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Healthcare-Associated Transmission of Plasmodium falciparum in New York City
- Ellen H. Lee, Eleanor H. Adams, Susan Madison-Antenucci, Lillian Lee, John W. Barnwell, Joan Whitehouse, Ernest Clement, Waheed Bajwa, Lucretia E. Jones, Emily Lutterloh, Don Weiss, Joel Ackelsberg
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- Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology / Volume 37 / Issue 1 / January 2016
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- 26 October 2015, pp. 113-115
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- January 2016
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A patient with no risk factors for malaria was hospitalized in New York City with Plasmodium falciparum infection. After investigating all potential sources of infection, we concluded the patient had been exposed to malaria while hospitalized less than 3 weeks earlier. Molecular genotyping implicated patient-to-patient transmission in a hospital setting.
Infect. Control Hosp. Epidemiol. 2015;37(1):113–115
Contributors
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- By Mitchell Aboulafia, Frederick Adams, Marilyn McCord Adams, Robert M. Adams, Laird Addis, James W. Allard, David Allison, William P. Alston, Karl Ameriks, C. Anthony Anderson, David Leech Anderson, Lanier Anderson, Roger Ariew, David Armstrong, Denis G. Arnold, E. J. Ashworth, Margaret Atherton, Robin Attfield, Bruce Aune, Edward Wilson Averill, Jody Azzouni, Kent Bach, Andrew Bailey, Lynne Rudder Baker, Thomas R. Baldwin, Jon Barwise, George Bealer, William Bechtel, Lawrence C. Becker, Mark A. Bedau, Ernst Behler, José A. Benardete, Ermanno Bencivenga, Jan Berg, Michael Bergmann, Robert L. Bernasconi, Sven Bernecker, Bernard Berofsky, Rod Bertolet, Charles J. Beyer, Christian Beyer, Joseph Bien, Joseph Bien, Peg Birmingham, Ivan Boh, James Bohman, Daniel Bonevac, Laurence BonJour, William J. Bouwsma, Raymond D. Bradley, Myles Brand, Richard B. Brandt, Michael E. Bratman, Stephen E. Braude, Daniel Breazeale, Angela Breitenbach, Jason Bridges, David O. Brink, Gordon G. Brittan, Justin Broackes, Dan W. Brock, Aaron Bronfman, Jeffrey E. Brower, Bartosz Brozek, Anthony Brueckner, Jeffrey Bub, Lara Buchak, Otavio Bueno, Ann E. Bumpus, Robert W. Burch, John Burgess, Arthur W. Burks, Panayot Butchvarov, Robert E. Butts, Marina Bykova, Patrick Byrne, David Carr, Noël Carroll, Edward S. Casey, Victor Caston, Victor Caston, Albert Casullo, Robert L. Causey, Alan K. L. Chan, Ruth Chang, Deen K. Chatterjee, Andrew Chignell, Roderick M. Chisholm, Kelly J. Clark, E. J. Coffman, Robin Collins, Brian P. Copenhaver, John Corcoran, John Cottingham, Roger Crisp, Frederick J. Crosson, Antonio S. Cua, Phillip D. Cummins, Martin Curd, Adam Cureton, Andrew Cutrofello, Stephen Darwall, Paul Sheldon Davies, Wayne A. Davis, Timothy Joseph Day, Claudio de Almeida, Mario De Caro, Mario De Caro, John Deigh, C. F. Delaney, Daniel C. Dennett, Michael R. DePaul, Michael Detlefsen, Daniel Trent Devereux, Philip E. Devine, John M. Dillon, Martin C. Dillon, Robert DiSalle, Mary Domski, Alan Donagan, Paul Draper, Fred Dretske, Mircea Dumitru, Wilhelm Dupré, Gerald Dworkin, John Earman, Ellery Eells, Catherine Z. Elgin, Berent Enç, Ronald P. Endicott, Edward Erwin, John Etchemendy, C. Stephen Evans, Susan L. Feagin, Solomon Feferman, Richard Feldman, Arthur Fine, Maurice A. Finocchiaro, William FitzPatrick, Richard E. Flathman, Gvozden Flego, Richard Foley, Graeme Forbes, Rainer Forst, Malcolm R. Forster, Daniel Fouke, Patrick Francken, Samuel Freeman, Elizabeth Fricker, Miranda Fricker, Michael Friedman, Michael Fuerstein, Richard A. Fumerton, Alan Gabbey, Pieranna Garavaso, Daniel Garber, Jorge L. A. Garcia, Robert K. Garcia, Don Garrett, Philip Gasper, Gerald Gaus, Berys Gaut, Bernard Gert, Roger F. Gibson, Cody Gilmore, Carl Ginet, Alan H. Goldman, Alvin I. Goldman, Alfonso