The method adopted at the end of the World War for dealing with the colonies and territories of Germany and Turkey which it was decided to detach from them is known as the mandate system, and is embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which is an integral part of the treaties of peace with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary. Under this system these detached territories are not in the owner-ship of any State, but are entrusted to certain States called ‘Mandatory States’ to administer on behalf of the League upon the conditions laid down in written agreements called mandates between the League and each mandatory. The system, which was proposed by General Smuts, is a novelty in International Law, and although the term ‘mandate’ suggests certain analogies in private law, it is doubtful whether much practical help in the understanding and application of the system can be derived from these sources.

As a man gets on in life he is frequently led to wonder whether his early and immature conceptions have any counterpart in the minds of the wiser young generation of to-day. At this moment I am wondering if any of you have ever thought about the Common Law of England as I did when I first made its acquaintance a good many years ago.

The provisions of the Law of Property and Land Charges Acts, 1925, in regard to the registration of land charges, havt modified, almost to the extent of annihilation, the dependence of equitable interests on the question whether ihe legal estate owner had actual notice, or was affected by constnuctive notice, of their existence. The exact scope of those land charges which aro included by the Land Charges Act, 1925, s. 10, sub-s. 1, Class C (iii), under the term ‘general equitable charges’ remains to be delimited. The editors of the eleventh edition of Wolslenholme and Cherry's Conveyancing Statutes comment with characteristic caution: ‘This paragraph sweeps up the remaining equitable charges, not otherwise specifically named, which require protection.’ This does not help us very much. It is presumed that the lien which an unpaid vendor of land has for the purchase-money is a general equitable charge, and requires to be registered. But what about the charge which a cestvi quc trust has on land which has been bought out of a mixed fund consisting partly of trust money and partly of the trustee's money, for the amount of the trust money laid out in the purchase? The new rule does not seem exactly appropriate to such a case.

We all know the Old Bailey—now, by statute, the Central Criminal Court—in Newgate Street. The Old Bailey as Dr. Johnson knew it is no more, and the present building is still in its infancy—blooded, it is true, but an infant. Its predecessor—a gloomy and forbidding structure—had had a long, busy and unwholesome career before its disappearance some twenty years ago.

In the recent case, Great Western Ry. Co. v. Owners of S.S. Mostyn, Viscount Dunedin said: ‘Now, when any tribunal is bound by the judgment of another Court, either superior or co-ordinate, it is, of course, bound by the judgment itself. And if from the opinions delivered it is clear—as is the case in most instances—what the ratio decidendi was which led to the judgment, then that ratio decidendi is also binding. But if it is not clear, then I do not think it is part of the tribunal's duty to spell out with great difficulty a ratio decidendi in order to be bound by it.’ In other words, not only the judgment itself, but also the grounds on which the judgment was reached, are binding. This proposition must, of course, be understood to include the further rule that only those reasons are binding which were material to the decision of the point at issue. If they were material they constitute a precedent; if they were not material they are merely obiter dicta.

A few years ago a distinguished constitutional historian reopened what had once been a burning issue of political controversy, the question of the validity of the authority claimed and exercised by the British parliament over the American colonies. There had always been a difference of opinion respecting the oppressiveness of those acts of parliament against which Americans protested during the years preceding the Declaration of Independence, but with regard to their legality, as determined by precedent, there had come to be a virtual consensus of historical opinion, British and American alike, that parliament was right, and that those who denied its legal authority over the colonies were wrong. What may bo called the orthodox view was thus expressed by Osgood in 1907:

British lawyers and officials at home and those who represented the home government in the colonies held that, in law if not in fact, the authority of Great Britain within the dominions was complete. … They held that the colonists were in principle as completely subject to parliament … as were the local jurisdictions within England itself. In this they were technically correct and were quite in harmony with the principles of English law.