Skip to content
Cart

Your Cart

×

You have 0 items in your cart.

Register Sign in Wishlist
Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design

Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design

£79.99

Paul Milgrom, Jacob K. Goeree, Yuanchuan Lien, Peter Cramton, Jeremy T. Fox, Patrick Bajari, David Porter, Stephen J. Rassenti, Anil Roopnarine, Vernon L. Smith, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Oleg V. Baranov, Robert W. Day, Aytek Erdil, Paul Klemperer, Kemal Guler, Martin Bichler, Ioannis Petrakis, Jonathan Levin, Andrzey Skrzypacz, Maarten Janssen, Vladimir Karamychev, Bernhard Kasberger, Christian Kroemer, Andor Goetzendorff, Robert L. Bulfin, Anthony M. Kwasnica, John O. Ledyard, Christine DeMartini, Charles A. Holt, Charles R. Plott, Hsing-Yang Lee, Travis Maron, Zhen Hao, Gediminias Adomavicius, Antonio Rangel, Christoph Brunner, Tobias Scheffel, Georg Ziegler, Pasha Shabalin, Jürgen Wolf, Stefan Mayer, Jeremy Bulow, David Salant, Vitali Gretschko, Stephan Knapek, Achim Wambach, Richard Marsden, Soren Tang Sorensen, Nicholas Fookes, Scott McKenzie, Randall Berry, Michael L. Honig, Rakesh Vohra, Ilya Segal, Alexandre Fréchette, Neil Newman, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Benjamin Lubin, Adam Juda, Ruggiero Cavallo, Sébastien Lahaie, Jeffrey Shneidman, David Parkes, Leslie Fine, Tak Ishikida
View all contributors
  • Publication planned for: December 2017
  • availability: Not yet published - available from December 2017
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9781107135345

£ 79.99
Hardback

Pre-order Add to wishlist

Looking for an inspection copy?

This title is not currently available on inspection

Description
Product filter button
Description
Contents
Resources
Courses
About the Authors
  • Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum, a key resource for any mobile telecommunications operator. Spectrum auctions have raised billions of dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The design of spectrum auctions is a central application of game theory and auction theory due to its importance in industry and the theoretical challenges it presents. Several auction formats have been developed with different properties addressing fundamental questions about efficiently selling multiple objects to a group of buyers. This comprehensive handbook features classic papers and new contributions by international experts on all aspects of spectrum auction design, including pros and cons of different auctions and lessons learned from theory, experiments, and the field, providing a valuable resource for regulators, telecommunications professionals, consultants, and researchers.

    • Comprehensive coverage of classic and new auctions saves regulators, telecoms, consultants, and academics time in preparing for spectrum auctions
    • Discusses recent developments and summarizes pros and cons of auction designs such as SMRA, CCA, and newer alternatives
    • Looks forward to possible designs for secondary markets
    Read more

    Reviews & endorsements

    Advance praise: 'This superb Handbook is a milestone in the progress of market design. It's a comprehensive analysis of designs, implementation, experimental testing, and bidding experience in auctions and similar markets for spectrum licenses. The authors achieved remarkable success in many auctions after the initial FCC auction began worldwide efforts to allocate licenses more efficiently via market mechanisms. The distinguished contributors report their solutions to difficult problems, the resulting performance, and remaining challenges.' Robert Wilson, Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Stanford University

    Advance praise: 'The papers in this volume highlight both the theoretical and the practical issues that arise in spectrum auctions. The book includes contributions from many of the world's leading economists, game theorists, optimizers, and computer scientists. Anyone interested in the practical application of market design and resource allocation will find this text an important reference.' Karla Hoffman, George Mason University, Virginia

    Advance praise: 'Bichler and Goeree, both important contributors to the field, have curated an exceptional Handbook, which will be an invaluable resource for researchers and practitioners working on the design of auctions and secondary exchanges for spectrum and other applications with complex interdependencies.' Peter Bossaerts, Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor, University of Melbourne

    Advance praise: 'Spectrum auctions are a remarkable example of 'technology transfer' from research to practice, with beautiful theoretical ideas informing current auction designs that regularly generate tens of billions of dollars in revenue. Bichler and Goeree have masterfully assembled the 'greatest hits' of this literature, ranging from the early papers that laid the foundations to the latest developments on the 2016 FCC Incentive Auction.' Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University

    Advance praise: 'This Handbook is the answer to my search for a truly wholistic view on auction designs and will be an extremely valuable resource for consultations with regulatory authorities as well as bid strategy preparations.' Matthias Leonhard, DT Spectrum Projects, Deutsche Telekom

    See more reviews

    Customer reviews

    Not yet reviewed

    Be the first to review

    Review was not posted due to profanity

    ×

    , create a review

    (If you're not , sign out)

    Please enter the right captcha value
    Please enter a star rating.
    Your review must be a minimum of 12 words.

    How do you rate this item?

