In order to analyze the trend of the United States Supreme Court from the beginning of its 1936 term in October, 1936, to the end of the 1945 term in June, 1946, it is first necessary to state the situation at the beginning of this period.

Before the pressure of our last great depression, the United States Supreme Court had found restrictions to exist upon the powers of the national government, and had found barriers against governmental power, both national and state. These barriers were found primarily in a small number of cases: Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928), which restricted price regulation; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1923), in which federal power was held not to extend to the shipment of child-made goods in interstate commerce; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923), in which it was held that a statutory regulation of minimum wages for women was violative of due process of law; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908) and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915), which sustained the so-called “yellow-dog” contract, and held that it was unconstitutional for either state or nation to forbid the employer's contracting that his employees should not belong to unions.

These opinions have now been overruled or explicitly disregarded and the Court has expressed the further opinions that state powers in no way restrict the powers granted to the nation; and that the national power to spend for the “general welfare of the United States” is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.

When Congress adjourned sine die on August 2, 1946, it brought to a close its shortest session since 1939. The legislative activity for the year, however, was most important, meriting careful analysis. Representatives and senators had their first opportunity for a good rest since America's entrance into the war, and they also desired time to stage their respective political campaigns. Even at the time of adjournment, members of both parties realized that the election outcome was unusually uncertain, with the Republicans having their best chance since 1933 to gain control in both houses. Consequently, the Congressional leaders planned their program to allow the membership an early departure from Washington.

Most of the time and effort of the session were directed to the determination of whether many of the emergency controls authorized during the war should be continued, now that hostilities had ceased. The two most controversial issues were the labor problem and the extension of OPA, both of which were tied up with an extension of the war powers.

Many bills on labor were given consideration, and several precipitated prolonged fights. The most dramatic event of the year on Capitol Hill was the appearance of President Truman before a joint session of Congress on May 25, requesting “emergency power” to draft strikers in basic industries into the armed services in case other methods of avoiding strikes failed. In pursuance of his recommendation, a bill (H. R. 6578) providing for settlement of industrial disputes passed both houses in different forms, but was permitted to die on the Speaker's table, the House having refused to dispose of the Senate amendments.

Problems of rural local government received considerable attention during 1945 from state legislators, constitution-makers, and the public in general. There were numerous statutory enactments relating to counties and townships, and a new constitution adopted in Georgia contained significant provisions concerning local government. Regular legislative sessions in the states convened, and indeed in a majority of the states adjourned, prior to V-E Day, and in only a few instances did they extend beyond the cessation of hostilities in the Pacific. Essentially, therefore, the 1945 legislative meetings constituted another series of wartime sessions, devoting much of their attention to problems related to winning the war and those of postwar reconstruction. This fact was clearly reflected in the year's enactments concerning local government, as in other fields of legislation.

Structural reorganization of the administrative departments and independent agencies of the national government has been on the agendas of the President and Congress almost continuously since World War I. A brief review of the principal developments during the period between the two wars will give us perspective as we undertake to present the problem in its current setting.

Ours is a government of “checks and balances.” It is the traditional concept which Montesquieu propounded in saying: “There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates.” One of the knottiest problems in the science of democratic government is that of reducing this basic theory of separated powers to a workable and efficient system. It requires the establishment of a proper balance, and devices of coördination that facilitate action but do not disturb the balance of powers. It also requires formal methods of procedure.

Time was, perhaps before the New Deal, when the limitations upon executive reorganization were largely self-limitations, which arose from a conception of administrative reform as primarily a technical problem. That is to say, students of administration assumed that their work had nothing to do with politics. The basic political decisions were to be acknowledged, and if changes were necessary they would be made by legislative enactment. Administrative analysis consisted in determining, according to criteria of efficiency and economy, the proper distribution and relationships of governmental functions. The responsibilities of the technician ended with the submission of a factual report and plans for reorganization, except that if the politicians insisted upon a different set of organizational objectives, he might give advice on the best arrangements for meeting those objectives. He might accept the responsibility of a consultant or adviser on organizational policy; but in so doing he was acting in a professional capacity, contributing the results of his experience in investigating methods of policy execution.