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The Theory of Economic Policy in a Strategic Context

£82.00

  • Date Published: November 2012
  • availability: In stock
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9781107023864

£ 82.00
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  • In developing a new and highly innovative theory of economic policy, this book deals with conflicts between strategic actions by public and private agents. It builds on the Lucas critique but also applies the tools introduced by Tinbergen and Theil to dynamic policy games and from there derives a new theory of economic policy. Its main propositions describe such properties in the models currently used for policy-making as neutrality and equilibrium existence, uniqueness, and multiplicity. These properties are key to understanding the impact of concepts such as rational expectations, time inconsistency, communication and the use of policy announcements. As the numerous examples show, they are useful both for model building and for devising optimal institutions. The Theory of Economic Policy in a Strategic Context is an essential but accessible tool for economic researchers involved in policy questions.

    • A new theory of economic policy which reincorporates elements of the Tinbergen theory of economic policy into more modern approaches
    • Provides a formal mathematical game-theoretic treatment of the subject
    • The mathematically rigorous presentation of the theory is complemented with practical examples
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    Product details

    • Date Published: November 2012
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9781107023864
    • length: 363 pages
    • dimensions: 235 x 155 x 22 mm
    • weight: 0.64kg
    • contains: 16 b/w illus. 4 tables
    • availability: In stock
  • Table of Contents

    List of figures
    List of tables
    Preface
    Common symbols
    1. An overview: the realm of economic policy
    Part I. The Classical Theory of Economic Policy:
    2. Statics
    3. Dynamics
    Part II. From the Classical to the New Theory of Economic Policy:
    4. The Lucas critique
    5. Policy games: an introduction
    Part III. The New Theory of Economic Policy: Statics:
    6. A theory of strategic conflict: foundations
    7. From individual players to system controllability
    8. Conflicts and coordination among groups
    9. Announcements as a coordination mechanism
    Part IV. The New Theory of Economic Policy: Dynamics:
    10. Controllability in a strategic dynamic setting
    11. Dynamic policy games with rational expectations
    12. Credibility, dynamic controllability and rational expectations
    13. Expectations and target coordination: institutional aspects
    14. A summary and round-up of conclusions
    References.

  • Authors

    Nicola Acocella, Università degli Studi di Roma 'La Sapienza', Italy
    Nicola Acocella is Professor of Economic Policy at the University of Rome 'La Sapienza'.

    Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Università degli Studi di Teramo, Italy
    Giovanni Di Boartolomeo is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Teramo, where he is also Director of the postgraduate course in Management and Business Communication.

    Andrew Hughes Hallett, George Mason University, Virginia
    Andrew Hughes Hallett is Professor of Economics and Public Policy at George Mason University and Professor of Economics at the University of St Andrews. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh.

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