    ×

    Product details

    • Publication planned for: December 2017
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9781107135345
    • dimensions: 253 x 177 mm
    • availability: Not yet published - available from December 2017
  • Table of Contents

    Preface
    Part I. The Simultaneous Ascending Auction:
    1. Putting auction theory to work: the simultaneous ascending auction
    2. An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
    3. The efficiency of the FCC spectrum auctions
    4. Measuring the efficiency of an FCC spectrum auction
    Part II. The Combinatorial Clock Auction Formats:
    5. Combinatorial auction design
    6. The clock-proxy auction: a practical combinatorial auction design
    7. Spectrum auction design
    8. A practical guide to the combinatorial clock auction
    9. Market design and the evolution of the combinatorial clock auction
    10. Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions
    11. Core-selecting package auctions
    12. A new payment rule for core-selecting package auctions
    13. On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
    14. Ascending combinatorial auctions with risk averse bidders
    15. Properties of the combinatorial clock auction
    16. Budget constraints combinatorial clock auctions
    17. (Un)expected bidder behavior in spectrum auctions: about inconsistent bidding and its impact on efficiency in the combinatorial clock auction
    Part III. Alternative Auction Designs:
    18. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation
    19. A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions
    20. Hierarchical package bidding: a paper and pencil combinatorial auction
    21. Assignment messages and exchanges
    22. The product-mix auction: a new auction design for differentiated goods
    23. The continuous combinatorial auction architecture
    24. Coalition-based pricing in ascending combinatorial auctions
    Part IV. Experimental Comparisons of Auction Designs:
    25. Experiments testing multiobject allocation mechanisms
    26. Laboratory experimental testbeds: application to the PCS auction
    27. An experimental test of flexible combinatorial spectrum auction formats
    28. On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: an experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design
    29. Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs
    30. Spectrum auction design: simple auctions for complex sales
    Part V. The Bidders' Perspective:
    31. Winning play in spectrum auctions
    32. Up in the air: GTE's experience in the MTA auction for personal communication services licenses
    33. Bidding complexities in the combinatorial clock auction
    34. Strategic bidding in combinatorial clock auctions – a bidder perspective
    35. Impact of budget-contraints on the efficiency of multi-lot spectrum auctions
    Part VI. Secondary Markets and Exchanges:
    36. Spectrum markets: motivation, challenges, and implications
    37. Designing the US incentive auction
    38. Solving the station repacking problem
    39. ICE: an expressive iterative combinatorial exchange
    40. ACE: a combinatorial market mechanism
    Outlook.

  • Editors

    Martin Bichler, Technische Universität München
    Martin Bichler is Professor of Informatics at the Technische Universität München (TUM), and a faculty member at the TUM School of Management. He is known for his academic work on market design, and he has acted as a consultant for private and public organizations including regulators, telecoms, and procurement organizations. Projects in which he is involved include the design of auctions for industrial procurement, logistics, advertising, fishery access rights, and spectrum sales. His research addresses algorithmic, game-theoretical, and behavioral questions and has appeared in leading journals in computer science, economics, operations research, and management science. He is currently Editor of Business and Information Systems Engineering and serves on the editorial boards of several academic journals.

    Jacob K. Goeree, University of New South Wales, Sydney
    Jacob Goeree is SHARP Professor and Director of the AGORA Center for Market Design at University of New South Wales, Sydney. He is a world-leading experimenter, theorist and market designer whose research has influenced the design of spectrum auctions and markets for pollution permits and fishing shares. Goeree was Research Fellow of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and is Fellow of the Econometric Society and the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. He served as President of the Economic Science Association and as Editor of Experimental Economics. He is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Economic Theory and Games and Economic Behavior.

    Contributors

    Paul Milgrom, Jacob K. Goeree, Yuanchuan Lien, Peter Cramton, Jeremy T. Fox, Patrick Bajari, David Porter, Stephen J. Rassenti, Anil Roopnarine, Vernon L. Smith, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Oleg V. Baranov, Robert W. Day, Aytek Erdil, Paul Klemperer, Kemal Guler, Martin Bichler, Ioannis Petrakis, Jonathan Levin, Andrzey Skrzypacz, Maarten Janssen, Vladimir Karamychev, Bernhard Kasberger, Christian Kroemer, Andor Goetzendorff, Robert L. Bulfin, Anthony M. Kwasnica, John O. Ledyard, Christine DeMartini, Charles A. Holt, Charles R. Plott, Hsing-Yang Lee, Travis Maron, Zhen Hao, Gediminias Adomavicius, Antonio Rangel, Christoph Brunner, Tobias Scheffel, Georg Ziegler, Pasha Shabalin, Jürgen Wolf, Stefan Mayer, Jeremy Bulow, David Salant, Vitali Gretschko, Stephan Knapek, Achim Wambach, Richard Marsden, Soren Tang Sorensen, Nicholas Fookes, Scott McKenzie, Randall Berry, Michael L. Honig, Rakesh Vohra, Ilya Segal, Alexandre Fréchette, Neil Newman, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Benjamin Lubin, Adam Juda, Ruggiero Cavallo, Sébastien Lahaie, Jeffrey Shneidman, David Parkes, Leslie Fine, Tak Ishikida

Sign In

Please sign in to access your account

Cancel

Not already registered? Create an account now. ×

Sorry, this resource is locked

Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email lecturers@cambridge.org

Register Sign in
Please note that this file is password protected. You will be asked to input your password on the next screen.

» Proceed

You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.

Continue ×

Continue ×

Continue ×

Find content that relates to you

Are you sure you want to delete your account?

This cannot be undone.

Cancel

Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.

If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.

×
Please fill in the required fields in your feedback submission.
×