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Papers in Experimental Economics

Papers in Experimental Economics

$208.00

D. B. Rice, R. M. Miller, C. R. Plott, A. W. Williams, W. K. Bratton, M. G. Vannoni, J. Ketcham, M. Knez, G. L. Suchanek, D. L. Coursey, V. M. Coppinger, J. A. Titus, B. Roberson, J. C. Cox, J. M. Walker, S. J. Rassenti, R. L. Bulfin, K. A. McCabe, S. J. Rassenti, R. M. Isaac
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  • Date Published: November 1991
  • availability: Available
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9780521364560

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About the Authors
  • Vernon L. Smith is the main creator of the burgeoning discipline of experimental economics. This collection of his papers from 1962 to 1988 surveys major developments in the field from early attempts to simulate economic behavior in now classic double oral auction markets through recent studies of industrial organization and decision making. Topics covered include monopoly and oligopoly supply and demand theory under posted pricing, uniform pricing, double continuous auction, and sealed bid-offer auction; hypothetical valuation and market pricing; asset price bubbles; predatory pricing; market contestability and natural monopoly; and the methodology of experimental economics. Taken together, the papers form a history of the study of economics under controlled conditions. Vernon Smith is Regents Professor of Economics at the University of Arizona, and is the author of over 100 articles and books on capital theory, finance, natural resource economics, and experimental economics. He is president of the Public Choice Society and past founding president of the Economic Science Association.

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    Product details

    • Date Published: November 1991
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9780521364560
    • length: 828 pages
    • dimensions: 234 x 156 x 44 mm
    • weight: 1.33kg
    • contains: 102 b/w illus. 245 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    Preface
    Acknowledgments
    Part I. The Formative Years: Introduction
    1. An experimental study of competitive market behaviour
    2. Effects of market organization on competitive equilibrium
    3. Nature, the experimental laboratory, and the credibility of hypotheses with D. B. Rice
    4. Experimental auction markets and the Walrasian hypothesis
    5. Experimental studies of discrimination versus competition in sealed-bid auction markets
    6. Experimental economics: induced value theory
    7. Bidding and auctioning institutions: experimental results
    8. Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: an empirical study of speculation with R. M. Miller and C. R. Plott
    9. Experimental economics at Purdue
    Part II. Institutions And Market Performance: Introduction
    10. On nonbinding price controls in a competitive market with A. W. Williams
    11. An experimental comparison of alternative rules for competitive market exchange with A. W. Williams
    12. Competitive market institutions: double auctions vs. sealed bid-offer auctions with A. W. Williams, W. K. Bratton and M. G. Vannoni
    13. Markets as economisers of information: experimental examination of the 'Hayek Hypothesis'
    14. The effect of rent asymmetries in experimental auction markets with A. W. Williams
    15. Microeconomic systems as an experimental science
    16. Experimental economics
    17. A comparison of posted-offer and double-auction pricing institutions with J. Ketcham and A. W. Williams
    18. Hypothetical valuations and preference reversals in the context of asset trading with M. Knez
    19. Bubbles, crashes, and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets with G. L. Suchanek and A. W. Williams
    Part III. Public Goods: Introduction
    20. The principle of unanimity and voluntary consent in social choice
    21. Incentive compatible experimental processes for the provision of public goods
    22. An experimental comparison of three public good decision mechanisms
    23. Experiments with a decentralised mechanism for public good decisions
    24. Experimental tests of an allocation mechanism for private, public or externality goods with D. L. Coursey
    Part IV. Auctions And Institutional Design: Introduction
    25. Incentives and behaviour in English, Dutch and Sealed-bid auctions with V. M. Coppinger and J. A. Titus
    26. Theory and behaviour of single object auctions with J. C. Cox and B. Roberson
    27. A test that discriminates between two models of the Dutch-first auction non-isomorphism with J. C. Cox and J. M. Walker
    28. Theory and behaviour of multiple unit discriminative auctions J. C. Cox and J. M. Walker
    29. Theory and individual behaviour of first-price auctions J. C. Cox and J. M. Walker
    30. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation with S. J. Rassenti and R. L. Bulfin
    31. Designing 'smart' computer-assisted markets with K. A. McCabe and S. J. Rassenti
    Part V. Industrial Organization: Introduction
    32. An empirical study of decentralised institutions of monopoly restraint
    33. Natural monopoly and contested markets: some experimental results with D. Coursey and R. M. Isaac
    34. In search of predatory pricing with R. M. Isaac
    Part VI. Perspectives On Economics:
    35. Theory, experiment and economics
    36. Experimental economics: behavioural lessons for microeconomic theory and policy.

  • Author

    Vernon L. Smith, Chapman University, California
    fm.author_biographical_note1

    Contributors

    D. B. Rice, R. M. Miller, C. R. Plott, A. W. Williams, W. K. Bratton, M. G. Vannoni, J. Ketcham, M. Knez, G. L. Suchanek, D. L. Coursey, V. M. Coppinger, J. A. Titus, B. Roberson, J. C. Cox, J. M. Walker, S. J. Rassenti, R. L. Bulfin, K. A. McCabe, S. J. Rassenti, R. M. Isaac

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