“Of political principles,” says a distinguished authority, “whether they be those of order or of freedom, we must seek in religious and quasi-theological writings for the highest and most notable expressions.” No one, in truth, will deny the accuracy of this claim for those ages before the Reformation transferred the centre of political authority from church to state. What is too rarely realised is the modernism of those writings in all save form. Just as the medieval state had to fight hard for relief from ecclesiastical trammels, so does its modern exclusiveness throw the burden of a kindred struggle upon its erstwhile rival. The church, intelligibly enough, is compelled to seek the protection of its liberties lest it become no more than the religious department of an otherwise secular society. The main problem, in fact, for the political theorist is still that which lies at the root of medieval conflict. What is the definition of sovereignty? Shall the nature and personality of those groups of which the state is so formidably one be regarded as in its gift to define? Can the state tolerate alongside itself churches which avow themselves societates perfectae, claiming exemption from its jurisdiction even when, as often enough, they traverse the field over which it ploughs? Is the state but one of many, or are those many but parts of itself, the one?

When the American government found itself in possession of the newly acquired portions of Spain's colonial empire, and particularly of the Philippines, it was forced to deal with many new and hitherto unfamiliar problems. Social, political and ecclesiastical characteristics were encountered there which were entirely foreign to American governmental traditions, but which were interwoven in the fabric of Philippine institutions and society by three centuries of Spanish rule. Among these was the universally recognized strength and importance of the ecclesiastical power, which in Spanish days had been fostered and protected by the state. Under the new conditions the ecclesiastical organization had to stand by itself, without governmental support.

Probably the most difficult problem which had to be solved was the celebrated friar land question. Thousands of hectares of the best land in the archipelago were owned or held by the religious orders. The friars had held these lands for centuries. The economic effect of these holdings was detrimental on account of the prohibitive rents which were demanded for them. The religious orders would not sell these lands of their own accord, and thus the Filipino agriculturists who desired to utilize them were prevented either from buying or renting. The government was also at a loss, since no taxes were paid on the lands of the church. This state of affairs was held by the American authorities to be inconsistent with the best interests of the Filipino people, and with the ideals of a free government.

The unusual circumstances of the present diplomatic situation of the United States resulting from the European war and the revolution in Mexico have led the present administration to resort to the use of presidential diplomatic agents. The missions of ex-Governor John Lind and of William Bayard Hale to Mexico, and the errands of Col. E. M. House in Europe have aroused considerable discussion of their diplomatic status, which gives point to an effort to explain the basis for the employment of presidential special agents in diplomacy.

At no point is the Constitution more definite and specific than in dealing with the appointing power of the President. Part of Article II, Section 2 reads: “He shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.” The third section of the same article reads: “The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.” There would seem to be no loophole here by which the President could either create an office not before existing, or, unless there is specific statutory warrant, appoint an individual to office without senatorial confirmation.

It may be assumed at the outset that any government based on the democratic principle should, regardless of the form it may take, reflect existing public opinion. The actual method by which expression may be given to the will of the people is of secondary importance. We have relied, in the past, and are still relying on representative institutions for the performance of this prime function of democratic government. Although satisfactory results have, on most occasions, been obtained, numerous instances are on record in which the action of the people's representatives has been at variance with definitely formulated public opinion. Such instances have been pointed to by critics as indicating serious defects in the working of the representative system.

To remedy these defects the devices known as the initiative and referendum were conceived and incorporated into many state constitutions. These instruments of government enable the voters, by means of the ballot, to supplant or supplement laws enacted by their representatives by laws of their own making. They were designed not to overthrow representative government but to prevent its diversion from its proper sphere of activity. When legislation does not seem to conform to public opinion the people may, by direct exercise of the law-making power, correct the error by popular vote, and the result is to be taken as the final word in determining what the will of the people really is on the subject in point. Public opinion is thus to find expression in the will of the electorate through the balloting process.

There is probably no problem in connection with the practical operation of the initiative and referendum on which opinions differ so widely as upon that of the proper safe-guarding of the petition. In every direct legislation State a petition is required to invoke either the initiative or the referendum; and in practically every State certain safeguards have been established either by constitutional provision or by statutory enactment, to prevent the initiative petition from being prostituted by unscrupulous enemies of direct legislation or by those whose zealous advocacy of the initiative and referendum overbalances their judgment.

At the outset, there is one proposition upon which all fairminded students of government will agree, namely, that if the initiative and referendum has been established in a state constitution as a part of the State's governmental machinery, its operation should not be impaired or destroyed by indirection. Let the enemies of direct legislation openly endeavor to abolish it by amending the constitution; but failing in this purpose, they should certainly not so hobble the initiative and referendum petition under the guise of safeguarding it, as to nullify the institution itself. The framework of government should not thus be made the victim of political tricksters. Accordingly any provision ostensibly to protect the petition from misuse, which in reality aims to prohibit its legitimate use, is utterly improper and unfit.

The more intensively one tries to study the interesting phenomena of direct legislation the more humble does he become. To look closely, for example, at the two hundred and ninety-one constitutional and legislative measures which the people of thirty-two States voted upon in 1914 is to be impressed with the number and significance of the things about that remarkable election which one cannot possibly know. How superficial at best must be our insight into that complex of social, political, economic and human forces which lay back of the presentation of those measures and the popular decision upon them. It is in full realization of the peril which lies in the way of sweeping classifications and glib generalizations that the conclusions drawn in the course of this brief discussion of the recent experience with the initiative and referendum petition are offered with considerable hesitancy.

As Ohio's first experience with the statewide initiative and referendum drew attention of students of direct legislation from all parts of the country and led to carefully worked out legislation for safeguarding petitions, I shall confine my attention in this discussion to the operation of safeguards in that State. The initiative and referendum were established by constitutional amendment in 1912. The amendment provides that only electors of the State are entitled to sign petitions, that each person must sign for himself, and that each part petition must contain an affidavit of the canvasser, stating that each of the signatures on such part was made in the presence of the affiant, that to the best of his knowledge and belief each signature is a genuine signature of the person whose name it purports to be, that he believes the persons who have signed it to be electors, and that they signed the petition with knowledge of its contents. The legislature in its first session following the adoption of the amendment passed a law prohibiting the giving or receiving of money for signing petitions, and requiring the circulators of petitions to file with the secretary of state, after election, a detailed statement of receipts and expenditures, with names and addresses of contributors and of persons receiving pay for circulating petitions, with amounts contributed or received by each. Neither the constitution nor the statute established further practical means to facilitate the prevention or detection of fraudulent practices in making or soliciting signatures.