Gömez-Lobo, Lenn E. Goodman, Robert M. Gordon, Stefan Gosepath, Jorge J. E. Gracia, Daniel W. Graham, George A. Graham, Peter J. Graham, Richard E. Grandy, I. Grattan-Guinness, John Greco, Philip T. Grier, Nicholas Griffin, Nicholas Griffin, David A. Griffiths, Paul J. Griffiths, Stephen R. Grimm, Charles L. Griswold, Charles B. Guignon, Pete A. Y. Gunter, Dimitri Gutas, Gary Gutting, Paul Guyer, Kwame Gyekye, Oscar A. Haac, Raul Hakli, Raul Hakli, Michael Hallett, Edward C. Halper, Jean Hampton, R. James Hankinson, K. R. Hanley, Russell Hardin, Robert M. Harnish, William Harper, David Harrah, Kevin Hart, Ali Hasan, William Hasker, John Haugeland, Roger Hausheer, William Heald, Peter Heath, Richard Heck, John F. Heil, Vincent F. Hendricks, Stephen Hetherington, Francis Heylighen, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Risto Hilpinen, Harold T. Hodes, Joshua Hoffman, Alan Holland, Robert L. Holmes, Richard Holton, Brad W. Hooker, Terence E. Horgan, Tamara Horowitz, Paul Horwich, Vittorio Hösle, Paul Hoβfeld, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Frances Howard-Snyder, Anne Hudson, Deal W. Hudson, Carl A. Huffman, David L. Hull, Patricia Huntington, Thomas Hurka, Paul Hurley, Rosalind Hursthouse, Guillermo Hurtado, Ronald E. Hustwit, Sarah Hutton, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Harry A. Ide, David Ingram, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Alfred L. Ivry, Frank Jackson, Dale Jacquette, Joseph Jedwab, Richard Jeffrey, David Alan Johnson, Edward Johnson, Mark D. Jordan, Richard Joyce, Hwa Yol Jung, Robert Hillary Kane, Tomis Kapitan, Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley, James A. Keller, Ralph Kennedy, Sergei Khoruzhii, Jaegwon Kim, Yersu Kim, Nathan L. King, Patricia Kitcher, Peter D. Klein, E. D. Klemke, Virginia Klenk, George L. Kline, Christian Klotz, Simo Knuuttila, Joseph J. Kockelmans, Konstantin Kolenda, Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk, Isaac Kramnick, Richard Kraut, Fred Kroon, Manfred Kuehn, Steven T. Kuhn, Henry E. Kyburg, John Lachs, Jennifer Lackey, Stephen E. Lahey, Andrea Lavazza, Thomas H. Leahey, Joo Heung Lee, Keith Lehrer, Dorothy Leland, Noah M. Lemos, Ernest LePore, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Isaac Levi, Andrew Levine, Alan E. Lewis, Daniel E. Little, Shu-hsien Liu, Shu-hsien Liu, Alan K. L. Chan, Brian Loar, Lawrence B. Lombard, John Longeway, Dominic McIver Lopes, Michael J. Loux, E. J. Lowe, Steven Luper, Eugene C. Luschei, William G. Lycan, David Lyons, David Macarthur, Danielle Macbeth, Scott MacDonald, Jacob L. Mackey, Louis H. Mackey, Penelope Mackie, Edward H. Madden, Penelope Maddy, G. B. Madison, Bernd Magnus, Pekka Mäkelä, Rudolf A. Makkreel, David Manley, William E. Mann (W.E.M.), Vladimir Marchenkov, Peter Markie, Jean-Pierre Marquis, Ausonio Marras, Mike W. Martin, A. P. Martinich, William L. McBride, David McCabe, Storrs McCall, Hugh J. McCann, Robert N. McCauley, John J. McDermott, Sarah McGrath, Ralph McInerny, Daniel J. McKaughan, Thomas McKay, Michael McKinsey, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ernan McMullin, Anthonie Meijers, Jack W. Meiland, William Jason Melanson, Alfred R. Mele, Joseph R. Mendola, Christopher Menzel, Michael J. Meyer, Christian B. Miller, David W. Miller, Peter Millican, Robert N. Minor, Phillip Mitsis, James A. Montmarquet, Michael S. Moore, Tim Moore, Benjamin Morison, Donald R. Morrison, Stephen J. Morse, Paul K. Moser, Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, Ian Mueller, James Bernard Murphy, Mark C. Murphy, Steven Nadler, Jan Narveson, Alan Nelson, Jerome Neu, Samuel Newlands, Kai Nielsen, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Carlos G. Noreña, Calvin G. Normore, David Fate Norton, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Donald Nute, David S. Oderberg, Steve Odin, Michael O’Rourke, Willard G. Oxtoby, Heinz Paetzold, George