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Cases in European Competition Policy

Details

  • 44 tables
  • Page extent: 512 pages
  • Size: 247 x 174 mm
  • Weight: 0.81 kg
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Paperback

 (ISBN-13: 9780521713504)

Manufactured on demand: supplied direct from the printer

 (Stock level updated: 01:58 GMT, 01 September 2015)

£34.99

Competition between firms is usually the most effective way of delivering economic efficiency and what consumers want. However, there is a balance to be struck. Firms must not be over-regulated and so hampered in their development of innovative products and new strategies to compete for customers. Nor must they be completely free to satisfy a natural preference for monopoly, which would give them higher profits and a quieter life. The economic role of competition policy (control of anticompetitive agreements, mergers and abusive practices) is to maintain this balance, and an effective policy requires a nuanced understanding of the economics of industrial organization. Cases in European Competition Policy demonstrates how economics is used (and sometimes abused) in competition cases in practical competition policy across Europe. Each chapter summarizes a real case investigated by the European Commission or a national authority, and provides a critique of key aspects of the economic analysis.

• Written by Europe's leading competition academics, many of whom advised on the cases featured in the book • Features seventeen different actual European cases, representing a wide range of issues addressed in competition policy • Non-technical and accessible style makes the book suitable for a wide range of readers, including lawyers, practitioners, economics undergraduates and law postgraduates

Contents

List of figures; List of tables; List of contributors; Preface; Introduction: the transformation of competition policy in Europe Bruce Lyons; Part I. Anticompetitive Behaviour by Firms with Market Power: Introduction; Section 1. Abuse of a Dominant Position: 1. Michelin II: the treatment of rebates Massimo Motta; 2. Interoperability and market foreclosure in the European Microsoft case Kai-Uwe Kühn and John Van Reenen; Section 2. Market Investigations: 3. Mobile call termination in the UK: a competitive bottleneck? Mark Armstrong and Julian Wright; 4. Relationship between buyer and seller power in retailing: UK supermarkets (2000) Paul Dobson; Part II. Agreements Between Firms: Introduction; Section 1. Cartels: 5. The graphite electrodes cartel: fines which deter? Morten Hviid and Andreas Stephan; 6. Assessment of damages in the district heating pipe cartel Peter Møllgaard; Section 2. Other Horizontal Agreements: 7. Interchange fees in payment card systems: price remedies in a two-sided market Jean-Charles Rochet; 8. The orders and rules of British horseracing: anticompetitive agreements or good governance of a multi-sided sport? Bruce Lyons; Section 3. Vertical Agreements: 9. Efficiency enhancing or anticompetitive vertical restraints? Selective and exclusive car distribution in Europe Frank Verboven; 10. Beer - the ties that bind Michael Waterson; 11. Parallel trade of prescription medicines: the Glaxo dual pricing case Patrick Rey and James Venit; Part III. Mergers: Introduction; Section 1. Measurement of Unilateral Effects: 12. A merger in the insurance industry: much easier to measure unilateral effects than expected Christian Gollier and Marc Ivaldi; 13. Merger simulations of unilateral effects: what can we learn from the UK brewing industry? Margaret Slade; Section 2. Coordinated Effects: 14. The ups and downs of the doctrine of collective dominance: sing game theory for merger policy Eliana Garces-Tolon, Damien Neven and Paul Seabright; 15. Capacity constraints and irreversible investments: defending against collective dominance in UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl Kai-Uwe Kühn and John Van Reenen; Section 3. Vertical and Conglomerate Effects: 16. Vertical effects between natural gas and electricity production: the Neste/IVO merger in Finland Rune Stenbacka; 17. Horizontal, vertical and conglomerate effects: the GE/Honeywell merger in the EU Xavier Vives and Gianandrea Staffiero; Index.

Reviews

'This book fills the need for a European companion to the Kwoka and White compendium of economic discussions of US antitrust cases. It will be invaluable both for its substantive discussions and also for the light cast on the ways in which US and EU competition policy are converging and the ways in which they remain distinct.' Joseph Farrell, University of California at Berkeley and former Deputy Assistant Attorney General with the US Department of Justice

'This book is essential reading for economist and lawyers alike. Not only does it illustrate the substantial progress economics has brought to bear on competition policy enforcement in Europe, but it also illustrates the challenges and the inherent limits, when it is not properly applied.' Lars-Hendrik Röller, Humboldt University, Berlin and President of the European School of Management and Technology (ESMT)

'… the volume must … be praised for presenting the economic reasoning behind important competition cases in Europe. This should enable more thorough scrutiny of the Commission's and other authorities' case practice. It should also raise awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of economic analyses in competition law enforcement. Hopefully, the volume will regularly be updated in the same manner as its role model …' European Competition Law Review

Contributors

Bruce Lyons, Massimo Motta, Kai-Uwe Kühn, John Van Reenen, Mark Armstrong, Julian Wright, Paul Dobson, Morten Hviid, Andreas Stephan, Peter Møllgaard, Jean-Charles Rochet, Frank Verboven, Michael Waterson, Patrick Rey, James Venit, Christian Gollier, Marc Ivaldi, Margaret Slade, Eliana Garces-Tolon, Damien Neven, Paul Seabright, Rune Stenbacka, Xavier Vives, Gianandrea Staffiero

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