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9 - Fairness as Equality
- from Part Two - Responding to the Case for Inclusion
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 05 November 2011
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- 31 October 2011, pp 268-300
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Summary
The argument from fairness is central to the case for constraint that was presented in Part One of this book. In that discussion, I argued that in order to be consistent with the demands of fairness, a properly conceived theory must focus on the unwilling listener rather than the constrained speaker and employ objective rather than subjective standards of evaluation. Predictably, the argument from fairness in favor of inclusion tends to take the opposite tack on both questions, focusing on the alleged unfairness to the constrained speaker and on the subjective experience of the constraints of public justification. Likewise, where I argued that concerns of fairness should lead liberal thinkers to abandon the claims of authenticity, the case for inclusion frequently asserts that fairness requires either permitting or requiring authenticity to be an element of democratic politics.
In this chapter and Chapter 10, I revisit the arguments from fairness, this time in the form of a speaker-oriented, subjectivist case for inclusion and the related appeal for a foundational commitment to authenticity. These same questions were visited in the last two chapters in terms of arguments from consequences. In that discussion, the point was that the inclusion of religious justifications and appeals to the politics of authenticity present the combined dangers of domination and division. In this discussion, my argument will be that when inclusion and authenticity are made elements of fairness, the result is a paradoxical outcome in which appeals to fairness become the basis for removing all limitations on what the proponents of inclusion themselves concede is manifest unfairness.
8 - Further Arguments from Consequences
- from Part Two - Responding to the Case for Inclusion
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 05 November 2011
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- 31 October 2011, pp 241-267
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Summary
In the previous chapter, I articulated some responses to critiques of public reason offered from pluralistic, republican, and agonistic perspectives. I have argued that these challenges are frequently grounded on premises that are overly optimistic or unduly pessimistic, that historical references and analogies do not serve the consequentialist arguments in support of which they are deployed, and that in some cases insufficient attention has been paid to the element of coercion that is at stake in justifications for state action. These responses, however, did not remotely exhaust the strengths of those critiques. Moreover, in the process of engaging pluralist, multiculturalist, and deliberative theories (in Part One), it has become clear that a theory of public reason cannot exist in isolation. Rather, it must be situated within a larger theoretical approach to democratic politics writ large. That was the reasoning that connected the formulation of standards for public justification with the call for an abandonment of the politics of authenticity.
At the risk of tiresome repetition, it remains the case that the theory of public justification is not a complete political theory. A theory about the constraints of public justification, for example, does not seek to explain the conditions of possibility for unified popular action sufficient to resist the institutional imperatives of global capitalism or the interests of multinational corporations. On the other hand, a defensible theory of public reason must do more than simply explain why it is not fatal to such efforts, it must establish a connection between its constraints and the effectuation of unity across diversity. Similarly, it is not enough to simply insist that concerns for the consequences of irreconcilable conflict motivate the case for constraint; it is necessary to explain why constraints are a better response to those concerns than the embrace of multipolarity. And thus far, the challenge of McConnell's pluralism has been only partially addressed. Since the premise behind the case for constraints is, precisely, the inescapability of deep pluralism in a diverse democratic society, the justification for a particular version of the constraints of public reason has to be connected to a positive argument to the effect that constraints do a better job of making space for diversity in democratic politics than the alternatives.
Part Two - Responding to the Case for Inclusion
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 05 November 2011
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- 31 October 2011, pp 203-204
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5 - Further Reflections on Authenticity
- from Part One - The Case for Constraint
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 05 November 2011
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- 31 October 2011, pp 130-162
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Summary
In the last chapter, I reviewed a number of arguments from consequences and fairness that address the idea of moving beyond a politics of authenticity. These arguments are part and parcel of the case for constraint, which asserts that within the scope of public political justification, citizens must be willing to put aside even authentic elements of their own subjective beliefs about the accessibility of reasons out of respect for an objectively evaluated understanding of the beliefs and understandings of others. The case for objective, listener-oriented standards and the case for a liberalism beyond the politics of authenticity are two sides of the same coin. One cannot ask a constrained speaker to accept the necessity of adopting the standards of accessibility of others without asking him to be willing to set aside a desire for deeply authentic politics, and one cannot ask citizens to forego the politics of authenticity unless they are first persuaded of the need to consider the significance of political justifications from the perspective of others. Both of these elements are equally necessary implications of a commitment to the values of consensus liberalism.
