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Market Structure and Competition Policy
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  • Page extent: 308 pages
  • Size: 228 x 152 mm
  • Weight: 0.62 kg

Library of Congress

  • Dewey number: 338.6/048
  • Dewey version: 21
  • LC Classification: HB238 .M37 2000
  • LC Subject headings:
    • Competition--Government policy--Mathematical models
    • Industrial policy--Mathematical models
    • Game theory
    • Phlips, Louis

Library of Congress Record

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 (ISBN-13: 9780521783330 | ISBN-10: 052178333X)

DOI: 10.2277/052178333X

Manufactured on demand: supplied direct from the printer

 (Stock level updated: 17:01 GMT, 25 November 2015)


This 2000 text applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy and develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. Containing contributions by leading scholars from Europe and North America, this book observes a common theme in the relationship between the regulatory regime and market structure. Since the inception of the new industrial organization, economists have developed a better understanding of how real-world markets operate. These results have particular relevance to the design and application of anti-trust policy. Analyses indicate that picking the most competitive framework in the short run may be detrimental to competition and welfare in the long run, concentrating the attention of policy makers on the impact on the long-run market structure. This book provides essential reading for graduate students of industrial and managerial economics as well as researchers and policy makers.

• Focuses on the interface between new modelling strategies of market structure and the design of efficient competition policy • Contains numerous and varied examples to illustrate • Considers the implications that arise for the formulation and implementation of anti-trust policy


Introduction; 1. Competition policy and game theory: reflection based on the cement industry case Claude d'Aspremont, David Encaoua and Jean-Pierre Ponssard; 2. Legal standards and economic analysis of collusion in the EC competition policy Damien J. Neven; 3. A guided tour of the folk theorem James W. Friedman; 4. Predatory pricing and anti-dumping P. K. M. Tharakan; 5. Should pricing policies be regulated when firms may tacitly collude? George Norman and Jacques-François Thisse; 6. Tougher price competition or lower concentration: a trade-off for antitrust authorities? Claude d'Aspremont and Massimo Motta; 7. The strategic effects of supply guarantees: the raincheck game Jonathan H. Hamilton; 8. Product market competition policy and technological performance Stephen Martin; 9. On some issues in the theory of competition in regulated markets Gianni de Fraja; 10. Modelling the entry and exit process in dynamic competition: an introduction to repeated commitment models Jean-Pierre Ponssard; 11. Coordination failures in the Cournot approach to deregulated bank competition André de Palma and Robert J. Gary-Bobo; 12. How the adoption of a new technology is affected by the interaction between labor and product markets Xavier Wauthy and Yves Zenou.


Claude d'Aspremont, David Encaoua, Jean-Pierre Ponssard, Damien J. Neven, James W. Friedman, P. K. M. Tharakan, George Norman, Jacques-François Thisse, Massimo Motta, Jonathan H. Hamilton, Stephen Martin, Gianni de Fraja, André de Palma, Robert J. Gary-Bobo, Xavier Wauthy, Yves Zenou

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