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Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory

$34.99 (P)

textbook
  • Date Published: August 2016
  • availability: Temporarily unavailable - available from TBC
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9781316624791

$ 34.99 (P)
Paperback

Temporarily unavailable - available from TBC
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About the Authors
  • Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

    • Short, focused chapters allow readers to quickly learn the essentials of the topics most relevant to them
    • Includes real-world case studies on a variety of topics including online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management
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    Reviews & endorsements

    'There are several features of this book that make it very well suited both for the classroom and for self-study … if your interest is in understanding how game theory, economics and computer science are cross-pollinating to address challenges of the design of online strategic interactions, this is the book to start with. It is clear, well-organized and makes a compelling introduction to a vibrant field.' David Burke, MAA Reviews

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    Product details

    • Date Published: August 2016
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9781316624791
    • length: 352 pages
    • dimensions: 227 x 151 x 19 mm
    • weight: 0.51kg
    • availability: Temporarily unavailable - available from TBC
  • Table of Contents

    1. Introduction and examples
    2. Mechanism design basics
    3. Myerson's Lemma
    4. Algorithmic mechanism design 34
    5. Revenue-maximizing auctions
    6. Simple near-optimal auctions
    7. Multi-parameter mechanism design
    8. Spectrum auctions
    9. Mechanism design with payment constraints
    10. Kidney exchange and stable matching
    11. Selfish routing and the price of anarchy
    12. Network over-provisioning and atomic selfish routing
    13. Equilibria: definitions, examples, and existence
    14. Robust price-of-anarchy bounds in smooth games
    15. Best-case and strong Nash equilibria
    16. Best-response dynamics
    17. No-regret dynamics
    18. Swap regret and the Minimax theorem
    19. Pure Nash equilibria and PLS-completeness
    20. Mixed Nash equilibria and PPAD-completeness.

  • Author

    Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University, California
    Tim Roughgarden is an Associate Professor of Computer Science at Stanford University, California. For his research in algorithmic game theory, he has been awarded the ACM Grace Murray Hopper Award, the Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers (PECASE), the Kalai Prize in Game Theory and Computer Science, the Social Choice and Welfare Prize, the Mathematical Programming Society's Tucker Prize, and the EATCS-SIGACT Gödel Prize. He wrote the book Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy (2005) and coedited the book Algorithmic Game Theory (2007).

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