In this chapter, I continue to present the case for removing the politics of authenticity from the vocabulary of liberalism. Where in the last chapter I focused on arguments from fairness and consequences, in this chapter, I examine two arguments from epistemology – epistemological perfectionism and epistemological populism – and then return to a particular case of the argument from consequences, the case of war. The chapter closes with some reflections on the relationship between the appeal to authenticity and a liberal conception of civil society, a theme that connects the arguments from consequences, fairness, and epistemology in these two chapters.
11 - The Argument from Epistemology
- from Part Two - Responding to the Case for Inclusion
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 31 October 2011, pp 328-363
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Questions of epistemology arise in complicated ways. The case for constraint in the theory of public justification depends on the claim that there exist certain categories of arguments, of which “religious” names an important case, that ought not to be permitted in public political discourse. Inclusionist arguments often focus on claims that there are no good epistemological grounds for distinguishing among different kinds of justifications. These arguments can be divided into two sorts of claims: that there is no articulable difference at all among religious and other forms of arguments (“perfect equivalence”), and that some arguments that are characterized as religious are distinguishable from publicly accessible forms of reason, and hence are properly excluded, but that other forms of religious justifications do not fit that description (“partial equivalence”). In this chapter, I engage these forms of the epistemological argument for inclusion and in the next chapter, I attempt to move from that dialogue to a better formulation of what is meant by describing a proffered justification as “accessible.”
One thing that makes these arguments complicated is the sometimes uneasy relationship between assertions of fact and normative conclusions. Without prejudging the case, let us consider an easy (and hence not terribly interesting) hypothetical case. Imagine two arguments in favor of a law criminalizing the act of wearing wool and linen in the same garment (shatnes), an act that is forbidden in the Hebrew Bible (New Revised Standard Bible Translation Committee, 1990: Leviticus 19:19). One argument states simply, “This practice is prohibited by the Bible, and a majority of us believe that the laws of the Bible should be observed.” The gravamen of the entire argument of this book has been that without more, this would not describe a proper justification for using the power of the state to enforce the rule against shatnes among nonbelievers. But now consider a second case in which the speaker says, “This practice is prohibited by the Bible; the accounts of events contained in the Bible demonstrate that a nation's failure to follow its laws leads to God sending earthquakes, locust attacks, and foreign invaders against that nation; therefore we should prevent this practice by making it a crime.” Here, the immediate justification, which is eminently accessible, is a prediction of disastrous consequences. The difficulty is that the conclusion is based on a whole series of assumptions: the reliability of accounts of historical events in the biblical text; the reliability of the biblical assertion that these events were expressions of divine displeasure; the reliability of the assumption that God exists and continues to work in the manner described in the biblical text; and the reliability of the interpretation of the rule at issue (this last is obviously more problematic in some cases than in others).
2 - Three Versions of the Case for Constraint
- from Part One - The Case for Constraint
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 31 October 2011, pp 33-67
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Summary
Arguments for constraints on public reason or public justification proceed directly from core values of consensus liberalism. In particular, arguments for constraint appeal to a dimension of equality captured in the phrase “equal respect.” In the Introduction, I proposed that the kind of equal respect that is central to consensus liberalism is a presumption of equal competence as a moral reasoner. Another way of conceptualizing this kind of respect is in terms of an equality of legitimacy, the presumption that one individual's personal interests, preferences, and beliefs cannot be treated as less legitimate than another's. Legitimate, obviously, does not mean successful; there is nothing in liberalism that requires that all citizens’ claims be satisfied to an equal degree. The assertion is only that no assertion of interests or outcome preferences can be dismissed because of the identity of the person asserting it.
