“To have mastered ‘theory’ and ‘method’ is to have become a conscious thinker, a man at work and aware of the assumptions and implications of whatever he is about. To be mastered by ‘method’ or ‘theory’ is simply to be kept from working.” The sentence applies nicely to the present plight of political science. The profession as a whole oscillates between two unsound extremes. At the one end a large majority of political scientists qualify as pure and simple unconscious thinkers. At the other end a sophisticated minority qualify as overconscious thinkers, in the sense that their standards of method and theory are drawn from the physical, “paradigmatic” sciences.

The wide gap between the unconscious and the overconscious thinker is concealed by the growing sophistication of statistical and research techniques. Most of the literature introduced by the title “Methods” (in the social, behavioral or political sciences) actually deals with survey techniques and social statistics, and has little if anything to share with the crucial concern of “methodology,” which is a concern with the logical structure and procedure of scientific enquiry. In a very crucial sense there is no methodology without logos, without thinking about thinking. And if a firm distinction is drawn—as it should be—between methodology and technique, the latter is no substitute for the former. One may be a wonderful researcher and manipulator of data, and yet remain an unconscious thinker.

Why do some men embrace society's values while others reject them? Is conformity a general trait, more uniformly manifested by some people than by others? What social or psychological forces lie behind the tendency to conform or deviate?

Although these questions obviously have significance for the conduct of political life, they have received far less attention from political scientists than from scholars in other disciplines such as psychology and sociology. In view of current challenges to the legitimacy of existing political institutions, the mounting debate over the acceptable limits of protest, and the growing disdain for democratic decision-processes shown by some segments of the population, the need for political scientists to understand the nature and sources of conformity and deviation has become, if anything, more urgent. We hope, in the present paper, to explore the psychological—and to some extent the social and political—meaning of conformity and deviation as reflected in citizen responses to political beliefs. To that end we shall review briefly the present state of psychological theory and research on conformity behavior; suggest, in light of our own research findings, some ways in which current psychological explanations might be modified and extended to account for conformity and deviation within the mass public; and furnish data that might help to explain why individuals who have different personality characteristics and who occupy different roles in the society are likely to accept or reject political norms.

The basic institutions of modern democracy were established at a very early stage in the transformation that societies have undergone since feudalism. In their establishment, forms that had developed even before feudalism, in Greece and Rome, were copied. Thus the institutions are very old ones indeed.

When the age of these political institutions is compared to that of economic institutions, the contrast is sharp and striking. As society has become more and more rationalized, economic transactions have mirrored this ever-increasing rationality, with increasing technical sophistication, and increasing abstraction. The best indicator of this is in the role of money. From barter economies to modern economies in which bank-deposit money and credit account for most transactions, the development of economic mechanisms for effecting exchange has been very great. Yet the development of political institutions, and of mechanisms for effective political authority, has been far less great.

In this paper, I want to explore the similarities and differences between political power and the embodiment of economic power or value, that is, money. A careful examination of the differences will suggest which of the differences are intrinsic to the differing natures of economic and political transactions, and which are accidental. This will then allow raising questions about what kinds of innovations in political institutions might be feasible, and might allow these institutions to develop more compatibility with the technical and economic changes that occur with such rapidity in modern society.

“Suit yourself.”

—American colloquialism

Currently fashionable modes of political analysis deserve acclaim today for at least two reasons: they provide opportunities for participating in a pleasurable if strenuous activity (regardless of the value of the end results) and they effectively come to terms with the surface facts of political reality. Our posterity, too, may find it easy to esteem the contemporary products of the profession of political science should it ever look back and see how an affection for craftsmanship is combined with the ability to please. Moreover, the reward system of the profession should appear as having been nicely designed to promote the present display of talent, ingenuity, variety, and success. There is evidence, in any case, that the prevailing inclination to work hard and to develop ever more powerful analytical tools is welcomed and reinforced within the discipline. All would seem to be well.

Yet doubts continue to be expressed today even by those who govern the profession and engage in what Thomas Kuhn has called normal science. Partially, there is a petulant resentment among older practitioners, scholars who are made fretful and irritable by the entrepreneurial opportunism of the nouveau riche, by the feeling that mindless industriousness rather than scholarly contemplation is now rewarded by tenure as well as by space in journals, time on panels, positions on editorial boards, and cash for projects. It does not pain me, however, to disregard the indictment that comes from this source—not because I suspect its patrician origins but because I believe it is blind to the underlying impulse of empiricism, because it ignores the subversive, liberating thrust of empirical science.

The purpose of this paper is to examine several specific kinds of nonrandom measurement errors and to note their implications for causal model construction. In doing so, my secondary purpose is to sensitize the reader to the crucial importance of making one's assumptions fully explicit and to the advantages of a causal models approach to measurement errors. It is well known that the presence of even random measurement errors can produce serious distortions in our estimates, particularly whenever one is attempting to assess the relative contributions of intercorrelated independent variables. Nevertheless, common practice is to utilize what Duncan refers to as the naive approach to the presence of measurement errors: that of acknowledging the existence of measurement errors, and even discussing possible sources of such errors, while completely ignoring them in the analysis stage of the research process. That is, measured values are inserted directly into causal models as though they adequately reflect the true values. It can easily be shown that such a practice, while leading to important simplifications, can readily lead one astray. In particular, it may blind the analyst to searching for alternative plausible explanations that allow for measurement error.

