First published in 1997, this volume addressed the growing preoccupation of scientists at the time had in environmental phenomena, such as global warming, ozone layer depletion, acid rains, fresh water and ocean pollution, desertification, deforestation and the loss of bio-diversity. The crucial and pressing nature of these issues spawned says the author a new wave of research in environmental economics. The volume provides broad surveys of the developments in the economics of the environment and reports on the developing set of environmental problems, analytical tools and economic policies. The importance of the developing approach was that environmental problems are no longer isolated from all other economic dimensions. Throughout the volume they are analysed in an open, generally non-competitive economy with transnational or global externalities. The first part deals with the relationship between the environment, economic growth and technological innovation. The second part analyses the optimal design of environmental taxation, while the third part considers the international dimension of environmental policy.
• The first volume to address new environmental phenomena using a new set of analytical tools recently developed for the purpose • The authors are all leading contributors to the debate • Highly topical subject, offers an entirely up-to-date contribution
1. Theoretical frontiers of environmental economics Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco; 2. Growth with natural and environmental resources Andrea Beltratti; 3. Environmental policy and technological innovation David Ulph; 4. Environmental policy, distortionary labour taxation and employment: pollution taxes and the double-dividend A. Lans Bovenberg; 5. International coordination of environmental taxes Michael Hoel; 6. Environmental policy and international trade: a survey of recent economic analysis Alistair Ulph; 7. Environmental regulation and international capital allocation Michael Rauscher; 8. Towards a theory of international cooperationScott Barrett; 9. Group formation in games without spillovers Hideo Konishi, Michel le Breton and Shlomo Weber; 10. Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers Francis Bloch; Index.