National survey data demonstrate that support of the federal government decreased substantially between 1964 and 1970. Policy preference, a lack of perceived difference between the parties, and policy dissatisfaction were hypothesized as correlates of trust and alternative explanations of this decrease. Analysis revealed that the increased distrust in government, or cynicism, was associated with reactions to the issues of racial integration and U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. A curvilinear relationship was found between policy preference on these and other contemporary social issues and political cynicism. The minority favoring centrist policies was more likely to trust the government than the large proportion who preferred noncentrist policy alternatives. This complex relationship between trust and policy preference is explained by dissatisfaction with the policies of both political parties. The dissatisfied noncentrists formed highly polarized and distinct types: “cynics of the left,” who preferred policies providing social change, and “cynics of the right,” who favored policies of social control.

“In God We Trust: Everyone Else Pays Cash.” America's political leaders should not pretend to godliness; no one will be fooled. According to prestigious biennial national surveys, the government's credit rating has steadily declined as a result of a disastrous foreign investment and growing consumer resistance to its “line” of products. Neither the country's present management nor its most prominent rivals inspire public confidence. How, then, can the political system rebuild its depleted reserves of political trust, the basis of future growth and stability? Will “one good season,” better advertising, new blood in the boardroom or product innovation be sufficient? Or is a drastic restructuring of the regime's organization and operating procedures the only alternative to liquidation?

Arthur Miller's article, “Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964–70” makes an important contribution to our understanding of the sharp increase in political cynicism among the American public. Miller evokes the language of the corporation balance-sheet and the imagery of Executive Suite by suggesting that the cumulative outcome of exchanges between political authorities on the one hand and citizens on the other determines the level of public trust in government. Political elites “produce” policies; in exchange, they receive trust from citizens satisfied with these policies and cynicism from those who are disappointed. Since Miller defines both policy satisfaction and political trust in attitudinal terms, the exchange transactions he records are purely psychological in nature. Operationally, dissatisfied respondents are those whose own policy preferences are discrepant with their perceptions of the positions advocated by the party controlling the presidency.

In 1958 only 22 per cent of the total population felt that they could not “trust the government in Washington to do what is right” all or most of the time. By the fall of 1972 that figure had climbed to 45 per cent. Furthermore, the percentage of eligible voters participating in the 1972 presidential election was the lowest it has been since 1948; crises and scandals have continually plagued the government since the Watergate revelations; and the economic conditions of the country have provoked widespread uncertainty and anxiety among the populace. There is good reason, then, for the intense current interest in attitudes of political disaffection and alienation.

Present U.S. conditions demonstrate that political alienation is a phenomenon of fundamental significance in political processes. Feelings of political cynicism and alienation may substantially diminish the willingness of citizens to participate in politics or to support programs directed at resolving the social problems that stimulate discontent. Attitudes of political alienation have likewise been related to public demands for radical political reforms during trying periods of social or economic discontent. Alienation and non-participation, however, go beyond just questions of voluntary compliance with policies or the possibilities for radical change; they strike at a very basic democratic norm. Democratic theory emphasizes voluntary consent as the basis of political obligation and legitimacy. Democratic government assumes—indeed, requires—widespread participation, political equality, the accountability of leaders and protection of the individual citizen's constitutional guarantees. The full attainment of these values is only possible when the relationship between the leaders and the public is based on mutual understanding and reciprocal trust rather than on the use of coercive and arbitrary authority.

Philip E. Converse has challenged the findings of a 1965 article, “The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe,” and other work by Burnham. Converse asserts that most of the very high voter participation which occurred before 1900 can be explained by a combination of electoral corruption, the absence of personal-registration requirements and other “undramatic” factors, and thus that the anomalies which Burnham reported are largely spurious. Issues of major importance for social-science explanation are joined. The present article attempts to demonstrate that intervening structural variables cannot come close to explaining all the post-1900 decline in voting participation and that the genuine existence of universal nineteenth-century rural corruption has yet to be demonstrated. These efforts to explain away anomaly are held to be unpersuasive. The weight of evidence supports the objective reality of the phenomena originally reported. This in turn means that more adequate conceptualizations are needed to integrate empirical findings than those which have hitherto dominated the voting-behavior research community.

