Cambridge Catalogue  
  • Your account
  • View basket
  • Help
Home > Catalogue > Applied Industrial Economics
Applied Industrial Economics
Google Book Search

Search this book


  • 10 tables
  • Page extent: 456 pages
  • Size: 228 x 152 mm
  • Weight: 0.72 kg

Library of Congress

  • Dewey number: 338.5
  • Dewey version: 21
  • LC Classification: HD2326 .A657 1998
  • LC Subject headings:
    • Industrial organization (Economic theory)

Library of Congress Record

Add to basket


 (ISBN-13: 9780521629546 | ISBN-10: 0521629543)

DOI: 10.2277/0521629543

  • There was also a Hardback of this title but it is no longer available | Adobe eBook
  • Published September 1998

Manufactured on demand: supplied direct from the printer

 (Stock level updated: 02:09 GMT, 28 November 2015)


This reader provides a unique mix of American and European contributions to the study of particular markets, often combined with a critical evaluation of antitrust regulations, decisions or judgments. Part I explains market structure as a function of sunk costs and market size. Part II illustrates the central role of pricing schemes (including parallel pricing, delivered pricing and competition clauses) in sustaining equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic markets. Parts III and IV give a game-theoretic foundation to competition policy and merger control. Louis Phlips offers a comprehensive introduction to the text in which he very carefully explains the reasoning behind his choice of papers, and provides a superb synthesis of the material. Particular highlights include the discussion and evaluation of antitrust regulations, which involve a systematic comparative analysis of European and American regulations, decisions and judgments in this area.

• Fills a gap in the market for an applied industrial economics text, most present texts are theoretical in focus • Louis Phlips is the leading writer in this area - achieved sales of over 11,000 with his three previous books for CUP • Big name contributors, providing accessible analysis


Preface; Introduction; Part I. Market Structure: 1. Game theory and industry studies: an introductory overview John Sutton; 2. Game-theoretic models of market concentration: sunk costs and market structure - a review article Richard Schmalensee; 3. Expanding markets: capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry Pankaj Ghemawat; 4. Declining markets: the devolution of declining industries Pankaj Ghemawat and Barry Nalebuff; 5. Empirical evidence: exit from declining industries - 'shakeout' or 'stakeout'? Marvin B. Lieberman; Part II. Industrial Pricing and Pricing Schemes: 6. Intertemporal pricing schemes: experimental tests of consciously parallel behaviour in oligopoly Ronald Harstad, Stephen Martin and Hans-Theo Normann; 7. Spatial pricing schemes: on the strategic choice of spatial price policy Jacques-François Thisse and Xavier Vives; 8. Best-price policies: facilitating practices - the effects of advance notice and best-price policies Charles A. Holt and David T. Scheffman; 9. Vertical pricing schemes: vertical restraints and producers' competition Patrick Rey and Joseph Stiglitz; 10. Price discrimination in a common market: international price discrimination in the European car market Frank Verboven; 11. Tacit collusion (I): interfirm rivalry in a repeated game - an empirical test of tacit collusion Margaret E. Slade; 12. Tacit collusion (II): collusive equilibrium in the great salt duopoly Ray Rees; Part III. Competition Policy: 13. Collusion and predation: on the detection of collusion and predation Louis Phlips; 14. Vertical restraints: vertical restraints in European competition policy J. A. Kay; 15. Franchising agreements: economic assessment of competition law provisions applicable to franchising OECD; 16. Joint R&D ventures: cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers C. d'Aspremont and A. Jacquemin; Part IV. Mergers and Merger Control: 17. Unprofitable exogenous mergers: losses from horizontal merger - the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium S. W. Salant, S. Switzer and R. J. Reynolds; 18. Profitable horizontal mergers and welfare: horizontal mergers - an equilibrium analysis Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro; 19. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index: horizontal mergers - comment Gregory J. Werden; 20. Cournot and merger control: horizontal mergers - reply Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro; 21.Vertical mergers: vertical mergers in multi-product industries and Edgeworth's paradox of taxation Michael A. Salinger; 22. Enforcement of the US merger guidelines: empirical evidence on FTC enforcement of the merger guidelines Malcolm B. Coate and Fred S. McChesney; 23. Enforcement of the European merger regulation: the merger decisions of the European Commission Damien Neven, Robin Nuttall and Paul Seabright; Index.


John Sutton, Richard Schmalensee, Pankaj Ghemawa, Barry Nalebuff, Marvin B. Lieberman, Ronald Harstad, Stephen Martin, Hans-Theo Normann, Jacques-François Thisse, Xavier Vives, Charles A. Holt, David T. Scheffman, Patrick Rey, Joseph Stiglitz, Frank Verboven, Margaret E. Slade, Ray Rees, Louis Phlips, J. A. Kay, OECD, C. d'Aspremont, A. Jacquemin, S. W. Salant, S. Switzer, R. J. Reynolds, Joseph Farrell, Carl Shapiro, Gregory J. Werden, Michael A. Salinger, Malcolm B. Coate, Fred S. McChesney, Damien Neven, Robin Nutall, Paul Seabright

printer iconPrinter friendly version AddThis