This article examines the factors that led to the end of the Cold War
from the perspective of the most important U.S. decision makers in both
the Reagan and Bush presidencies. The centerpiece of the analysis is a
longitudinal study that compares the timing of U.S. decision makers'
assessments of the nature of the Soviet threat with changes in Soviet
power, foreign policies, and domestic ideology and institutions. This
research design allows one to determine if America's key leaders were
basing their foreign policies primarily in response to reductions in
Soviet power (as realists assert), to more cooperative international
policies (as systemic-constructivist and costly signals arguments claim),
or to changes in Soviet domestic politics (as democratic peace theories
argue). I find that American leaders' beliefs that the Cold War was
ending corresponded most closely with Soviet domestic-ideological and
institutional changes. As soon as America's most important leaders
believed both that Gorbachev was dedicated to core tenets of liberal
ideology, and that these values would likely be protected by liberal
institutions, they believed the Cold War was ending. These findings help
to both illustrate the key determinants of leaders' perceptions of
international threats and explain why outstanding Cold War disputes were
resolved so smoothly, with the Americans primarily attempting to reassure
the Soviets rather than coercing them with America's power
superiority.I wish to thank the following
people for their helpful comments on previous versions of this article and
related projects that led to it: Cliff Bob, Steve Brooks, Dale Copeland,
Robert Jervis, Mark Kramer, Jeff Legro, Jack Levy, Allen Lynch, Sean
Lynn-Jones, Kimberly Marten, Rose McDermott, Steve Miller, Kevin Narizny,
John Owen, Steve Rosen, John Sawicki, Monica Duffy Toft, Steve Walt, and
especially Lisa Martin and two anonymous reviewers at International
Organization. I also thank the participants in the seminars on
international security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies
and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, both at
Harvard University, and the Center for International Studies at Princeton
University. For generous financial and institutional support, I remain
grateful to the Olin Institute and the Belfer Center.