I am very grateful to Dean Burnham for his labor in checking out a number of “plausible rival hypotheses” that I proposed some years ago might account for the bundle of changes in American voting statistics he had first described in his seminal 1965 paper. I had pointed out these possibilities with some vigor, since if they could be shown to have empirical merit, they would seem to put a rather different light on those historical changes, relative to the interpretations Burnham originally provided.

I now read the current paper as indicating that for the areas covered, changes in registration practices do appear to have affected turnout adversely, following one of our original rival hypotheses. It also suggests, however, that this registration change does not begin to account for all of the decline in turnout that occurred around 1900, particularly in states like Pennsylvania. It goes on to imply that some other familiar factors affecting turnout, such as party competition, also contributed to that change. In effect, the turnout decline not accounted for by structural change seems greatest where the realignment of 1896 moved states from competitive to rather noncompetitive status (the more frequent case); but states moved by the same events from noncompetitive into competitive status, like Missouri and, in fact, numerous other upper midwestern states, do not show the same pattern as Pennsylvania.

All this is well and good, particularly as Burnham in his penultimate paragraph sets aside the 1965 conspiratorial interpretation of the change that had originally prompted our own brief inquiries as to probable causes.

In the last two decades the empirical approach to political science has been heavily preoccupied with the study of contemporary voting behavior. Few have been sufficiently curious about or motivated by the mysteries of our electoral past to sustain a concentrated research effort in this direction. Yet, as V. O. Key often noted, a knowledge of our electoral past provides us with a better understanding of our electoral present, with how our current system has evolved and changed over time. Only recently have scholars begun to heed the call of Key and new historians like Lee Benson and Samuel P. Hays for an empirical analysis of historical voting behavior. The initial research efforts, although often crude and unsystematic in method, have prompted interesting speculation as to “divergences” in our thinking from what previously had been assumed about past electorates. They have discovered “anomalies” in several different contexts—in earlier unconfirmed theories of voting behavior, in data-oriented contemporary work on the American voter, and even among the various historical research efforts themselves. While the presence of such anomalies characterizes the first stages of any research effort in virgin territory, unraveling the apparent inconsistencies must always be part of the process of a more fully developed cumulative research program. What is the task of the moment is to examine these anomalies in light of the theories and research of Professors Burnham, Converse, and myself—the principal elements in this continuing dialogue about the proper interpretation of our electoral past.

Professors Converse and Rusk have replied to my present paper in two different ways: the former by a short, sharp rejoinder and the latter by a longer and more diffuse article. For space reasons alone, my commentary on their remarks must be concise; and while there is much which I should like to discuss further, there comes a time when the case must be sent to the jury.

It is best, I think, to confine most of my comments on Philip Converse's Note to the last half of it. We begin with The American Voter and the SRC “paradigm” as I see them. Having also reread this book, I will go even further in my praise of it than Converse has. It is not only a meticulous piece of scholarship; it is also truly a classic, a seminal work which justly gives permanent professional honor to those who wrote it. A seminal work is one which not only contributes to knowledge but permanently reorganizes the shape of a scholarly field. This can be done only by providing a conceptual framework for the myriad nonseminal but essential scholarly activities which take place in that field thereafter. As a meticulous piece of work, The American Voter was indeed qualified and judicious in its statements and generalizations. It also had at least as much sensitivity to the time dimension as could be expected for 1960.

The central problem of the general search for explanations of political change has been the lack of adequate explanations of the relationship between social change and political change. This research proposes and tests a six-variable causal model of the process of social change and political mobilization in the United States during the period 1870 to 1960. The variables used are based on previous theoretical efforts which have indicated that the process of social and political change is a syndrome. From these previous efforts a new model is synthesized. The model is found to operate as proposed during the period 1870 to 1910, and a simplified version in four variables is identified for the period 1920 to 1960.

One of the central questions explored by this research is the degree to which the pattern of social change alters as the process of change proceeds through time. The transition in the United States is explained by reference to the threshold effect of two social infrastructures—urbanization and government activity in education.

In light of the identification of the model, an attempt is then made at revising certain aspects of modernization theory.