S. Pappas, Anthony J. Parel, Lydia Patton, R. P. Peerenboom, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Adriaan T. Peperzak, Derk Pereboom, Jaroslav Peregrin, Glen Pettigrove, Philip Pettit, Edmund L. Pincoffs, Andrew Pinsent, Robert B. Pippin, Alvin Plantinga, Louis P. Pojman, Richard H. Popkin, John F. Post, Carl J. Posy, William J. Prior, Richard Purtill, Michael Quante, Philip L. Quinn, Philip L. Quinn, Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, Diana Raffman, Gerard Raulet, Stephen L. Read, Andrews Reath, Andrew Reisner, Nicholas Rescher, Henry S. Richardson, Robert C. Richardson, Thomas Ricketts, Wayne D. Riggs, Mark Roberts, Robert C. Roberts, Luke Robinson, Alexander Rosenberg, Gary Rosenkranz, Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, Adina L. Roskies, William L. Rowe, T. M. Rudavsky, Michael Ruse, Bruce Russell, Lilly-Marlene Russow, Dan Ryder, R. M. Sainsbury, Joseph Salerno, Nathan Salmon, Wesley C. Salmon, Constantine Sandis, David H. Sanford, Marco Santambrogio, David Sapire, Ruth A. Saunders, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Charles Sayward, James P. Scanlan, Richard Schacht, Tamar Schapiro, Frederick F. Schmitt, Jerome B. Schneewind, Calvin O. Schrag, Alan D. Schrift, George F. Schumm, Jean-Loup Seban, David N. Sedley, Kenneth Seeskin, Krister Segerberg, Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Dennis M. Senchuk, James F. Sennett, William Lad Sessions, Stewart Shapiro, Tommie Shelby, Donald W. Sherburne, Christopher Shields, Roger A. Shiner, Sydney Shoemaker, Robert K. Shope, Kwong-loi Shun, Wilfried Sieg, A. John Simmons, Robert L. Simon, Marcus G. Singer, Georgette Sinkler, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Matti T. Sintonen, Lawrence Sklar, Brian Skyrms, Robert C. Sleigh, Michael Anthony Slote, Hans Sluga, Barry Smith, Michael Smith, Robin Smith, Robert Sokolowski, Robert C. Solomon, Marta Soniewicka, Philip Soper, Ernest Sosa, Nicholas Southwood, Paul Vincent Spade, T. L. S. Sprigge, Eric O. Springsted, George J. Stack, Rebecca Stangl, Jason Stanley, Florian Steinberger, Sören Stenlund, Christopher Stephens, James P. Sterba, Josef Stern, Matthias Steup, M. A. Stewart, Leopold Stubenberg, Edith Dudley Sulla, Frederick Suppe, Jere Paul Surber, David George Sussman, Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Zeno G. Swijtink, Richard Swinburne, Charles C. Taliaferro, Robert B. Talisse, John Tasioulas, Paul Teller, Larry S. Temkin, Mark Textor, H. S. Thayer, Peter Thielke, Alan Thomas, Amie L. Thomasson, Katherine Thomson-Jones, Joshua C. Thurow, Vzalerie Tiberius, Terrence N. Tice, Paul Tidman, Mark C. Timmons, William Tolhurst, James E. Tomberlin, Rosemarie Tong, Lawrence Torcello, Kelly Trogdon, J. D. Trout, Robert E. Tully, Raimo Tuomela, John Turri, Martin M. Tweedale, Thomas Uebel, Jennifer Uleman, James Van Cleve, Harry van der Linden, Peter van Inwagen, Bryan W. Van Norden, René van Woudenberg, Donald Phillip Verene, Samantha Vice, Thomas Vinci, Donald Wayne Viney, Barbara Von Eckardt, Peter B. M. Vranas, Steven J. Wagner, William J. Wainwright, Paul E. Walker, Robert E. Wall, Craig Walton, Douglas Walton, Eric Watkins, Richard A. Watson, Michael V. Wedin, Rudolph H. Weingartner, Paul Weirich, Paul J. Weithman, Carl Wellman, Howard Wettstein, Samuel C. Wheeler, Stephen A. White, Jennifer Whiting, Edward R. Wierenga, Michael Williams, Fred Wilson, W. Kent Wilson, Kenneth P. Winkler, John F. Wippel, Jan Woleński, Allan B. Wolter, Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, Rega Wood, W. Jay Wood, Paul Woodruff, Alison Wylie, Gideon Yaffe, Takashi Yagisawa, Yutaka Yamamoto, Keith E. Yandell, Xiaomei Yang, Dean Zimmerman, Günter Zoller, Catherine Zuckert, Michael Zuckert, Jack A. Zupko (J.A.Z.)
- Edited by Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame, Indiana
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PART IV - Pragmatics of archaeological typology
