Thomas Nagel’s contribution to philosophy over the past forty years has been enormously influential. In this book, the first sustained examination of Nagel’s ideas, Alan Thomas provides readers with a detailed exploration of the central dichotomy around which Nagel organizes his philosophy: the concern over how to reconcile the “subjective” and “objective” views of the world. Thomas begins by clarifying and defending Nagel’s basic metaphysical contrast between subjective and objective ways of thinking about the world. He shows how a proper understanding of radically perspectival views of the world allows one to defend some of Nagel’s most important claims about the mind: his influential work in the philosophy of mind is traced from his early paper on physicalism to his recent defence of a form of dual aspect theory. Thomas then turns the argument to ethics, where Nagel’s influence is pre-eminent, and the development of his views is traced from his contrast between subject and objective reasons in his early work to his later hybrid ethical theory. The volume concludes with an examination of Nagel’s political philosophy, particularly his recent controversial work on global justice.

John Rawls (1921–2002) is one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century. Contemporary political philosophy has been reshaped by his seminal ideas and most current work in the discipline is a response to them. This book introduces his central ideas and examines their contribution to contemporary political thought. In the first part of the book Catherine Audard focuses on Rawls’ conception of political and social justice and its justification as presented in his groundbreaking A Theory of Justice. This includes sustained examination of Rawls’ moral philosophy and its core thesis, the primacy of justice, the complex relation between Rawls’ views and utilitarianism, and his most famous concept, the Original Position Device. In the second half of the book, Audard explores Rawls’ more practical concerns for stability and political consensus, citizenship and international justice, and shows the continuity between these concerns and his earlier work. Throughout, Audard contextualizes Rawls’ ideas by giving a sense of their historical development, which underlines the intellectual cohesion of his thought. The move between ethics and politics so characteristic of Rawls’ work, and which makes for the richness of his philosophy, is shown to also create for it significant problems. John Rawls combines clear exposition with insightful analysis and provides an interpretative and critical framework that will help shape ongoing debates surrounding Rawls’ work.

The British philosopher, Peter (P. F.) Strawson (1919–2006) helped shape the development of philosophy for over fifty years. His work radically altered the philosophical concept of analysis, returned metaphysics to centre stage in Anglo-American philosophy, and transformed the framework for subsequent interpretations of Kantian philosophy. In this introduction to Strawson’s ideas, Clifford Brown examines Strawson’s most important texts, focusing on the arguments and contributions to debates that have done most to establish Strawson’s formidable reputation. Each chapter provides clear exposition of a central work, close and detailed examination of its main arguments, and an exploration of the ways in which other philosophers have responded to Strawson’s initiatives. Brown shows how Strawson’s philosophical approach has been to seek better understanding of particular concepts or concept-groups and to draw out an awareness of parallels and connections among them that sheds new light over apparently familiar landscapes. The central thoughts in logic and language with which Strawson began his career are shown to have remained constant throughout it while manifesting their applications across an even broader range of philosophical topics.

From his earliest work on personal identity to his last on the value of truthfulness, the ideas and arguments of Bernard Williams (1929-2003) have proved sometimes controversial, often influential, and always worth studying. This book provides a comprehensive account of Williams's many significant contributions to contemporary philosophy. Topics covered include personal identity, various critiques of moral theory, practical reasoning and moral motivation, truth and objectivity, and the relevance of ancient Greece to modern life. The book not only positions Williams among these important philosophical topics, but also with regard to the views of other philosophers, including prominent forerunners such as Hume and Nietzsche and contemporary thinkers such as Parfit, McDowell, Korsgaard and Nussbaum. Despite the fragmentary nature of Williams's work and the resistance of his views to familiar labels, Jenkins reveals the recurring themes and connections within his writings and the philosophical underpinnings to his work.

Hilary Putnam is one of the most influential philosophers of recent times, and his authority stretches far beyond the confines of the discipline. He has had a dramatic influence on theories of meaning, semantic content, the nature of mental phenomena, on interpretations of quantum mechanics, theory-change, logic, mathematics, and on what shape we should desire for future philosophy. However, the diversity of Putnam's writings and his frequent spells of radical rethinking pose a considerable challenge to readers. De Gaynesford shows how these difficulties may be overcome by examining the whole of Putnam's career within its historical context in an accurate and accessible way. In so doing he reveals a basic unity in Putnam's work, achieved through repeated engagements with a small set of hard problems. By foregrounding this integrity, the book offers an account that is both true to Putnam and will be welcomed by students and philosophers alike as an aid to reading his work.

Wilfrid Sellars (1912–89) has been called the most profound and systematic epistemological thinker of the twentieth century. Many of his ideas have become widely acknowledged, including his attack on the "myth of the given", his functionalist treatment of intentional states, his proposal that psychological concepts are like theoretical concepts, and his suggestion that attributions of knowledge locate the knower "in the logical space of reasons". Sellars is, however, notoriously difficult to understand. His essays are complex and sometimes rely on doctrines and arguments he put forward elsewhere. Although each of his articles is deepened and strengthened by seeing it in its systematic context, Sellars never wrote a unified exposition of his system. Willem deVries addresses these difficulties and provides a careful reading and remarkable overview of Sellars's systematic philosophy. This clear, comprehensive and authoritative work will become the standard point of reference for all philosophers seeking to understand Sellars's hugely significant body of work.

