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5 - The effects of security measures on youth radicalization
- Edited by Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Kate Meagher
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- Book:
- Overcoming Boko Haram
- Published by:
- Boydell & Brewer
- Published online:
- 21 March 2020
- Print publication:
- 17 January 2020, pp 131-166
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- Chapter
- Export citation
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Summary
Introduction
A primary duty of the Nigerian state is to provide for the security of its citizens. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999 as amended) invests the responsibility for security in certain organs of the state, chiefly the police and the armed forces (military). The Nigeria Police Force is responsible for internal security, law and order while the primary roles assigned to the armed forces of Nigeria (AFN) are: to defend Nigeria from external aggression, protect its territorial integrity and secure its borders from violations. The armed forces may also be called upon to suppress insurrection and provide aid to civil authorities to restore order and perform other roles as the National Assembly may prescribe (Section 217 (2) a–d). The authority to offer assistance to civil authority or civil power is referred to in military doctrine as ‘Military Aid to Civil Authority’ (MACA) and ‘Military Aid to Civil Power’ (MACP), respectively. When the military is deployed in an internal security operation (ISO), the goal is to put an end to violence and restore normalcy and law and order as quickly as possible so that the civil power, in this case the Nigeria Police Force, can resume its normal duties. The ability of the Nigerian military to perform these roles has been severely tested in its decade-long struggle against the extremist religious group, Jama‘atu Ahlul Sunna li Da‘wati wal Jihad, popularly referred to as Boko Haram. Not only has Boko Haram inflicted devastation on the Nigerian population, but fighting this brutal and complex insurgency has challenged the capacity and integrity of the Nigerian military, raising questions about whether it is becoming part of the problem rather than a key player in the solution.
In conformity with constitutional provisions and other relevant legal instruments, the Nigerian state has deployed the armed forces, comprising the Nigeria Army (NA), Nigeria Navy (NN) and Nigeria Air Force (NAF), in several conflict and crisis zones throughout the country. The military has been engaged in such operations in every state, including the federal capital, Abuja. These deployments are undertaken as single service operations, joint operations combining two or three services or even multi-agency operations. According to a former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), ‘the Joint Task Force system has been operating very well.
11 - Conclusion Toward a whole-of-society approach to counter-radicalizationAll Contributors
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- By Sarkin Kano, Kate Meagher, Kate Meagher, M. Sani Umar, Abubakar K. Monguno, Ibrahim Umara, Rahmane Idrissa, Julie G. Sanda, David Ehrhardt, M. Sani Umar, Zainab Usman, Sherine El Taraboulsi-Mccarthy, Khadija Gambo Hawaja, Murray Last, Kate Meagher, Ibrahim Haruna Hassan, M. Sani Umar, David Ehrhardt
- Edited by Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Kate Meagher
-
- Book:
- Overcoming Boko Haram
- Published by:
- Boydell & Brewer
- Published online:
- 21 March 2020
- Print publication:
- 17 January 2020, pp 304-324
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Introduction
As the Boko Haram insurgency heads into its second decade, it seems no quick end is in sight. What are the possible scenarios for the future trajectory of Boko Haram, and in particular what is its endgame? While predicting the future is a very hazardous business, plausible endgame scenarios can be envisioned based on reflection on the metamorphoses of Boko Haram, careful analysis of the dynamics of its current situation, and prognosis of its emergent trends. The formal declaration of the Boko Haram Caliphate and its territorial control over much of Borno State are no more. Yet the ‘technical military defeat’ proclaimed by President Muhammad Buhari in 2015 has not prevented Boko Haram from carrying out attacks not only in rural areas, but in big towns and even military bases, often killing Nigerian soldiers – as many as 100 soldiers in one attack. Negotiations leading to the release of Boko Haram captives in exchange for freeing incarcerated leaders of the insurgency came about more than a year after the proclamation of the technical defeat. It seems that decisive defeat leading to complete surrender and total cessation of hostilities is not on the immediate horizon. Yet what scenario is likely to unfold?
This chapter explores this question by drawing insights from the literature on the growth, decline, and end of past insurgent insurgencies and civil wars. Theoretically, one may argue that there are only a few possible outcomes to an insurgency: the government may defeat the insurgents; the insurgents may defeat the government; both parties may reach a negotiated settlement; there may be a stalemate; or the insurgency may transform into something else, such as organized crime. We suggest that rather than one distinct ending, Boko Haram is likely to continue its previous patterns of transformations and factionalization, precluding decisive outcomes. Unless distinctively different approaches are taken by the state, likely endgames include a negotiated settlement with some factions, the further entrenchment of the war economy with its continuous menacing of rural areas by others, and some elements potentially becoming absorbed into the global terrorist networks of the Islamic State.