Theory of Conditional Games
$46.00 ( ) USD
- Author: Wynn C. Stirling, Brigham Young University, Utah
Adobe eBook Reader
Looking for an examination copy?
If you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an examination copy. To register your interest please contact email@example.com providing details of the course you are teaching.
Game theory explains how to make good choices when different decision makers have conflicting interests. The classical approach assumes that decision makers are committed to making the best choices for themselves regardless of the effect on others, but such an approach is less appropriate when cooperation, compromise, and negotiation are important. This book describes conditional games, a form of game theory that accommodates multiple stakeholder decision-making scenarios where cooperation and negotiation are significant issues and where notions of concordant group behavior are important. Using classical binary preference relations as a point of departure, the book extends the concept of a preference ordering that permits stakeholders to modulate their preferences as functions of the preferences of others. As these conditional preferences propagate through a group of decision makers, they create social bonds that lead to notions of group concordance. This book is intended for all students and researchers of decision theory and game theory, including students in artificial intelligence (especially multiagent systems and distributed control), economics, management science, psychology, analytic philosophy, and applied mathematics.Read more
- Revises game theory to accommodate multiple stakeholder decision-making scenarios
- Extends the concept of a preference ordering to permit stakeholders to modulate their preferences as functions of the preferences of others
Reviews & endorsements
"… in my opinion Stirling's book is the most important new basis for novel extensions and applications of game theory since the invention of stochastic equilibrium ideas two decades ago."
Journal of Economic MethodologySee more reviews
"… a balanced reading of theory, application, and examples, with ample opportunity for novices to become familiar with prerequisite topics. This book thus becomes a valuable companion to anyone even tangentially interested in modeling phenomena in multiagent societies, as the framework is general enough to provide ease of its adoption in modeling a wide variety of 'miniworlds', and powerful enough to introduce the term 'conditional game theory' in the mainstream research glossary. A truly practical elaboration on a powerful subject. Highly recommended."
G. Trajkovski, Choice
Not yet reviewed
Be the first to review
Review was not posted due to profanity×
- Date Published: February 2012
- format: Adobe eBook Reader
- isbn: 9781139211383
- contains: 27 b/w illus. 29 tables
- availability: This item is not supplied by Cambridge University Press in your region. Please contact eBooks.com for availability.
Table of Contents
Sorry, this resource is locked
Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email firstname.lastname@example.orgRegister Sign in
You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.Continue ×