Originally published in 1997, The Political Economy of Property Rights reports on comparative research into the transformation of property rights in post-communist countries and China. Two important theoretical questions unify the contributions: what aspects of political systems give credibility to systems of property rights? What can be learned from the transformation of property rights in post-communist countries about the large-scale change of economic institutions? The contributors consider the credibility of property rights as arising from the strategic interaction of political and economic actors, and they apply this perspective and test its implications using a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods. Overall, the volume demonstrates the value of coordinated cross-national research by area specialists sharing a common focus on questions of political economy.
• The discussants include senior 'stars' in political economy, like Barry Weingast, Adam Przeworski, and Douglass North • Introduces important conceptual tools from modern political economy in non-technical ways
1. The political economy of property rights David L. Weimer; 2. Credible commitment and property rights: the role of strategic interaction between political and economic actors Daniel Diermeier, Joel Ericson, Timothy Frye, and Steven Lewis; 3. The political commitment to markets and marketization: comment on 'Credible commmitment and property rights' Barry R. Weingast; 4. Political determinants of the success of economic transition Nikolai Mikhailov; 5. Comment on 'Political determinants of the success of economic transition' Adam Przeworski; 6. Russian privatization and the problem of credible commitment Timothy Frye; 7. Three issues of credible commitment and Russian privatization John M. Litwack; 8. Legislative politics and the political economy of property rights in post-Communist Russia Brendan Kiernan and Francis X. Bell; 9. Commitment, coordination, and the demise of the post-Communist parliament in Russia Steven S. Smith; 10. Private firms, city governments, and arbitration: enforcing economic legality in St. Petersburg Jole Meyer Ericson; 11. Comment on 'Private firms, city governments, and arbitration: enforcing economic legality in St. Petersburg' Anthony Jones; 12. Property rights and institutional change in the Czech and Slovac Republics Mariusz Mark Dobek; 13. Comment on 'Property rights and institutional change in the Czech and Slovac Republics' Sharon Wolchik; 14. Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving privatization bargains in Poland Lorene Allio; 15. Comment on 'Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving privatization bargains in Poland' Bartlomeij Kaminski; 16. Privatization as institutional change in Hungary László Urbán; 17. Comment on 'Privatization as institutional change in Hungary' Kálmán Mizsei; 18. Marketization and government credibility in Shanghai: federalist and local corporatist explanations Steven Lewis; 19. Federalist and corporatist theories: a comment on an empirical test Victor Nee; 20. Learning about the economy: property rights and the collapse of the East German industrial economy Hannes Wittig; 21. Misinformation, insecure property rights, and the collapse of the East German economy Susanne Lohmann; 22. Post-Communist privatization as a test of theories of institutional change Lorene Allio, Mariusz Mark Dobek, Nikolia Mikhailov, and David L. Weimer; 23. Explaining the complexity of institutional change Jack Knight and Douglass C. North.