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The internalism-externalism debate is one of the oldest debates in epistemology. Internalists assert that the justification of our beliefs can only depend on facts internal to us, while externalists insist that justification can depend on additional, for example environmental, factors. In this book Clayton Littlejohn proposes and defends a new strategy for resolving this debate. Focussing on the connections between practical and theoretical reason, he explores the question of whether the priority of the good to the right (in ethics) might be used to defend an epistemological version of consequentialism, and proceeds to formulate a new 'deontological externalist' view. His discussion is rich with insights and will be valuable for a wide range of readers in epistemology, ethics and practical reason.Read more
- Provides a survey of the internalism-externalism debate from its beginnings to the present day
- Proposes new strategies for resolving a long-standing debate in epistemology
- Focuses on the connections between practical and theoretical reason
Reviews & endorsements
"In this book Clayton Littlejohn defends the unorthodox view that there are no justified false beliefs. But his book will be a must-read for anyone, orthodox or not, who is interested in the theory of justification, and in epistemic normativity more generally. I cannot say whether his view will win the day; but I can say that his arguments will be a core part of the debate going forward."
--Sanford Goldberg, Northwestern UniversitySee more reviews
"This is an up-to-date and accessible treatment of core areas of concern in contemporary epistemology. Highly recommended."
--Trent Dougherty, Baylor University
"...Littlejohn’s book hence is a work of contemporary epistemology that engages deeply with a range of concerns in value theory."
--Robert Talisse, New Books in Philosophy
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- Date Published: July 2012
- format: Hardback
- isbn: 9781107016125
- length: 278 pages
- dimensions: 233 x 159 x 28 mm
- weight: 0.58kg
- availability: In stock
Table of Contents
2. Epistemic value
3. Reasons for belief (I)
4. Reasons for belief (II)
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