It might appear paradoxical to argue that the requirement that all citizens’ views of the world be taken equally seriously leads directly to a case for constraint on the articulation of those views in political contexts. That paradox, however, is only apparent. In truth, the case for constraint is squarely grounded in the values of consensus liberalism. To take only one example, the idea that there are limitations on what counts as an acceptable justification for law making has played a central role in American constitutionalism. The first and most basic constraint on the actions of government that is imposed by the U.S. Constitution – at least after the adoption of the 14th Amendment – is the requirement that the state provide valid justifications for its actions. “Arbitrary” or “purposeless” limitations on liberty are presumptively unconstitutional. The theory is that the phrase “due process of law” applies to law making as well as law enforcement, and that the most basic requirement of due process in law making is that we owe other reasons for employing the coercive power of the state. “Because I say so” is the logic of a tyrant; “because we, the majority, say so” is the majoritarian tyranny that Madison feared. In Cass Sunstein's happy phrase, the rejection of arbitrary law making of either sort marked the establishment of a “republic of reasons” (Sunstein, 1993: 20).
3 - Subjective Standards and the Problem of Deliberative Perfectionism
- from Part One - The Case for Constraint
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 31 October 2011, pp 68-94
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The review of the theories of public reason espoused by Audi, Rawls, and Larmore demonstrates the ways in which arguments from consequences, fairness, and epistemology are woven together into narratives characterized by appeals to “equal respect.” But, as I have already suggested, there are reasons to be skeptical of this neat interweaving of arguments, in particular the equation of arguments from fairness and arguments from epistemology. In this chapter I continue to examine the problems associated with these and other prominent theories of public reason and, in the process, begin developing and laying out the case for a theory of public justification unencumbered by the politics of authenticity.
As was noted in the Introduction, there are three main characteristics of the theory I am developing that distinguish it, in varying degrees, from earlier theories. First, although I agree that the epistemological standards for inclusion turn on some conception of accessibility, in this chapter I argue that the governing standard for accessibility must be couched in terms of objective rather than subjective standards, meaning an evaluation of actions rather than subjective motivations or mental states. This commitment to objective standards is closely related to an argument that the constraints of public justification must focus on what I call “the unwilling listener” rather than on “the constrained speaker.” In particular, I argue that the tendency toward subjectivism and a focus on the speaker rather than the listener has led earlier theories to become unduly perfectionist, a trend exemplified in the development of deliberative democratic theory. In asserting that a well-constructed theory of public justification is properly concerned with objective rather than subjective standards of accessibility, therefore, I am equally arguing in favor of a more neutralist, thinner version of liberal constraints.
Bibliography
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 31 October 2011, pp 417-432
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Index
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 31 October 2011, pp 433-439
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Contents
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 31 October 2011, pp v-vi
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1 - Introduction
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 31 October 2011, pp 1-30
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This is a book about liberalism. In many places in the West and elsewhere, liberalism as a creed is under siege. The increasing power and success of social movements, particularly in postcolonial and postsocialist states, has both given voice to long-suppressed communities and revealed long-overlooked lines of division and conflict. Increasingly multicultural societies with fluid borders have enhanced the level of communication across deep historical divides but also revealed the challenge that deep pluralism poses for democratic values of unity, self-government, and equal treatment. These historical developments have given new urgency to what might be called “the problem of pluralism,” the problem of combining basic liberal commitments with both democratic rule and an acceptance of deep differences at the level of values, worldviews, and identities.
In response to the problem of pluralism, there has been a veritable chorus of challenges to the ideals of specifically liberal democracy coming from both the Left and the Right. From the Left, the challenges have taken the form of calls for greater accommodation of cultural diversity within nation-states, explorations of postnational systems of self-government designed to expand the range of choices available to mobile populations, and a forthright embrace of identity-based politics with its clamor of conflicting claims asserted in mutually incomprehensible voices. From the Right, especially in the United States, over the past three decades there has been a revival of a specifically religious form of politics that was largely absent from the national discourse of the previous half century, as well as essentially defensive ethnic and cultural politics aimed at fending off perceived threats to traditional social and political order. Other critics from the Right have questioned the tradition of liberalism on the grounds that it is too weak a creed to stand and fight against its most determined enemies. Among democratic theorists across the ideological spectrum, there has been a renewed interest in nationalist ideologies at the same time that intellectuals struggle with the challenges of an increasing international order of governance.
