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Can We Measure the Badness of Death for the Person who Dies?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 November 2021

Thomas Schramme
Thomas Schramme*
Affiliation:
University of Liverpool
*
t.schramme@liverpool.ac.uk
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Abstract

I aim to show that the common idea according to which we can assess how bad death is for the person who dies relies on numerous dubious premises. These premises are intuitive from the point of view of dominant views regarding the badness of death. However, unless these premises have been thoroughly justified, we cannot measure the badness of death for the person who dies. In this paper, I will make explicit assumptions that pertain to the alleged level of badness of death. The most important assumption I will address is the assignment of a quantitative value of zero to death, which leads to the conclusion that there are lives not worth living for the affected person. Such a view interprets the idea of a live worth living in quantitative terms. It is in conflict with actual evaluations of relevant people of their lives.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 90: Death and Meaning , October 2021 , pp. 253 - 276
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2021

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