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Economics and the Theory of Games

Economics and the Theory of Games

$60.00 (X)

  • Date Published: July 2003
  • availability: Manufactured on demand: supplied direct from the printer
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9780521775908

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Description
Contents
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About the Authors
  • Fernando Vega-Redondo's self-contained account of the main contributions of modern game theory and its applications to economics starts with a detailed description of how to model strategic situations. The discussion proceeds by studying basic solution concepts and their main refinements; games played under incomplete information; and repeated games. For each of these theoretical developments, the text includes a companion set of applications that cover the most representative instances of game-theoretic analysis in economics (e.g., oligopolistic competition, public goods, coordination failures, bargaining, insurance markets, implementation theory, signaling and auctions).

    • Covers all aspects of game theory (now a wide field), including topics of social learning, evolution, rationality, multiple equilibria
    • Balances theory and applications; author known in US as well as Europe
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    Product details

    • Date Published: July 2003
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9780521775908
    • length: 528 pages
    • dimensions: 244 x 170 x 27 mm
    • weight: 0.83kg
    • contains: 84 b/w illus. 55 tables 227 exercises
    • availability: Manufactured on demand: supplied direct from the printer
  • Table of Contents

    Part I. Theoretical Framework:
    1. Introduction and examples
    2. The representation of a game in extensive form
    3. The representation of a game in strategic form
    4. The mixed extension of a game
    5. Mixed and behavioral strategies
    6. Representation in coalition form
    Summary
    Exercises
    Part II. Strategic-Form Analysis: Theory:
    7. Dominance and iterative dominance
    8. Nash equilibrium
    9. Zero-sum bilateral games
    10. Nash equilibrium: formal existence results
    11. Strong and coalition-proof equilibrium
    12. Correlated equilibrium
    13. Rationalizability
    Summary
    Exercises
    Part III. Strategic-Form Analysis: Applications:
    14. Oligopoly (I): static models
    15. Mechanism design (I): efficient allocation of public goods
    16. Mechanism design (II): Nash implementation
    17. Markets (I): macroeconomic coordination failures
    Summary
    Exercises
    Part IV. Refinements of Nash Equilibrium: Theory:
    18. Introduction
    19. Refinements excluding 'incredible threats': examples
    20. Subgame-perfect equilibrium
    21. Weak-perfect Bayesian equilibrium
    22. Refinements excluding 'untenable beliefs': examples
    23. Sequential equilibrium
    24. Perfect and proper equilibria
    25. Strategic-form refinements
    Summary
    Exercises
    Part V. Refinements of Nash Equilibrium: Applications:
    26. Oligopoly (II): sequential moves
    27. Markets (II): decentralized price formation
    28. Oligopoly (III): differentiated products
    29. Mechanism design (III): efficient allocation of an indivisible object
    Summary, Exercises
    Part VI. Incomplete Information: Theory:
    30. Introduction and examples
    31. Bayesian games
    32. Bayes-Nash equilibrium
    33. Signalling games
    34. Mixed strategies revisited: a purification approach
    35. Forward induction
    Summary
    Exercises
    Part VII. Incomplete Information: Applications:
    36. Markets (III): signalling in the labor market
    37. Markets (IV): insurance markets and adverse selection
    38. Mechanism design (IV): one-sided auctions
    39. Mechanism design (V): buyer-seller trade
    Summary
    Exercises
    Part VIII. Repeated Interaction: Theory:
    40. Introduction and examples
    41. Repeated games: basic theoretical framework
    42. Folk theorems: Nash equilibrium
    43. Reputation and 'irrationality': informal discussion
    44. Folk theorems: subgame=perfect equilibrium
    45. Reputation and 'irrationality': formal analysis
    Summary
    Exercises
    Part IX. Repeated Interaction: Applications:
    46. Oligopoly (IV): intertemporal collusion in a Cournot scenario
    47. Oligopoly (V): intertemporal collusion in a Bertrand scenario
    48. Markets (V): efficiency, wages and unemployment
    Summary
    Exercises
    Part X. Evolutionary Foundations of Equilibrium:
    49. Introduction
    50. Static analysis
    51. Basic dynamic analysis
    52. Evolution in social environments
    53. The evolution of cooperation: an example
    Summary
    Exercises
    Part XI. Learning to Play:
    54. Introduction
    55. Reinforcement learning
    56. Static perceptions and Nash equilibrium
    57. Memory, expectations and foresight
    Summary
    Exercises
    Part XII. Social Learning and Equilibrium Selection:
    58. Introduction
    59. Evolutionary games: theoretical framework
    60. Evolutionary games: alternative scenarios
    61. Stochastic stability and equilibrium selection
    62. Experimental evidence
    63. Perturbed Markov processes: basic concepts and techniques
    64. Reinforcement learning with flexible aspirations
    Summary
    Exercises.

  • Author

    Fernando Vega-Redondo, Universidad de Alicante

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