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A SIMPLE APPROACH TOWARDS RECAPTURING CONSISTENT THEORIES IN PARACONSISTENT SETTINGS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 August 2013

JC BEALL
JC BEALL*
Affiliation:
University of Connecticut and Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT STORRS, CT 06268
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Abstract

I believe that, for reasons elaborated elsewhere (Beall, 2009; Priest, 2006a, 2006b), the logic LP (Asenjo, 1966; Asenjo & Tamburino, 1975; Priest, 1979) is roughly right as far as logic goes.1 But logic cannot go everywhere; we need to provide nonlogical axioms to specify our (axiomatic) theories. This is uncontroversial, but it has also been the source of discomfort for LP-based theorists, particularly with respect to true mathematical theories which we take to be consistent. My example, throughout, is arithmetic; but the more general case is also considered.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 6 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 755 - 764
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2013 

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