There have been a number of very recent papers in the sociological literature, some of which will be briefly summarized since they may not be familiar to the reader. For the most part, these papers have dealt rather systematically with ways to handle random measurement errors, whereas nonrandom errors have been dealt with only incidentally and much less carefully.

It has been said that technological and economic development lead ultimately to the decline of communal conflict, and that the emergence of new kinds of socio-economic roles and identities undercuts the organizational bases upon which communal (that is, “racial,” “ethnic,” “religious,” or “tribal”) politics rests. In the past decade, several scholars working in culturally plural societies have challenged this conventional view. They have suggested that communalism may in fact be a persistent feature of social change, and that the dichotomous traditionmodernity models which have often guided our empirical investigations have obscured this theoretical alternative and thereby produced false expectations concerning the direction of change. This paper attempts to synthesize the various elements of this emerging theoretical perspective through the formulation of several propositions which link modernization to communalism. While our discussion will draw primarily upon the Nigerian experience for illustrative material, the propositions are intended to be applicable across societies.

“Communalism,” in this paper, refers to the political assertiveness of groups which have three distinguishing characteristics: first, their membership is comprised of persons who share in a common culture and identity and, to use Karl Deutsch's term, a “complementarity of communication;” second, they encompass the full range of demographic (age and sex) divisions within the wider society and provide “for a network of groups and institutions extending throughout the individual's entire life cycle;” and, third, like the wider society in which they exist, they tend to be differentiated by wealth, status, and power.

When military officers are either sitting in the governmental saddle or have one foot securely in the stirrup, is it likely that such military controlled governments will pursue policies of socio-economic change and reform? What are the officer-politicians' motivations in reacting to the possibilities of such modernizing changes? Under what conditions are their motivations likely to vary? This essay attempts to answer these questions with regard to the contemporary non-western states. And in making the attempt, I believe that the analysis falls squarely within the purview of certain recent changes that are taking place in the study of comparative politics. These changes may be most broadly depicted as a movement away from that aspect of behavioralism that has focused exclusively upon “inputs,” and away from that dimension of “scientism” that has focused upon abstract concepts at the expense of empirical analysis. The change can also be described (in an overly facile manner) as a movement toward the politics in political science and the government in comparative politics.

As is evidenced in LaPalombara's call for “parsimony” in the selection of problems, we should choose problems for analysis that are blatantly political and of obvious contemporary relevance. In approximately half of the contemporary non-western states military officers either occupy the topmost seats of government themselves or they have a marked influence upon the civilian incumbents. And when this fact is placed alongside the potential of most contemporary governments to influence the pace and direction of social and economic change, this essay's central concern fulfills LaPalombara's criterion.

Representation is a matter of linkage. In this paper it is argued that a useful handle can be gained on the problem of identifying and measuring representational relationships empirically by viewing representation as a type of support linkage between members of political systems and the authorities.

To conceive representation as a type of support linkage is to direct attention primarily to the represented rather than the representative. Representational relationships have functional significance for political systems particularly because they are linkages which involve members' satisfaction-dissatisfaction with the behavior of the political authorities—linkages which reflect the degree to which members feel that the performance of the authorities “stands for” or “re-presents” their own interests; and this performance satisfaction-dissatisfaction presumably makes a contribution to more general support for the political system. In contrast to legitimacy sentiments, which are independent of immediate outputs from political authorities, members' perceptions of representational linkages between themselves and the authorities depend on their affective responses to outputs, encompassing not only instrumental performance satisfactions, but (and most commonly among the membership in general) symbolic performance satisfactions as well.

This paper reports an exploratory investigation of a construct for measuring sense of representation. The sample consists of a group of students enrolled at the University of Iowa—including, in order to ensure adequate variation on the support scales, a number of students arrested for participating in a protest demonstration against the presence of Marine recruiters on the University of Iowa campus.

The story of a presidential election year is in many ways the story of the actions and interactions of those considered as possible candidates for their nation's highest office. If this is true in the abstract, it certainly was true in the election of 1968. The political headlines of 1968 were captured by those who ran for the nominations of their parties, those who pondered over whether or not to run, those who chose to pull out of the race or were struck down during the campaign, those who raised a third party banner, and those who resisted suggestions to run outside the two-party structure. While 1968 may have been unusual in the extent to which many prospective candidates dominated the political scene, every presidential election is, in its own way, highlighted by those considered for the office of President.

