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Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents

Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents

$134.99 (C)

  • Date Published: February 1989
  • availability: Available
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9780521343831

$134.99 (C)

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About the Authors
  • This book extrapolates on the Nash (1950) treatment of the bargaining problem to consider the situation where the number of bargainers may vary. The authors formulate axioms to specify how solutions should respond to such changes, and provide new characterizations of all the major solutions as well as the generalizations of these solutions.

    Reviews & endorsements

    "This is one of the best books ever written on normative collective choice." Ehud Kalai, Social Choice and Welfare

    "For both he sympathetic and the critical reader, the well-written monograph is the reference book covering this strand of literature." Hans Haller, Mathematical Reviews

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    Product details

    • Date Published: February 1989
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9780521343831
    • length: 222 pages
    • dimensions: 229 x 152 x 16 mm
    • weight: 0.5kg
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    1. Preliminaries
    2. Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a fixed number of agents
    3. Population monotonicity and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
    4. Population monotonicity and the egalitarian solution
    5. Truncated egalitarian and monotone path solutions
    6. Guarantees and opportunities
    7. Stability and the Nash solution
    8. Stability without pareto-optimality
    9. Stability and the leximin solution
    10. Population monotonicity, weak stability and the egalitarian solution
    11. Stability and collectively rational solutions
    12. Invariance under replication and juxtaposition

  • Authors

    William Thomson

    Terje Lensberg

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