Frontmatter
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 31 October 2011, pp i-iv
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13 - Toward a Theory of Public Justification
- from Part Two - Responding to the Case for Inclusion
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 05 November 2011
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- 31 October 2011, pp 391-416
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This is a book about liberalism and tribalism. My project throughout has been to explore the implications of a commitment to consensus liberalism and to argue for the necessity of ridding ourselves of the inherited habits of tribalism. The modern version of tribalism is different from its earlier antecedents. Modern tribalism is not expressed in divine commandments to “kill everything that breathes.” It appears, instead, in the politics of authenticity that relies on inaccessibly subjective truth claims and performative identity claims that push dialogue toward a bare maneuver for dominance. In modern democracies, tribalism is not dictated by authoritarian leaders, it is rooted in the claims of populist democracy. Examples of the phenomenon can be seen almost anywhere: in Pakistan in the 1980s, a government seeking to shore up nationalist sentiment enacts a law making blasphemy a capital crime; in 2011, the prime minister of Israel proposes that the oath of citizenship be modified so that henceforth new citizens will declare their allegiance to “the nation-state of the Jewish people” rather than to the State of Israel; in the United States, a president faces accusations of secretly being a non-Christian, and to the surprise of almost no one, acceptance of that claim directly correlates with approval or disapproval of his policies.
Few of the writers whose ideas I have engaged in this book would support any of these ways of thinking, but in a number of cases their arguments provide such tribal appeals entry into the political discourse of liberal democracy. In other instances, writers avoid such dangers only by turning the defining commitments of liberalism away from any program that can plausibly claim widespread support in favor of a comprehensive, perfectionist theory of the virtues of citizenship. The theory of public justification is intended as a corrective to prior theories of public reason and to liberalism's responses to the challenge of pluralism in general. The theory that is developed in these pages seeks standards of accessibility that avoid subjectivism and perfectionism and offers a liberal conception of the political unencumbered by the politics of authenticity.
6 - The Scope of Constraint
- from Part One - The Case for Constraint
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 31 October 2011, pp 163-202
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Summary
At this point, a review of the argument thus far is in order. I began by setting out the project in terms of the development of a version of the theory of public reason applicable to coercive state actions that is consistent with the principles of consensus liberalism: a limited state, basic equality, and individual freedom. Right from the beginning, that commitment led to a recognition of the need to distinguish between preference aggregation (voting, representation), preference expression (the public assertion of justifications for state actions), and preference formation (the combination of social experiences and interactions that lead to the subjectively held beliefs and preferences of individual citizens). The project, thus defined, is limited in its scope. The theory of public justification is not intended as a complete theory of liberalism or an exhaustive statement of the norms that might influence our understandings of what constitutes the most desirable forms of political dialogue. The question, instead, has to do with the case for constraint. What are the limitations on permissible justifications for state action that are consistent with consensus liberalism, and what are the strongest forms of the arguments in favor of those limitations?
To address these questions, I considered arguments from consequences, fairness, and epistemology. The arguments from consequences focused on the fear that allowing certain kinds of justifications for coercive state actions to be offered in public political dialogue would lead to a form of faux “dialogue” consisting of the assertion of mutually incomprehensible positions. The negative political consequences to be feared are that instead of dialogue, the result would be nothing more than competing assertions of allegiance, a situation that reduces democracy to the mere aggregation of preferences, a bare competition for power. Worse, in such a situation, the institutional mechanisms of preference aggregation lose their capacity to ensure that minorities will ever have a meaningful hope for success, with the result that majoritarian domination is built into the system. Where “the machinery of the state” is available for the imposition of sectarian, incommunicable norms on nonadherents, those nonadherents no longer have any reason to feel any sense of ownership with respect to the system of decision making, let alone particular policy outcomes. Audi's description of the justified “resentment” felt by unwilling listeners captured this concern. The prevention of such a situation is precisely the point at which consensus liberalism requires something more than the mere form of democratic decision making.