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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- Archaeological Typology and Practical Reality
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- 26 July 1991, pp 155-156
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Summary
In anthropology there is little to be gained by pushing conceptual distinctions very far, and some risk of sterility, because phenomena intergrade endlessly, especially in so highly plastic a thing as culture. A broad definition, centering on the core of meaning involved rather than aiming at hairline logical definition at its edges, is therefore ordinarily the most useful.
A. L. Kroeber (1964:234)
20 - Principles of practical typology
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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Summary
Before concluding the practical section of our work, it seems desirable to synthesize the main ideas that have been expressed in earlier chapters into a set of general principles, which we will call “principles of practical typology.” For convenience they will be subdivided into basic principles, principles of type formulation, principles of practicality, and principles of utility.
Basic principles
A type, as defined in this work, is at once a group of entities, our ideas about those entities, and the words and/or pictures in which we represent our ideas. In other words a type in the fullest sense has material, mental, and representational dimensions (Chapter 3).
The relationship between the material, mental, and representational dimensions of typehood is mutable. Either the objects, our ideas about them, or the ways in which we represent the ideas may change, without necessarily effecting change in the other dimensions (Chapter 3).
Types have the two essential properties of identity and meaning. That is, to be useful they have to be consistently identifiable, and they have in addition to tell us something that we want to know (Chapter 3).
Individual type concepts can originate in various ways, by intuition or by some process of conscious analysis. Once they have come into being, type concepts generally evolve as we apply them to actual entities, through a continuous feedback between our observations of the objects and our ideas about them.
5 - The dialectics of type formulation
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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Summary
In the last two chapters we were concerned mainly with establishing definitions, and we discussed types in more or less abstract and theoretical terms. Here we will adopt a more practical perspective, and will explore the actual processes of human thought and activity through which types come into being, or are formulated. We will suggest that the formulation of any type involves a continual feedback, or dialectic, between its physical, mental, and communicative aspects, which we discussed in Chapter 4. At least in open typologies, types evolve through use and experience like the words in any other language (cf. especially Smoke 1932; Vygotsky 1962: 124–30). (In Chapter 18 we will define an open typology as one that is designed to accommodate new finds as well as material already in hand. The great majority of practical typologies are of this kind.) We will also suggest that, like the words in any language, the use and meaning of types has to be learned, and the type labels, identities, and meanings have to be learned independently of one another (cf. Margolis 1987: 48–9).
Ferdinand de Saussure (1966) was the first to recognize that language involves the two aspects which he called langue and parole. The approximate English equivalents are “language” and “speech,” but the conceptual distinction is more clear-cut in French. Langue is the cognitive aspect of language: the set of names, rules, and meanings that each of us carries in his head.