The most influential philosopher in the analytic tradition of his time, Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000) changed the way we think about language and its relation to the world. His rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, his scepticism about modal logic and essentialism, his celebrated theme of the indeterminacy of translation, and his advocacy of naturalism have challenged key assumptions of the prevailing orthodoxy and helped shape the development of much of recent philosophy. This introduction to Quine's philosophical ideas provides philosophers, students and generalists with an authoritative analysis of his lasting contributions to philosophy. Quine's ideas throughout are contrasted with more traditional views, as well as with contemporaries such as Frege, Russell, Carnap, Davidson, Field, Kripke and Chomsky, enabling the reader to grasp a clear sense of the place of Quine's views in twentieth-century philosophy and the important criticisms of them.

Richard Rorty is notorious for contending that the traditional, foundation-building and truth-seeking ambitions of systematic philosophy should be set aside in favour of a more pragmatic, conversational, hermeneutically guided project. This challenge has not only struck at the heart of philosophy but has ricocheted across other disciplines, both contesting their received self-images and opening up new avenues of inquiry in the process. Alan Malachowski provides an authoritative overview of Rorty's considerable body of work and a general assessment of his impact both within philosophy and in the humanities more broadly. He begins by explaining the genesis of Rorty's central ideas, tracking their development from suggestions in his early papers through their crystallization in his groundbreaking book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Malachowski evaluates some of the common criticisms of Rorty's position and his ensuing pragmatism. The book examines the subsequent evolution of his ideas, focusing particularly on the main themes of his second major work, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. The political and cultural impact of Rorty's writings on such diverse fields as feminism, cultural and literary theory, and international relations are also considered, and the author explores why Rorty's work has generally found its warmest reception in these areas rather than among mainstream philosophers.

Although best known for the hugely influential Anarchy, State and Utopia, Robert Nozick (1938–2002) eschewed the label "political philosopher" because the vast majority of his writings and attention have focused on other areas. Indeed the breadth of Nozick's work is perhaps greater than that of any other contemporary philosopher. This book is the first to give full and proper discussion of Nozick's philosophy as a whole, including his influential work on the theory of knowledge, his notion of "tracking the truth", his metaphysical writings on personal identity and free will, his evolutionary account of rationality, his varying treatments of Newcomb's paradox and his ideas on the meaning of life. Illuminating and informative, the book will be welcomed as an authoritative guide to Nozick's philosophical thinking.

Charles Taylor is one of the most influential and prolific philosophers in the English-speaking world today. The breadth of his writings is unique, ranging from reflections on artificial intelligence to analyses of contemporary multicultural societies. This thought-provoking introduction to Taylor's work outlines his ideas in a coherent and accessible way without reducing their richness and depth. His contribution to many of the enduring debates within Western philosophy is examined and the arguments of his critics assessed. Taylor's reflections on the topics of moral theory, selfhood, political theory and epistemology form the core chapters within the book. The author engages with the secondary literature on Taylor's work and suggests that some criticisms by contemporaries have been based on misinterpretations and suggests ways in which a better understanding of Taylor's work leads to different criticisms of it. The book will serve as an ideal companion to Taylor's ideas for students of philosophy and political theory, and will be welcomed by the non-specialist looking for an authoritative guide to Taylor's large and challenging body of work.

Direct, combative and wide-ranging, John Searle's philosophy has made fundamental and lasting contributions to thinking in language, mind, knowledge, truth and the nature of social reality. His account of language based on speech-acts, that mind is intentional, and the Chinese Room Argument, are just some of his most famous contributions to philosophical thinking. In this – the first introduction to John Searle's philosophy – Nick Fotion provides clear and assured exposition of Searles' ideas, while also testing and exploring their implications. The book begins by examining Searle's work on the philosophy of language: his analysis of speech acts such as promising, his taxonomy of speech acts and the wider range of indirect speech acts and metaphorical uses of language. The book then moves on to cover the philosophy of mind and outlines Searle's ideas on international states. It introduces his notions of "background" and "network", his claims for the often unrecognized importance of consciousness, and examines his attacks on other philosophical accounts of mind, such as materialism, functionalism and strong AI. The final section examines Searle's later work on the construction of social reality and concludes with more general reflections on Searle's position vis-à-vis ontology, epistemology, scepticism and the doctrine of "external realism."

This is the first introduction to the ideas of the British philosopher, Peter Winch (1926–97). Although author of the hugely influential The Idea of a Social Science (1958) much of Winch's other work has been neglected as philosophical fashions have changed. Recently, however, philosophers are again seeing the importance of Winch's ideas and their relevance to current philosophical concerns. In charting the development of Winch's ideas Lyas engages with many of the major preoccupations of philosophy of the past forty years. The range of Winch's ideas becomes apparent and his importance clearly underlined. Lyas offers more than an assessment of the work of one man: it introduces in a sympathetic and judicious way a powerful representative of an important and demanding conception of philosophy.