This article proposes an authority based conception of the phenomenon of institutionalization. Whereas most social science writing on the subject focuses either upon the organization's internal structural integration (such criteria as well-boundedness, universalism, complexity, and coherence often are employed) or upon its ability to cope with environmental challenges (the concepts of adaptability and autonomy have been suggested), I propose that an organization's offensive capabilities vis à vis environmental actors be viewed as a measurement of its institutionalization.

Principally based upon fieldwork in New Zealand bolstered by additional research in Scandinavia, Britain, and Hawaii, this study focuses upon the institutionalization of the ombudsman—an increasingly popular bureaucratic control mechanism. A sociometric analysis of ombudsman-bureaucratic interaction is undertaken, and four questions are investigated: How extensive is the interaction? How consequential is the threat posed by complaints? What demands does the ombudsman make? How cooperative is the agency in responding? The investigation provides answers which are indicative of the ombudsman's successful institutionalization. That is, the office performs its mission and has established itself with the environmental actors as an authority figure.

In “Abstract Right,” the first part of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel criticizes the usual content and formulations of liberal theories of rights. In terms of content, Hegel argues that the subject of rights is only a narrow abstraction from the full human being; that he has limited self-determination and limited political freedom; and that, when he acts on his rights, he produces terror and destruction. In terms of formulations, Hegel argues that the pervasiveness of contract relations is inaccurate and undesirable; that the state cannot be derived from the natural man's alienating his right to punish; and that it is inaccurate to conceptualize civil society as only limiting natural man's freedoms. By transforming natural to abstract rights, Hegel retains much of the substance of rights, while concurrently preparing for the later sections of his text which try to overcome the inadequacies of a political theory based only on rights.

This study focuses on A. Lawrence Lowell's classic thesis that a parliamentary democracy must possess a majority party system if durable cabinets are to exist. The argument of this study is that majority party government is not essential to cabinet durability. Rather, in line with the British analyst W. L. Middleton as well as more contemporary game-theoreticians, the critical factor is held to be the coalitional status of the cabinet: (1) cabinets of minimum winning status should be durable; as cabinets depart from minimum winning status, cabinet durability decreases; (2) the coalitional status of the cabinet that forms is partially a product of party system fractionalization, instability, and polarization. Hypotheses derived from the theory are tested with data drawn from 17 Western parliamentary democracies, from 1918 to 1940 and from 1945 to 1970. The findings generally support the theory. A key to durable government is the minimum winning status of the cabinet. Minimum winning cabinets are possible in multiparty and majority party systems.

The purpose of this paper is to reformulate the linkage between interparty competition and welfare policies in the American states. Specifically, it is hypothesized that this linkage should be substantially greater among states with strong, effective legislatures than among states with weak, ineffective legislative systems. When legislative effectiveness was defined in terms of professionalism and welfare effort was assessed by seven specific measures, it was found that the link between party competition and welfare expenditures was indeed stronger among states with effective, as opposed to ineffective, legislative systems. Further, when controls were introduced for several socioeconomic factors, the linkage continued to be stronger among states with professional legislatures. It is concluded, consequently, that the influence of party competition on state welfare policies is mediated by the differential effectiveness of state legislatures.

This paper investigates the proposition that rapid urbanization produces significant changes in the kinds, volume, and intensity of demand making aimed at local and national governments, leading to political system “overload” and pressure for major shifts in resource allocation. Drawing upon data gathered among low-income migrants to Mexico City and other Latin American cities, the paper analyzes the process through which objective needs are converted into demands upon government. The findings indicate that there are often major lags in the process of demand creation among cityward migrants, and that many kinds of felt needs are viewed by migrants as needs to be satisfied primarily through individual rather than governmental action.

Data are presented on the incidence of demand making among the migrant population and the substantive nature of the demands they make upon government. Strategies used in attempting to influence government decisions are described, and the attitudes and perceptions underlying the migrant's preference among alternative strategies are analyzed. The long-term propensity of migrants and their offspring to engage in demand making with regard to broad social and economic issues rather than individual or community-related needs is assessed.

