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Living without Free Will

$67.00 (C)

Part of Cambridge Studies in Philosophy

  • Date Published: November 2006
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9780521029964

$ 67.00 (C)
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About the Authors
  • In Living Without Free Will, Derk Pereboom argues that our best scientific theories indeed have the consequence that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform, and that because of this, we are not morally responsible for any of them. He seeks to defend the view that morality, meaning, and value remain intact even if we are not morally responsible, and furthermore, that adopting this perspective would provide significant benefit for our lives.

    • Covers most recent material on free will
    • Argues for rather than against free will - original and radical perspective
    • Provides a conception of life without free will that would not undermine our sense of meaning in life
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    Reviews & endorsements

    "This is an impressive book, which can be recommended to all philosophers interested in the problems surrounding freedom and moral responsibility. It covers a lot of ground..." Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

    "This book is well written and as easy to read as the intricacy of its argument permits. It is clear, careful, insightful, and well-informed, a good guide to the philosophical literature on the many issues it discusses. Anyone concerned with those issues will profit greatly from reading it. Journal of Ethics

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    Product details

    • Date Published: November 2006
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9780521029964
    • length: 256 pages
    • dimensions: 228 x 152 x 14 mm
    • weight: 0.389kg
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    Acknowledgments
    Introduction: Hard incompatibilism
    1. Alternative possibilities and causal histories
    2. Coherence objections to libertarianism
    3. Empirical objections to agent-causal libertarianism
    4. Problems for compatibilism
    5. The contours of hard incompatibilism
    6. Hard incompatibilism and criminal behavior
    7. Hard incompatibilism and meaning in life
    Bibliography
    Index.

  • Author

    Derk Pereboom, University of Vermont

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