Democracy and Authenticity
- Toward a Theory of Public Justification
- Howard H. Schweber
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- 05 November 2011
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- 31 October 2011
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In Democracy and Authenticity Professor Howard Schweber examines a basic problem for liberal democracies. When a political entity is characterized by a multitude of identities and values, certain constraints apply to reasons for citizens and public officials to justify coercive political actions. The author argues that justifications based on particular religious doctrines are not a proper basis for government actions that affect everyone. He then develops a concept of public justification intended to guide citizens in a liberal democracy through the work of creating policies that satisfy their responsibilities to one another.
7 - Arguments from Consequences
- from Part Two - Responding to the Case for Inclusion
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 31 October 2011, pp 205-240
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Summary
In this chapter and the next one, I focus on four arguments for inclusion based on consequentialist arguments: a pluralistic argument exemplified by Michael McConnell, an appeal to culture exemplified by the arguments of Seyla Benhabib, a republican critique exemplified by Sheldon Wolin, and agonistic challenges exemplified by Chantal Mouffe and Bonnie Honig. While I continue to assert that the principle of public justification is an essential bedrock of democratic governance that is consistent with liberalism, each of these challenging critiques has important lessons to teach about the significance and contours of that principle.
To begin with, let us reiterate the basic consequentialist concerns that give rise to the case for constraint in the first place. First and foremost, there is the Madisonian fear of the divisive effects of religion on democratic politics. Closely related is the concern that allowing religious justifications for state actions will weaken the capacity of nonadherents of majority religions to feel full-fledged loyalty to their nations. One reason is structural. Members of minority groups who are subject to laws grounded in justifications that are accessible only to members of the majority may conclude that the game is permanently rigged against them. What is lost in this situation is what Ian Shapiro calls “institutionalized uncertainty about the future,” meaning that those who lose in one round of policy making will remain committed to the system if they believe that there is a chance of victory in the future. The existence of a single dominant faction achieves stability in outcomes and reliable realization of preference order, “but at the price of turning loyal opposition (where the democratic system is endorsed though the government of the day is opposed) into disloyal opposition, where those who lose try to overthrow the system itself” (Shapiro, 2006: 14).
12 - Empiricism and Public Justification
- from Part Two - Responding to the Case for Inclusion
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 31 October 2011, pp 364-390
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In Chapter 11, there was a shift from focusing on the accessibility of justifications to the accessibility of standards of reliability, an example of the by-now-familiar move to a second order of inquiry. That change in focus responded to Alexander's approach of comparing the different ways in which persons experience their beliefs in descriptive statements about events. Religiously grounded political arguments, however, more often have to do with moral teachings than with declarations of fact. The nonequivalence of Ann's beliefs about descriptions of states of affairs does not obviously extend to a similar nonequivalence between religious and secular normative principles. In addressing that question, the focus of the discussion shifted to another second-order question, this time one that focused on the accessibility of the logic that connected empirical beliefs with normative consequences rather than on the evidence that established the basis for belief in the occurrence of events. These are not cleanly separable inquiries. It should be clear that an epistemological standard of accessibility implicates arguments about both the basis for reliability claims and the ways in which those claims are made the basis for arguments that appeal to shared values. Nonetheless, the questions of whether standards of reliability are publicly accessible and how standards of reliability address normative justifications remain distinct in their respective focus on the basis for accepting empirical assertions as true and the logic by which normative claims are derived. And there is yet a third question to be asked: What do these epistemological standards require of citizens in practice? These three questions – What are the evidentiary standards of accessibility for second-order claims of reliability?; How do those standards constrain the logic of justification?; and What demands do epistemological standards of accessibility impose on citizens as a matter of democratic practice? – provide the organizing structure for this chapter.