Philippine data are presented which indicate that a contradiction exists between changes induced partly through capital accumulation by the indigenous elite and foreign investment, and both increased political factionalism and declining voting participation. While national elites become more powerful through capital accumulation, local political machines confront structural changes weakening their power. More specialized patron-client structures diminish local elites' ability both to deliver votes to national patrons and to stimulate electoral participation. Growth of the middle class in a stagnant economy increases competition for lucrative local political office Factions proliferate and with the increased concentration of private income, become more dependent on national patronage resources. Unable to meet rising patronage demands, the government resorts to extensive deficit spending which stimulates inflation and further undermines economic growth. The national elite's economic activities thus undermines its authority base as the state becomes increasingly less able to provide security to individuals dislocated by changes generating profit for the elite.

This paper is addressed to three tasks and the analysis operates at three levels. First, there is an attempt to specify an analytic approach to Marxist-Leninist sociopolitical systems that integrates regime and sociocultural units. This approach rests on a structural conception of political culture, a conception that stresses the informal adaptive quality of political culture, and that includes behavioral as well as attitudinal patterns. The second task consists of analyzing the paradoxical character of development in Soviet-type systems; development that simultaneously reinforces and undermines traditional-peasant political cultures at the community, regime, and elite levels. Finally, this pattern of development is examined in the context of a single Soviet-type regime and society, the Romanian.

This paper compares the research on the determinants of domestic policy outcomes, primarily in American state governments, with similar research in the area of foreign policy. Using seven foreign policy measures, it then tests a hypothesis based on Cutright's cross-national analysis of social insurance programs, that political representativeness is more important in accounting for policy outcomes among developed than among undeveloped nations. Finally, it suggests what implications the reported findings may have on empirical democratic theory.

Three hypotheses suggesting why senators might adopt or change positions on such an issue as the ABM are compared. The empirical analysis clearly substantiates the contention that position reflects ideology, not party commitment or potential state economic benefits. Furthermore, the influence of ideology is seen to have grown more apparent each year the issue was contested in the Senate. Virtually all the senators who changed position between 1968 and 1970 had initial positions that did not accord with their ideology, and they moved so as to bring them in accord. Virtually all those senators whose initial position was in accord with their ideology maintained that position.

Need for achievement and strategic predispositions among political party elites are hypothesized to have an important impact on the success parties enjoy in elections and in coalitions. More specifically, this study develops and tests a model which suggests that parties whose leaders have high need for achievement and are predisposed to pursue a mixed competitive/cooperative strategy are more likely to do well in elections and in coalitions than are parties whose leaders are low in need for achievement and oriented to either cooperative or competitive strategies.

When the Indian political party system between 1967 and 1971 is used as the data base, the success or failure of political parties is correctly predicted by need for achievement for thirteen out of fourteen variables. By means of multiple regression analysis, as much as seventy-two per cent of the variance in the electoral success of Indian parties is explained by the model.

This essay analyses the explanatory power of Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky's theory of budgetary incrementalism. By means of sensitivity testing, it demonstrates that inferences to “gaming” or strategic explanations of budgetary incrementalism are not warranted on the basis of correlational analysis.

To explain budgetary incrementalism more satisfactorily, recourse is made to concepts and variables explicit in the vocabulary of the budget process participants. When mandatory requests are distinguished from programmatic requests, the differential treatment of the two by Congress is observed to allow good explanation of budgetary relations. In particular, the inexorable but small mandatory request, which is almost automatically granted, is adequate by itself to explain why requests always increase and why one year's appropriation surpasses the previous one.

While many scholars have recognized that decentralization encourages American party organizations to tailor activities to the local environment, few have studied systematically the relationships between that environment and party behavior. This study examines the impact of certain political and demographic county characteristics on the activities of a national sample of county party organizations in 1964. Three dimensions of party behavior—organization, mobilization, and persuasion—are utilized as dependent variables. The relationships between the environment and these dimensions of party behavior in the North support a revised “machine theory” of environment and party: organizational effort does not vary with environmental conditions, while mobilization and persuasion activities are opposites in their relationships with the concentration of parochially-oriented voters. Additionally, the division of partisan strength influences party activity: parties perform their “natural” activities well where they have strong support and the other party's “natural” activities well under competitive conditions. Few significant relationships are found in the South, but their similarity in direction to those in the North suggests that the normal relationships may have been attenuated by circumstances unique to that region, particularly one-partyism and decades of “whites only” politics.