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Coordination Games
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  • 14 b/w illus.
  • Page extent: 180 pages
  • Size: 228 x 152 mm
  • Weight: 0.27 kg

Library of Congress

  • Dewey number: 339/.01/5118
  • Dewey version: 21
  • LC Classification: HB172.5 .C69 1999
  • LC Subject headings:
    • Macroeconomics--Mathematical models
    • Equilibrium (Economics)--Mathematical models
    • Social classes--England--History--19th century

Library of Congress Record

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 (ISBN-13: 9780521578967 | ISBN-10: 0521578965)

DOI: 10.2277/0521578965

Manufactured on demand: supplied direct from the printer

 (Stock level updated: 02:19 GMT, 01 December 2015)


This 1999 book studies the implications of macroeconomic complementarities for aggregate behavior. The presentation is intended to introduce PhD students into this sub-field of macroeconomics and to serve as a reference for more advanced scholars. The initial sections of the book cover the basic framework of complementarities and provide a discussion of the experimental evidence on the outcome of coordination games. The subsequent sections of the book investigate applications of these ideas for macroeconomics. The topics Professor Cooper explores include: economies with production complementarities, search models, imperfectly competitive product markets, models of timing and delay and the role of government in resolving and creating coordination problems. The presentation goes into detail on a few models and uses them as a structure to integrate related literature. The discussion brings together theory and quantitative analysis.

• The subject of coordination games which this book explores is a hot topic in economics, but this material is not covered in any other books • The author is one of the leading scholars developing coordination game theory • The analysis blends theory and quantitative analysis


Introduction; 1. Experimental evidence and selection; 2. A framework for analysis; 3. Technological complementarities; 4. Imperfect competition and demand spillovers; 5. Thick markets: search and matching; 6. Timing of discrete choices; 7. Government policy; 8. Concluding thoughts; References; Endnotes.

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