Although British sentiment for several decades had been steadily growing more imperialistic, it was not until the outbreak of the war that the process was completed, and with dramatic suddenness. The “Little Englanders,” already dwindling in numbers, were confounded by the immediate and practical manifestations of colonial loyalty of which England was glad to avail herself. The murmurings of the anti-imperialist ceased in the face of such expressions of empire good-will as that contained in the message of the Canadian ministry to the British government on August 2, 1914. “If unhappily war should ensue,” ran the message, “the Canadian people will be united in a common resolve to put forth every effort and to make every sacrifice necessary to insure the integrity and to maintain the honor of our Empire.”

However, notwithstanding the impetus given by the war to the doctrines of imperialism and militarism, the believer in the principles of internationalism cannot be denied a crumb of comfort from the same event. He clings to the hope that the worldwide war, through its very enormity, will actually serve to preach peace more effectively than any pacifist can possibly do, and that international arbitration and simultaneous suppression of armaments among civilized peoples may therefore be hastened.

When the British parliament passed a vote extending the life of the existing house of commons, whose duration would otherwise have terminated in January, 1916, their action attracted little attention and aroused but slight opposition. The forces of the empire, engaged in a desperate war, must not be dissipated by an appeal to the people, with the consequent evils of electioneering. Yet to the student of politics this action has a profound interest. One of the cardinal features of the legislation of 1911 had been the quinquennial duration of parliament—a provision which, as the debates show, was essential to the whole compromise. Yet in an unforeseen crisis, the legislature by its own resolution could provide an extension of its life, and thus postpone the date of accountability to the people. No political measure could furnish so striking a test of the flexibility of the British system, its adaptibility to emergencies, and its reliance upon a practically omnipotent legislature.

In this paper we shall trace the principal statutes which limit the parliamentary term and the intervals between parliamentary sessions. There are five such laws, each bearing a date full of significance in English constitutional history. The first three statutes, passed in 1641, 1664, and 1694, were triennial acts, though in different senses; the fourth statute, passed in 1716, was the familiar septennial act under which parliaments were so long regulated; the last permanent legislation on the subject was the parliament act of 1911 fixing a five-year maximum duration, and it still remains law though temporarily suspended in 1916.

That final legislative authority in this country is lodged in the letter of a constitution that is amended with the greatest difficulty, and with a supreme court which is entirely independent of electoral control has become a commonplace of political discussion.

To quote Professor Goodnow: “Acts of congress and of state legislatures are declared to be unconstitutional ‥‥ because they cannot be made to conform to a conception of the organization and powers of government which we have inherited from the eighteenth century;” and Dr. Blaine F. Moore: “If we may judge from the decisions based on the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment and applying to the States, the court has it in its power to make the similar clause in the fifth amendment cover practically all federal legislation dealing with new problems concerning which there are few or no precedents. If the court does make this entirely possible extension of its power, then the legislation dealing with the more recent and pressing questions is under the control of the popularly inaccessible justices of the supreme court.”

Both these quotations are from studies published before the adoption of the sixteenth and seventeenth amendments, but they are only a little less true now than then, as an analysis of the history of those amendments will show.

The development of government on American soil presents, as one of its features, the embodiment in its fundamental law of provisions for its modification. The early colonial charters kept alive the fiction that a form of government once established was supposed by its creators to last forever. Only the slow change of custom or the violence of a revolution could modify or destroy such a system of government, except, as in the case of the charters granted by the crown, a modification came as a consequence of the exercise of the royal prerogative.

In the Frame of Government drawn up by Penn and his colonists in 1683, appeared an amending provision for the first time in the history of written constitutions; and while all subsequent Pennsylvania charters contained a similar provision, the other colonial charters presented no method whatever for their alteration. Prior to the drafting of the Constitution of the United States, however, a method of amendment was embodied in the state constitutions of Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Georgia, Vermont, South Carolina, and also in the Articles of Confederation.

Since the United States has theoretically no police power, and since the federal Constitution is essentially a political document, the national judiciary must in the main use political clauses of the organic law as the basis for nullifying statutes. While clauses of this nature are thus frequently made to serve as a basis for the decisions, the great majority of statutes nullified by the United States supreme court have pertained in fact to economic and social rather than political matters. While the court has nullified in all about thirty-three federal statutes, the scope of this discussion will permit of a summary only of the more important statutes which have directly affected political questions.

The political principle of separation of powers has afforded the basis for the nullification of seven federal statutes. All these decisions have, however, affected the power and jurisdiction of the court itself; and in every jurisdictional case, with but one unimportant exception, the court has refused to accept authority which congress attempted to bestow upon it.

While the court has thus almost uniformly limited its authority in the jurisdictional cases, in one instance the principle promulgated was most momentous—the one laid down in Marbury vs. Madison.

The purpose of the direct primary, in so far as its purpose can be formulated in general terms, was to realize within the party organization, and especially in the process of nomination, accepted principles of democratic control. It is a commonplace, however, that political machinery must in the long run be judged not by its theoretical democracy but by its practical results. In a study of direct nominations, then, it appears most fruitful to examine the system in its operation rather than in its theory, and, whenever possible, to compare its working with that of the system which it supplanted.

Since 1901 the Michigan legislature has passed more than thirty acts, original and amendatory, relating to the nominating machinery. From 1901 to 1905 legislation applied to selected counties, cities, and districts; from 1905 to 1909 it was both local and general but optional with the parties and with the localities; since 1909 it has been general and mandatory. On the whole it has been halting, half-hearted, opportunistic, and unscientific, and is still far from perfection. At the present time all state officials elected in the spring, including judges of the supreme court and regents of the university, all elective state administrative officers except governor and lieutenant-governor, and all township and village officers are still nominated by the old method, a method which is also retained for the selection of delegates to state and national conventions and in a modified form for the drafting of party platforms.