This paper studies the figure of «Factor General del rey» in the organization and work of the Royal Finances of Castilla between 1627 and 1644, under the reformist government of the Count-Duke of Olivares. During these years, the Factor General was Bartolomé Spinola, one of the most importante Genoese bankers of Phillip IV. This article analyses the strategy of Royal Finances in the financial market during the early seventeenth century, and the role played by the most important bankers. To begin with, I examine why the Royal Finances needed a Factor General. At this moment, the Crown was establishing a system where the policy was established by experts. The presence of financiers in the court of Madrid grew as much as to influence economic policy. Later afterwards, I explain who Bartolomé Spinola was and how he got to become the main important banker, and then the Factor General. Drawing upon the experience and understanding he gained from his activities in the financial markets as a private banker, he could influence the direction of the political economy of the Spanish Empire. Finally, I analyse briefly some of the functions of the Factor General in the financing of the Crown's expenses, and his intervention in the problems relative to the vellon coinage.

The aim of this paper is to analyse and compare the structure of rural properties of three houses of mendicants in Castile during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Analysing these three case studies we can gain a wide chronological view to show how the mendicants evolved to adapt to the feudal structures. We can also compare their role as members of the dominant class with that of other feudal lords, specially with other ecclesiastical institutions of previous foundation.

This article discusses a new series of alternative indexes to measure Spanish protectionism in the period 1875–1930. The new indexes show that the biases downwards of the conventional index are relevant specially for the protection increase at given years and sectors. They confirm the relatively high level of protection at the beginning of the «Restauración» in the 1870's but contradict the stable level of protection before First World War and put forward an upward cyclical trend until the 1920's. From the beginning of the period Spanish protection was mainly industrial. When the general protection index is moderate, agriculture improves its position in relation to industry, and when protection increases the reverse occurs. The high level of departure, the upward cyclical trend and the permanent industrial bias support the traditional hypothesis of the existence of a strong influence of the industrial sector in Spanish comercial policy design and deny the «compulsory» or «accidental» explanation of the Spanish return to protection in the 1890's.

This article studies the evolution of the composition of shareholders in one of the big companies in Spain, Compañía del Norte, devoted to railways sector between 1858 and 1941. Changes in property and interests groups inside the company are identified along the time. We establish the implications that this changes had in the Board of Administration by using modern agency theory, and looking for how the corporate structure advanced within the company. This process is studied from a comparative point of view in Europe and United States. The French influence in property, management and power in BA is highlighted. Only at the beginning of the XX century, when First World War broke out, Spanish capital got the majority of shareholders and the company introduced and international management style. The Spanish General Managers started to recruit new executives from qualified staff preferably with the same nationality, introducing a new system between the managers. This meant a break with hierarchic and militar system imposed by French style. Finally we analyse the evolution of the organization of the company which grew up rapidly from line schemes into a more complex structure although without arriving at a multidivisional one.

The aim of this work is to study the diffusion of the changes towards a diversified manufacturing structure in the different Spanish regions during the first third of the XXth century and the evaluation of the factors which explain the manufacturing industrial growth of these regions. The considerated factors are the localization economies (Marshall's externalities of specialization) and the urbanization economies (externalities of diversity or Jacobs's externalities). Owing to the non-existence of an industrial census in Spain, we estimate a data set based on a reconstruction of the industrial direct taxes in 1913 and 1929, for 50 provinces and 20 manufactures. We find that in this period of creating of an important manufacturing basis to realize the industrialization process, the different regions did not increase their specialization and, the urbanization economies were even positive to the manufacture growth between 1913 and 1929.

A David S. Landes no le gustan ni la Nueva Historia Económica ni los cliómetras, pero es un gran historiador económico. Ahora, ya con años —hace casi cincuenta que apareció su primer trabajo—, acaba de publicar una magna obra sobre la riqueza y la pobreza de las naciones, donde recoge investigaciones, lecturas y enseñanzas de medio siglo (Landes, 1998).

Sin la capacidad teórica del escocés, es un buen imitador de Adam Smith, al que cita a menudo, aunque, sin duda por una errata, La riqueza de las naciones, a la que se hace referencia detallada una docena de veces, no figure en la bibliografía final. Se distingue de aquél en que incluye la pobreza en el título de su obra, con lo que Landes señala uno de los rasgos fundamentales de la historia económica contemporánea, en el que insiste a lo largo del texto: la creciente desigualdad desde finales del siglo XVIII o principios del XIX entre países ricos y pobres.

Una primera observación a propósito de la última obra del profesor David Landes: la crítica en profundidad de un trabajo de estas características probablemente requiera más cualificaciones de las que dispongo y un espacio del que carezco. Al margen de estas circunstancias particulares, no creo que resulte fácil para nadie la tarea de hacer plena justicia en pocas páginas a un trabajo tan ambicioso, extenso, erudito, polémico y discutible como el que nos ocupa. Por tanto, el atrevido comentarista se arriesga conscientemente a hacer unas consideraciones que, por fuerza, prescinden de buena parte del contenido de una obra multifacética. El principal argumento en defensa de su osado proceder es el enorme interés despertado por una obra que —creo poder decir sin incurrir en exageración— tendrá más lectores apasionados, a favor o en contra, que indiferentes. Y que, además, ha cosechado un gran éxito de ventas —es inusual que un ensayo de nuestra disciplina haya llegado a ser un best-seller— sin que ello le haya privado de los elogios de especialistas de la Historia Económica y de la Economía no precisamente del montón. El hecho de que su autor sea uno de los «grandes» de nuestra profesión tampoco contribuye a facilitar la tarea del comentarista, ya de por sí admirado por una obra en la que, junto a sus no pocas virtudes intrínsecas, concurre un particular sentido de la oportunidad. Algo que dista de ser irrelevante para explicar su éxito entre académicos y público en general.