16 - The use of types: typing and sorting
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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Summary
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 8 we defined a typology as a system of classification made specifically for the sorting of entities. We cannot state often enough that classifying (making categories) and sorting (putting things into them) are two different processes, each involving its own problems (cf. Jevons 1874, II: 394–6; Kluckhohn 1960: 135–6; Dunnell 1971b: 45; Vierra 1982: 162–3). The problems encountered in classifying are in the broadest sense problems of definition; they are partly theoretical (see Chapter 6), partly procedural, and partly judgmental (see Chapter 15). The problems in sorting are problems of recognition, and are purely judgmental. As we have observed several times before, even the inventors of types have to learn to use them in practice.
It is important at the outset to be clear about what it is we are recognizing in the sorting process. It is not, as is often suggested, a simple matter of identification (cf. Shepard 1965: 306–22; Clarke 1968: 187–91; Whallon 1972: 15; Voorrips 1982: 116–17), because in archaeology the type membership of an artifact is often far from obvious. What we are recognizing are the resemblances between specific entities and specific type concepts. That is, we are matching entities with concepts, and we have to decide for each individual entity which of several type concepts it most nearly resembles, and label it accordingly. Type application therefore involves the processes of matching and labeling, which we will designate collectively as type attribution.
8 - A synthetic definition of typology and type
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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Summary
The various concepts that were discussed in the three preceding chapters may now be synthesized into a single, synthetic definition of “typology” and “type.” This will necessarily be a cumbersome formulation, since a large number of individual concepts is involved. Following the example of Geertz (1966: 4) in his famous definition of religion, we will first state the definition, then break it down into its constituent elements, then analyze each element for its significance.
Definition
A typology is a conceptual system made by partitioning a specified field of entities into a comprehensive set of mutually exclusive types, according to a set of common criteria dictated by the purpose of the typologist. Within any typology, each type is a category created by the typologist, into which he can place discrete entities having specific identifying characteristics, to distinguish them from entities having other characteristics, in a way that is meaningful to the purpose of the typology.
The definition can now be analyzed in terms of the following components: (1) A typology is a conceptual system (2) made by partitioning (3) a specified field of entities (4) into a comprehensive set (5) of mutually exclusive types (6) according to a set of common criteria (7) dictated by the purpose (8) of the typologist.
List of tables
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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List of figures
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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21 - Information-theoretic formulations
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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Summary
In recent years there has been a trend toward employing mathematical information theory to formulate ideas about information in the fields of classification (Duncan and Estabrook 1976; Voss, Estabrook, and Voss 1983), philosophy of science (Rosenkrantz 1977), and even in the theory of knowledge (Dretske 1981). A similar application could be especially appropriate here, where we are concerned with informative typologies, because the concise expression that it gives to otherwise vague intuitions may allow us to see implications and connections between them that are not otherwise apparent.
Perhaps the most important intuition, to begin with, is that typologies like the Nubian Pottery Typology are developed primarily so that they will yield data that are useful for estimation, which means that the typologies are informative about those things that they are designed to estimate. Related theses are that the attributes, in terms of which the types are described, are informative about the types (with diagnostic attributes being the most informative), and that objectivity is useful to the extent that estimates based on objective data are better than estimates that are subjectively based.
The present chapter will sketch a way of formulating the above and other, related ideas information-theoretically. Our approach adapts to the typological case, and to the Nubian Pottery Typology in particular, certain methods that were earlier applied by EWA (1966) to quantitative measurement. This involves the application of information-theoretic concepts to typological propositions, expressed in the language of formal logic.
1 - Beginning points
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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- Archaeological Typology and Practical Reality
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Summary
On a summer afternoon in 1983, two brothers – the authors of this book – went for a hike in the California mountains. As usual on the infrequent occasions when we get together, our conversation ranged over matters of common intellectual concern. On this particular afternoon we somehow got onto the topic of scientific typologies, and we discovered for the first time that we share a strong interest and closely similar views on the subject, although approaching it from nearly opposite directions.