4 - Liberalism and the Problem of Authenticity
- from Part One - The Case for Constraint
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 05 November 2011
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- 31 October 2011, pp 95-129
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The problem of combining a liberal theory of political discourse with appeals to authenticity is most commonly approached either by redefining authenticity or reconceiving liberalism. In the first approach, the solution appears to be simply assuming the existence of a shared authenticity sufficient to ground a case for constraint. One example of this approach is the assertion that as a matter of empirical and historical fact, we are all cosmopolitans, capable of drawing freely from a wide range of different sources in the expression of our authentic identities. Such an assertion can be made either descriptively or prescriptively. If the assertion is intended prescriptively, as a guide for political conduct that citizens are expected to find persuasive, then it implies a deeply perfectionist program. What, after all, is the response to the citizen who insists that he does not conceive of himself as a self-created cosmopolitan? To assert that all speakers should be aware of their own authentic liberalism is to tell the dissenter that he is simply wrong about the nature of his own subjectivity. Insisting that citizens are cosmopolitans in the face of their contrary subjective experience moves us into the realm of false consciousness. This is the violence of the constative that emerges when a subjective standard is married to a pervasive perfectionism. The attempt to combine a liberal case for constraint with the politics of authenticity by an assertion about the “true” nature of others’ authentic identities cannot be a satisfactory basis for a liberal theory of public reason.
If the proposition is presented descriptively, it “solves” the problem of pluralism by denying its existence. The whole point of acknowledging the fact of deep pluralism as a challenge for democracy is to recognize that any theory that posits universal agreement on moral and political questions as its starting point is neither useful nor particularly interesting as a response to the conditions of modernity. A case for constraint that begins by assuming that all citizens agree with the desirability of a case for constraint is not an argument; it is either an exercise in utopianism or a profoundly dystopian prediction about the future of liberal democracy. The utopian, prescriptive version of the exercise is one that justifies a case for constraints by presuming that everyone already supports them, so that no persuasion is necessary. The utopian version thus combines authenticity with perfectionism by first defining a single ideal model of subjectivity that is required of moral agents fit for citizenship, and then making it the business of the perfectionist state to inculcate that model of subjectivity in all its citizens. The dystopian version begins with the same assumption that the success of liberal democracy depends on universally shared desirable forms of subjectivity, but then combines that assumption with a deep commitment to neutralism. The result is a descriptive statement of the conditions of possibility for liberal democracy that becomes dystopic when it is combined with the stark unlikelihood of those conditions existing in reality. In that case, the prospects for liberalism as a set of principles capable of resolving the challenge of deep pluralism are dim indeed.
10 - Fairness as Recognition
- from Part Two - Responding to the Case for Inclusion
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 31 October 2011, pp 301-327
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In rejecting a balancing-of-unfairness approach to the problem of public reason, I suggested that one difficulty lies in finding a suitably objective standard from which such a balance can be struck that is itself defensible in publicly accessible terms. Charles Taylor argues that there is precisely such an available vocabulary: in his words, “you can argue in reason” about the ideals of authentic self-fulfillment and the requirements of a “politics of recognition” (Taylor, 1994: 23). There are several pieces to this argument. First, there is an argument from fairness that to be denied the recognition that one is due is a denial of respect that breaches the fundamental requirements of fairness and equality in a way that being subject to a merely “unjust” law does not. At the same time, there is an implicit argument from consequences. The terms of this latter argument are somewhat unclear, but Taylor appears to be arguing that what he calls a “politics of difference” provides a basis for unity across difference and thus a response to the problem of pluralism that is more in accord with the demands of fundamental fairness and equality than the theory of public justification.
The idea that recognition is essential to certain conceptions of political equality is not new. Isaiah Berlin identified the desire for recognition as a signature example of positive liberty:
The lack of freedom about which men or groups complain amounts, as often as not, to the lack of proper recognition.…What I may seek to avoid is simply being ignored, or patronized, or despised, or being taken too much for granted – in short, not being treated as an individual, having my uniqueness insufficiently recognized.…And what is true of the individual is true of groups, social, political, economic, religious.…What they want, as often as not, is simply recognition (of their class or nation, or color or race) as an independent source of human activity, as an entity with a will of its own, intending to act in accordance with it.
Part One - The Case for Constraint
- Howard H. Schweber, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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- Democracy and Authenticity
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- 31 October 2011, pp 31-32
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