Skip to content
Open global navigation

Cambridge University Press

AcademicLocation selectorSearch toggleMain navigation toggle
Cart
Register Sign in Wishlist
A Theory of Efficient Cooperation and Competition

A Theory of Efficient Cooperation and Competition

$156.00

  • Date Published: September 1987
  • availability: Available
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9780521306195

$156.00
Hardback

Add to cart Add to wishlist

Other available formats:
Paperback, eBook


Looking for an examination copy?

This title is not currently available for examination. However, if you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an examination copy. To register your interest please contact collegesales@cambridge.org providing details of the course you are teaching.

Description
Product filter button
Description
Contents
Resources
About the Authors
  • This book looks at competition in a new way. It attacks the notion that competition always leads to good results and that more competition is better. It also attacks the notion that cooperation is always harmful. An efficient economic equilibrium requires an optimal combination of both cooperation and rivalry. Telser first examines the genesis of certain late nineteenth-century laws that affected competition in the United States. Going on to give new theoretical insights into cooperation and rivalry, he shows when unrestricted competition can lead to an efficient equilibrium, as well as when restrictions on competition can provide for the same. The tensions between these two forces are especially pertinent to the study of innovation--the more costly it is to protect the property rights of ideas, the greater is the reliance on secrecy, and hence, the more likely is the wasteful duplication of results.

    Customer reviews

    Not yet reviewed

    Be the first to review

    Review was not posted due to profanity

    ×

    , create a review

    (If you're not , sign out)

    Please enter the right captcha value
    Please enter a star rating.
    Your review must be a minimum of 12 words.

    How do you rate this item?

    ×

    Product details

    • Date Published: September 1987
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9780521306195
    • length: 320 pages
    • dimensions: 229 x 152 x 19 mm
    • weight: 0.6kg
    • contains: 11 b/w illus. 21 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    List of tables
    Preface
    1. Prologue
    2. Perceptions and reality: the genesis of the Sherman act
    3. Competition, cooperation, and efficiency
    4. Stable coalitions
    5. Equilibrium with decreasing average cost: an application of the theory of the core illustrated by production and exchange among spatially separated markets
    6. A theory of self-enforcing agreements
    7. Some new results on duopoly applied to theories of Cournot, Bertrand, and Edgeworth
    8. Rivalry by means of innovation
    References
    Index.

  • Author

    Lester G. Telser, University of Chicago

Sign In

Please sign in to access your account

Cancel

Not already registered? Create an account now. ×

You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website, your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.

Continue ×

Continue ×

Find content that relates to you

© Cambridge University Press 2014

Back to top

Are you sure you want to delete your account?

This cannot be undone.

Cancel Delete

Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.

If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.

×
Please fill in the required fields in your feedback submission.
×