Ernest W. Adams (hereinafter EWA) is Professor of the Philosophy of Science at Berkeley. Earlier work in the field of scientific measurement (EWA 1966; Adams and Carlstrom 1979) had led him, by natural extension, to a consideration of typologies, which have some of the attributes of measurement (see Chapter 7). William Y. Adams (hereinafter WYA) is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Kentucky, and for many years has also been a director of archaeological excavations in Egypt and the Sudan. The practical requirements of his work have led him over the years to construct a number of typologies (WYA 1962d; 1964a; 1965a), the best known of which is a classification of medieval Nubian pottery wares (WYA 1986a). This has become the principal instrument for calculating dates of occupation at Nubian archaeological sites, and has been adopted for that purpose by a number of different expeditions (see Gardberg 1970; Scanlon 1970; Säve-Söderbergh 1981).
C - Estimated dates for pottery wares found in Nubia
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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- Archaeological Typology and Practical Reality
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PART II - The nature of types and typologies
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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- Archaeological Typology and Practical Reality
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Summary
The clarification of concepts … directly gauges scientific progress.
Robert H. Lowie (1937: 281)
6 - The nature of types
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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Summary
In the last chapter we saw how types come into being. Here we will consider more fully what their properties are, once they have been formulated. It should be evident from the previous discussion that they are among the most complex of all human mental constructs (cf. Jevons 1874, II: 425–6); so much so that it is often impossible to give them precise or rigorous definition (cf. Simpson 1945: 15–16; Vygotsky 1962: 79).
A preliminary note on terminology
The processes of type formation that we described in the last chapter are in the broadest sense processes of definition. Yet, as we will see presently, archaeological types are almost never defined in the rigorous or formal way required by philosophers and logicians. Consequently, we must be careful in our use of the terms “define” and “definition” in the present work.
We will speak of a type as being defined by certain attributes, if and only if the possession of those attributes is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the existence of the type. We will say that a definition is a recognized or unrecognized aspect, or component, of every type, in the sense that every type must necessarily have a unique combination of features (diagnostic attributes) that is potentially capable of formal definition. To avoid terminological confusion, we will refer to the process of consciously formulating or expressing a definition as defining.
2 - Introductory theses
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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Summary
This chapter will state briefly the major theses that are to be elaborated in later chapters. It will serve at the same time as an introductory guide to the remaining parts of the book, so that readers with particular interests may judge for themselves which chapters are and are not germane to them. Since there is no point in describing what has presumably already been read, we will begin our review with Part II. In the paragraphs that follow, the numbers that precede each heading are chapter numbers.
Part II The nature of types and typologies
Part II is occupied with preliminary considerations about the nature of human concept formation, the organization of concepts into languages, classifications, and typologies, the special structural features of typologies, and the nature of types and type concepts individually.
3 Dimensions and elements of “typehood.” We have at the outset to establish at least a working definition of what we mean by the word “type,” although we are not yet ready to offer a formal definition. Accordingly we begin Chapter 3 by considering the different usages of the word in scientific literature, observing that it refers sometimes to a group of physical entities, sometimes to our ideas about a group of entities, and sometimes to the words and/or pictures in which we express those ideas.
B - Specimen pottery ware description: Terminal Christian Decorated White Ware
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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Summary
Family N Group N.VII
Ware W14. Terminal Christian decorated white ware
A rather heavy matte white ware decorated in Style N.VII; the most distinctive ware of the Terminal Christian period. It is presumably evolved from Wares W15 and W16 in Group N. VI, but is distinguished from them by its bolder and simpler decorative style and a distinctive, rather heavy group of vessel forms.
CONSTRUCTION: Wheel-made.
FABRIC: Paste: Nile mud. Density: Medium. Texture: Medium. Color: Tan, light brown or red-brown shading to darker, often purplish core (typical Munsell signatures 2.5YR 4/5, 2.5YR 6/6). Carbon streak: Occasional; seldom dark. Hardness: Generally medium soft (Mohs' value 2.5 to 4.5, av. 3.0). Solid temper: Fairly abundant fine sand, black and red fragments. Organic temper. None seen. Variability: Apparently low. Remarks: Same fabric as Ware R28.
SURFACES: Covering: Medium thick, soft slip. Finish: Matte or sometimes lightly polished. Texture: Usually rather chalky or gritty. Configuration: Level; rotation marks not prominent on interiors. Variability: Surfaces may be matte or lightly polished; never glossy.
