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Reputation and Judicial Tactics
A Theory of National and International Courts

$34.99 (C)

Part of Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy

  • Date Published: September 2016
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9781316621141

$ 34.99 (C)
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  • This book argues that national and international courts seek to enhance their reputations through the strategic exercise of judicial power. Courts often cannot enforce their judgments and must rely on reputational sanctions to ensure compliance. One way to do this is for courts to improve their reputation for generating compliance with their judgments. When the court's reputation is increased, parties will be expected to comply with its judgments and the reputational sanction on a party that fails to comply will be higher. This strategy allows national and international courts, which cannot enforce their judgments against states and executives, to improve the likelihood that their judgments will be complied with over time. This book describes the judicial tactics that courts use to shape their judgments in ways that maximize their reputational gains.

    • Presents a theory of courts as institutions that differs from many theories that focus on individual judges
    • Deals with the court as an actor that strategically increases its power through its judgments
    • Develops a theory that explains the way reputational sanctions shape the behavior of states and governments
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    Product details

    • Date Published: September 2016
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9781316621141
    • length: 352 pages
    • dimensions: 230 x 153 x 20 mm
    • weight: 0.52kg
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    1. Introduction
    2. A theory of the reputations of courts
    3. Constraints on courts
    4. Tactics to increase courts' reputations
    5. National court case study - Israeli Supreme Court
    6. International court case study - European Court of Human Rights
    7. When compliance is irrelevant
    8. Conclusions.

  • Author

    Shai Dothan, Tel-Aviv University
    Shai Dothan is a senior researcher with the Global Trust Project at Tel Aviv University and an adjunct professor in the Faculty of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

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