market-based determination of merit, which would permit those who contribute little to the common good to extract a great deal of the common wealth.
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29. Simon, Yves R., “Beyond the Crisis of Liberalism,” in Essays in Thomism, ed. Brennan, Robert Edward (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942), p. 277.Google Scholar Of course, “corporative” in Simon's sense is radically different from fascist corporate concepts.
30. Simon, , Community of the Free, trans. Trask, Willard (New Yorkand London: University Press of America, 1984), p. 164.Google Scholar Emphasis ours.
31. For fuller explication of Simon's concept of authority, see Cochran, , “Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves R. Simon and Michael Polanyi,” American Political Science Review 71 (1977): 546–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
32. While antitrust laws do regulate particular interests in order to contribute to the common good, the rationale is not the principle of common use, but merely the desire to prevent unfair competition. Neither do we see in the approximately 1.5% of the GNP spent on needs-based programs evidence that the principle of common use is accepted in the United States. Moreover, the trend in recent years has clearly been away from even the limited commitment to needs-based programs, the most lamentable recent example of which was the cancellation of General Assistance for thousands of people in Michigan and other states which, at the time of this writing, has served only to increase homelessness.
33. Ryan, John, “Economic Philosophy of Saint Thomas,” in Brennan, , Essays in Thomism, pp. 248–49.Google Scholar
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35. For a more extended discussion of the issue of economic organization in Simon's thought, see Nelson, Ralph, “Freedom and Economic Organization in a Democracy,” in Freedom in The Modern World, ed. Torre, Michael (Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 141–53.Google Scholar
36. Kuic, , “Introduction” to Work, Society, and Culture, p. xv.Google Scholar
37. Simon, , Practical Knowledge (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991) p. 61.Google Scholar
38. Simon, , Tradition of Natural Law, p. 127.Google Scholar
39. On modern substitutes for virtue, see Simon, , Definition of Moral Virtue, pp. 1–15.Google Scholar Since, for Simon, virtue is not a science, it seems fair to conclude that he would reject any purely formulaic approach to economic policy. This would extend to the rejection of a natural law approach that would attempt, on the basis of reasoning from principles however sound, to bypass consideration of all the contingencies involved in the real world of politics.