VESSEL FORMS: Most common forms: Cups, plain bowls, vases (Fig. 11). Less common forms: Goblets, footed bowls, lids, jars (Fig. 11). Forms not illustrated: A9, A20, A23, D44, D47, F27A, Q6. Doubtful forms: C12, C34, C42, F16. Vessel sizes: Mostly medium. Rims: Rounded, frequently thickened. Bases: Ring almost completely absent; a few examples of very low, solid ring base on footed vessels. Wall thickness: Generally notably thick., especially in larger vessels (7–13 mm, av. 9.6 mm). Execution: Generally fairly precise.
3 - Dimensions and elements of “typehood”
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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Summary
Since our book is about typologies and types, we should in theory begin by explaining what we mean by the two terms. However, this is much more easily said than done. We will suggest in later pages (especially Chapter 6) that types are among the most complex of all human ideas; so much so that they often defy formal definition (cf. Klejn 1982: 35–6). In addition, a typology has peculiarities and complexities of its own (see Chapter 7). Although by definition it is a system of types, it is more than just the sum of its parts.
We will leave aside until Chapter 7 the question of what is a typology, and will concentrate here on the question of what is a type. Some scientists would probably argue that it is a group of similar things, others that it is an idea or group of ideas about the similarity of things, still others that it is a form of words describing things and their similarity (cf. Dunnell 1986: 191–3). If our discussion is to encompass all of the different meanings given to the word “type” in the scientific literature, however, we must begin by recognizing that all three of the usages described above are legitimate. That is, a type in the fullest sense consists of things, plus our ideas about them, plus the words and/or pictures in which we express those ideas (see especially Leach 1976: 17–22).
23 - Issues and non-issues in the Typological Debate
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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- Book:
- Archaeological Typology and Practical Reality
- Published online:
- 23 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 26 July 1991, pp 278-295
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Summary
In this chapter we want to identify some of the most important issues that have emerged in the course of the Typological Debate, and to discuss them in relation to our own point of view. Some of these are genuine issues that have been around as long as classification itself, and are certainly incapable of resolution. Others from our perspective are non-issues that have arisen through conceptual misunderstandings, or as a result of the intrusion of inappropriate theoretical considerations. The issues that are discussed here are obviously not all of equal importance, nor is the list comprehensive. In general we have selected for discussion those issues that are particularly relevant to our own interests.
Natural vs. artificial classification
This issue dominated the Typological Debate during its configurational/functional phase, but its origins are much older. In fact, it is surely the oldest and the most persistent of all classificatory controversies, tracing back in a certain sense to the age-old debate between “fixists,” who believe in a settled order of things, and “fluxists,” who do not. This question troubled both the Greek and the Chinese philosophers of ancient times (cf. Foucault 1973: 127–8).
The debate over natural vs. artificial classification was evidently flourishing in 1874, when W. S. Jevons published his path-breaking Principles of Science.
12 - Philosophical implications
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
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- Book:
- Archaeological Typology and Practical Reality
- Published online:
- 23 November 2009
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- 26 July 1991, pp 143-154
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Summary
We will now consider some corollaries of the philosophy of conceptual instrumentalism that was outlined in Chapter 1. To begin with, it involves a wholly pragmatic view of the role that definitions play in scientific typologies. This in turn has implications for more general philosophical issues, and in particular for the presently much-debated question of whether types are “real.” We will end the chapter by commenting briefly on that issue, and also on certain similarities and differences between typologies and systems of measurement. Here as elsewhere our philosophical comments must be fairly brief, and cannot fully explore the issues that we raise, much less resolve them. Our main concern is to show the interconnection between our views on archaeological typology, and on more general philosophical problems.
Definiteness and definitions
The philosophy of conceptual instrumentalism that was set forth in Chapter 1 holds that typologies and other systems of deliberately constructed concepts in the sciences are instruments that are designed for specific purposes, and they are to be evaluated in terms of their effectiveness in serving those purposes. It is implicit in this philosophy that definiteness in the concepts is not an end in itself, and should only be insisted upon to the extent that it serves the purposes for which the instrument was created. This holds true of any feature in a typology that can vary in definiteness, including type concepts, and the types themselves.
References
- William Y. Adams, University of Kentucky, Ernest W. Adams, University of California, Berkeley
-
- Book:
- Archaeological Typology and Practical Reality
- Published online:
- 23 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 26 July 1991, pp 388-411
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