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Contents
- 1. Getting to work:
- 1.1 Politics sets the stage
- 1.2 Designing for multiple goals
- 1.3 Comparing seller revenues
- 1.4 The academic critics
- 1.5 Plan for this book
- Section I. The Mechanism Design Approach:
- 2. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms:
- 2.1 Formulation
- 2.2 Always optimal and weakly dominant strategies
- 2.3 Balancing the budget
- 2.4 Uniqueness
- 2.5 Disadvantages of the Vickrey auction
- 2.6 Conclusion
- 3. The envelope theorem and payoff equivalence:
- 3.1 Hottelling’s lemma
- 3.2 The envelope theorem in integral form
- 3.3 Quasi-linear payoffs
- 3.4 Conclusion
- 4. Bidding equilibrium and revenue differences:
- 4.1 The single crossing conditions
- 4.2 Deriving and verifying equilibrium strategies
- 4.3 Revenue comparisons in the benchmark model
- 4.4 Expected-revenue maximizing auctions
- 4.5 Conclusion;
- 5. Interdependence of types and values:
- 5.1 Which models and assumptions are ‘useful’?
- 5.2 Statistical dependence and revenue-maximizing auctions
- 5.3 Wilson’s drainage tract model
- 5.4 Correlated types model interdependent values
- 5.5 Conclusion
- 6. Auctions in context:
- 6.1 The profit and surplus contribution of an entrant
- 6.2 Symmetric models with costly entry
- 6.3 Asymmetric models: devices to promote competition
- 6.4 After the bidding ends
- 6.5 Conclusion
- Section II. Multi-Unit Auctions:
- 7. Uniform price auctions:
- 7.1 Uniform price sealed bid auctions
- 7.2 Simultaneous ascending auctions
- 7.3 Conclusion
- 8. Package auctions and combinatorial bidding:
- 8.1 Vickrey auctions and the monotonicity problems
- 8.2 Bernheim-Whinston first-price package auctions
- 8.3 Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auctions
- 8.4 Conclusion
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Series: Churchill Lectures in Economics
Publication: March 2004
228 x 152 mm | 384pp
8 line diagrams | 4 tables
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