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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2009
Why should metaphors pose a problem for the philosopher of religion? Most forms of discourse involve some use of metaphor: if I describe Fred as ‘a tower of strength’ most people know what I mean and there can be no objection to my doing it. Of course, metaphor in general generates certain philosophical problems which have been taken up in the philosophy of art and which continue to generate controversy. For example, how does one identify a metaphor, and how does it differ from a literal assertion? Is a metaphor a disguised comparison, logically reducible to simile? Can metaphors be true and false, or can one only describe them as ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’?
1 Wittgenstein, L., Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Barrett, Cyril (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970), p. 71.Google Scholar
2 The Vimalakirti Nirdesa Sutra; transl. & ed. Luk, Charles (Berkeley & London: Shambhala, 1972).Google Scholar
3 See, e.g. Beardsley, Monroe C., Aesthetics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981)Google Scholar; Beardsley, M. C., The Metaphorical Twist: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1962, Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 293–307Google Scholar; Black, Max, Metaphor: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1954, Vol. 55, PP. 273–294.Google Scholar
4 Palmer, Humphrey, Analogy (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 97ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5 The Koran: sura 17: 111.
6 Genesis 18.25.
7 See, e.g. Psalm 1.
8 Psalm 19.
9 Romans 2.14f.
10 Psalm 23.1.
11 Psalm 91.2.
12 John 6.35.
13 John 8.12.
