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Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making


  • 40 b/w illus. 2 tables
  • Page extent: 348 pages
  • Size: 228 x 152 mm
  • Weight: 0.64 kg

Library of Congress

  • Dewey number: 658.4/0353
  • Dewey version: 19
  • LC Classification: H61.25 .M677 1988
  • LC Subject headings:
    • Social sciences--Mathematical models
    • Game theory
    • Social choice

Library of Congress Record

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 (ISBN-13: 9780521360555 | ISBN-10: 0521360552)

DOI: 10.2277/0521360552

  • Also available in Paperback
  • Published February 1989

Manufactured on demand: supplied direct from the printer

 (Stock level updated: 02:09 GMT, 28 November 2015)


Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making provides a unified and comprehensive study of welfarism, cooperative games, public decision making, and voting and social choice theory - technically heterogeneous subjects that are linked by common axioms. Hervé Moulin studies these areas from an axiomatic perspective. Every axiom conveys a certain ethical principle (e.g. 'one man one vote', or 'to each according to his contribution'). Axiomatic theory examines the compatibility of various combinations of axioms. The book describes recent successes of this method. It gives many examples of the axiomatic approach, ranging from the construction of numerical indices for measuring inequality, to the pricing of a regulated monopoly, to the comparison of various voting rules. The book will be useful to mathematical modellers, especially those interested in economics and political science.

• Original and forceful argument • Author is recognized authority in decision making theory • Includes many application examples


Foreword Amartya Sen; Acknowledgements; Introduction; Overview; Part I. Welfarism: 1. Egalitarianism versus utilitarianism; 2. Social welfare orderings; 3. Axiomatic bargaining; 4. Cost-sharing schemes and the core; 5. Values of cooperative games; Part III. Public decision mechanisms: 6. Equal versus proportional sharing; 7. Regulated monopoly; 8. Strategyproof mechanisms; 9. Majority voting and scoring methods; 10. Strategyproofness and core stability; 11. Aggregation of preferences; Bibliography; Indexes.


'A most valuable contribution to the essence of the social science, and especially of economics: how agents, be they collective or individual, make choices.' Georges Bernard, Centre National de la Récherche Scientifique, Paris

'This book is a real pedagogical tour de force ... it is beautifully produced thanks to the Econometric Society and Cambridge University Press. It is not only highly recommended but, in the reviewer's opinion, obligatory reading for every theoretically-inclined economist or political scientist.' Maurice Salles, University of Caen


Amartya Sen

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