The political scientist has shown scholarly interest in the candidates. His interest, however, has been selective in its focus—mainly concentrating on the two actual party nominees and not the larger set of possible presidential candidates. Research in electoral behavior has detailed the popular image of the nominees in terms of the public's reactions to their record and experience, personal qualities, and party affiliation. Furthermore, attitudes toward the nominees have been shown to constitute a major short-term influence on the vote. Yet attitudes toward other candidates have been surveyed only to ascertain the behavior of those people who favored someone other than the ultimate nominees.

Political science, by whatever definition of the discipline one might want to adopt, traditionally has been concerned with public opinion and participation on significant policy questions. Although the literature has become too vast for a complete enumeration of the varied contexts in which this research has been conducted, one issue that might rank high on a list of priorities for study—and yet has received somewhat less emphasis than other topics—is the subject of public attitudes toward war.

Perhaps this relative neglect has been promoted by a lack of opportunities for direct public participation in foreign policy decisions. Unlike most domestic issues, controversies over world problems have been relatively insulated from popular influence. Hence, research on the development of international conflict usually has devoted more attention to the statements and behavior of national leaders or key influentials than to public sentiments regarding war.

In recent years, however, the bitter debate generated by the war in Vietnam has stimulated mounting interest in popular attitudes concerning military action. The controversy has provoked both an unusual display of public disagreement about the war and a desire for basic changes in the policy-making process. Many persons not only have registered strong disapproval of American involvement in the Vietnam war, but they also have expressed an acute sense of frustration about their inability to affect the conduct of international relations. As a result, growing demands have emerged to permit expanded public access to critical decisions and to create increasingly democratic methods of formulating foreign policy.

No government yet established has had the loyalty and trust of all its citizens. Regardless of the popularity of its leaders or how careful they are in soliciting opinions and encouraging participation in the process of policy-making, there are always those who see inequalities and injustices in the society and harbor suspicions of the government's motives and intentions. Resentment and distrust are elements of disaffection and the first step toward resistance. Therefore, even the most dictatorial governments have usually striven to increase their credibility and popularity. For democratic governments, however, the problem of combating distrust and encouraging voluntary acceptance of its institutions and decisions is a paramount concern. One of democratic theory's distinctive characteristics is its strong emphasis on voluntary consent, both as a basis of political obligation and as a central attribute of citizenship. The concern expressed by democratic thinkers about the elements of due process and the protection of opportunities for widespread participation is directed toward the creation of citizens who voluntarily accept the society's goals; “the demand for consent is the demand that the government must be more than self-appointed and must, in some significant way, be the chosen instrument through which the body politic and community acts ….”

Democracy's guiding ideal is the substitution of mutual understanding and agreement for coerciveness and arbitrary authority in all phases of social and political life. The existence of distrustful citizens who are convinced that the government serves the interests of a few rather than the interests of all is a barrier to the realization of the democratic ideal.

In the last two decades of political science, there has been considerable interest in the determinants of electoral behavior. Theories have been developed and tested on the sociological, psychological, and political antecedents of the vote. Virtually neglected in this search for determinants have been the institutional or structural properties of the electoral system itself. With a few notable exceptions, such factors as electoral qualification requirements, registration laws, and ballot and voting systems have not generated much research enthusiasm. These institutional properties, however, provide the framework within which the effects of other independent variables must be judged. This applies to all basic electoral research—whether time specific or longitudinal—but especially to the latter. Too often longitudinal research tries to trace the causes of changing voting patterns without taking into account the institutional framework. A pointed example of this is Walter Dean Burnham's recent description of this country's “changing political universe” around the turn of the century—a change which he ascribed to a breakdown in party competition and consequent voter alienation, but which undoubtedly could be partially, if not largely, explained by reference to the many institutional changes in voting rules which occurred during this period. The effects of institutional properties must be sorted out if the researcher is to establish reliable baselines against which to measure the effects of other variables.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of one such institutional property of the electoral system—the Australian Ballot reform—on the changing split ticket voting patterns of the American electorate in the 1876–1908 time period.

Discussing the character of the Polish party system elsewhere, I have suggested a label of “hegemonic party system” for it, as well as for some other party systems based on similar principles. The hegemonic party systems stand mid-way between the mono-party systems and the dominant party systems as defined by Maurice Duverger. In an earlier paper written jointly with Rajni Kothari we have suggested the following typology of party systems:

1. Alternative party systems, where two or more political parties compete for political power with realistic chances of success;

2. Consensus party systems, where multi-partism does exist but one political party commands in a lasting way the loyalties of a predominant majority of the citizens and permanently runs the government;

3. Hegemonic party systems, where all the existing parties form a lasting coalition within which one of them is accepted as the leading force of the coalition;

4. Mono-party systems;

5. Suspended party systems, where political parties exist but are prevented from regulating political life by other forces (for instance, by the military);

6. Non-party systems, where the government is ideologically hostile toward the political parties as such and does not permit them to function.

Quite obviously, this typology does not exclude mixed types of party systems. On the contrary, the very fact that in political life nothing is absolutely permanent leads to the emergence of transitory types of party systems.