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Aggressive Colonization Screening and Infection Control Measures in Containment of NDM-5 Carbapenemase-Producing CRE
- Ishrat Kamal-Ahmed, Kate Tyner, Teresa Fitzgerald, Heather Adele Moulton-Meissner, Gillian McAllister, Alison Halpin, Muhammad Salman Ashraf, Tom Safranek, Maroya Walters, Maureen Tierney
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- Journal:
- Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology / Volume 41 / Issue S1 / October 2020
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 02 November 2020, pp. s458-s459
- Print publication:
- October 2020
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Background: In April 2019, Nebraska Public Health Laboratory identified an NDM-producing Enterobacter cloacae from a urine sample from a rehabilitation inpatient who had recently received care in a specialized unit (unit A) of an acute-care hospital (ACH-A). After additional infections occurred at ACH-A, we conducted a public health investigation to contain spread. Methods: A case was defined as isolation of NDM-producing carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) from a patient with history of admission to ACH-A in 2019. We conducted clinical culture surveillance, and we offered colonization screening for carbapenemase-producing organisms to all patients admitted to unit A since February 2019. We assessed healthcare facility infection control practices in ACH-A and epidemiologically linked facilities by visits from the ICAP (Infection Control Assessment and Promotion) Program. The recent medical histories of case patients were reviewed. Isolates were evaluated by whole-genome sequencing (WGS). Results: Through June 2019, 7 cases were identified from 6 case patients: 4 from clinical cultures and 3 from 258 colonization screens including 1 prior unit A patient detected as an outpatient (Fig. 1). Organisms isolated were Klebsiella pneumoniae (n = 5), E. cloacae (n = 1), and Citrobacter freundii (n = 1); 1 patient had both NDM-producing K. pneumoniae and C. freundii. Also, 5 case patients had overlapping stays in unit A during February–May 2019 (Fig. 2); common exposures in unit A included rooms in close proximity, inhabiting the same room at different times and shared caregivers. One case-patient was not admitted to unit A but shared caregivers, equipment, and devices (including a colonoscope) with other case patients while admitted to other ACH-A units. No case patients reported travel outside the United States. Screening at epidemiologically linked facilities and clinical culture surveillance showed no evidence of transmission beyond ACH-A. Infection control assessments at ACH-A revealed deficiencies in hand hygiene, contact precautions adherence, and incomplete cleaning of shared equipment within and used to transport to/from a treatment room in unit A. Following implementation of recommended infection control interventions, no further cases were identified. Finally, 5 K. pneumoniae of ST-273 were related by WGS including carriage of NDM-5 and IncX3 plasmid supporting transmission of this strain. Further analysis is required to relate IncX3 plasmid carriage and potential transmission to other organisms and sequence types identified in this study. Conclusions: We identified a multiorganism outbreak of NDM-5–producing CRE in an ACH specialty care unit. Transmission was controlled through improved infection control practices and extensive colonization screening to identify asymptomatic case-patients. Multiple species with NDM-5 were identified, highlighting the potential role of genotype-based surveillance.
Funding: None
Disclosures: Muhammad Salman Ashraf reports that he is the principal investigator for a study funded by an investigator-initiated research grant.
Bronchoscope-Related Outbreaks and Pseudo-Outbreaks: CDC Consultations—United States, 2014–2019
- Ana Bardossy, Shannon Novosad, Kiran Perkins, Heather Adele Moulton-Meissner, Matthew Arduino, Isaac Benowitz
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- Journal:
- Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology / Volume 41 / Issue S1 / October 2020
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 02 November 2020, p. s144
- Print publication:
- October 2020
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- Article
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- You have access Access
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Background: Exposure to medical devices can be a risk factor for the development of healthcare-associated infections; bronchoscopes are a leading cause of device-associated outbreaks. We describe bronchoscope-related outbreaks and pseudo-outbreaks reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion (DHQP), and we summarize investigation steps and control measures. Methods: We identified bronchoscope-related consultations with state and local health departments between July 1, 2014, and September 30, 2019, in the DHQP database. We abstracted data on patient symptoms, clinical culture results, investigation findings, and subsequent infection prevention and control interventions. Results: We identified 15 consultations involving 150 patients (range, 3–31 patients per consultation). Each consultation involved at least 1 cluster of the same organism. Organisms associated with bronchoscope-associated clusters were nontuberculous mycobacteria (n = 7), Candida spp (n = 3), Exophiala spp (n = 2), Pseudomonas aeruginosa (n = 2), Enterobacter spp (n = 2), and Raoultella planticola, Stenotrophomonas maltophilia, Achromobacter spp, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, and Aspergillus spp (1 each; 2 consultations involved multiple pathogens). Procedures from which these patient specimens were collected included bronchoalveolar lavage, bronchial wash, bronchial brushing, sputum swab, and lymph node biopsy. For the 7 outbreaks in which clinical data were available, 5 did not have patients with clinical infections related to the pathogen recovered. Two consultations involved pseudo-outbreaks: one involved contamination of specimen collection tubes and the other involved contamination of cultures within the laboratory. Potential underlying pathogen sources included contaminated bronchoscopes (inadequate reprocessing or device damage) (n = 10, 67%), use of nonsterile ice, water, or saline during the procedure (n = 4, 27%), contaminated specimen collection tubes (n = 1, 7%), contaminated bronchoscope suite (n = 1, 7%), and clinical laboratory contamination (n = 1, 7%). The most common interventions included improvement of reprocessing procedures (n = 5), removal of possibly damaged bronchoscopes (n = 4), and eliminating nonsterile ice and water exposures in bronchoscopy (n = 3). Conclusions: Water-related organisms were the most commonly identified pathogens in bronchoscope-related consultations, highlighting the important role that exposure to contaminated water during bronchoscopy and bronchoscope reprocessing might play in bronchoscopy-associated outbreaks and pseudo-outbreaks. During bronchoscope-related outbreaks identifying a common pathogen could indicate problems in bronchoscope handling or reprocessing, device damage, or exposure to nonsterile water.
Funding: None
Disclosures: None