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Evolution of the Social Contract

2nd Edition

$30.99 (P)

  • Date Published: October 2014
  • availability: In stock
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9781107434288

$ 30.99 (P)
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About the Authors
  • In this new edition of Evolution of the Social Contract, Brian Skyrms uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the genesis of social contracts and investigates social phenomena including justice, communication, altruism, and bargaining. Featuring new material on evolution and information transfer, and including recent developments in game theory and evolution literature, his book introduces and applies appropriate concepts of equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics, showing how key issues can be modeled as games and considering the ways in which evolution sometimes supports, and sometimes does not support, rational choice. He discusses topics including how bargaining with neighbors promotes sharing of resources, the diversity of behavior in ultimatum bargaining in small societies, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and an investigation into signaling games and the spontaneous emergence of meaningful communication. His book will be of great interest to readers in philosophy of science, social science, evolutionary biology, game and decision theory, and political theory.

    • Provides a new perspective on social contract bargaining, commitment, and altruism through a game theoretic analysis
    • Offers a fuller account of the genesis of the social contract by contrasting evolution with rational choice
    • Features discussion of the evolution of signals and spontaneous generation of meaning
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    Reviews & endorsements

    "This second edition is an important update of Brian Skyrms' important book. Game theorists in evolutionary biology, economics and philosophy will continue to profit from, and enjoy, Skyrms' groundbreaking work."
    Elliott Sober, University of Wisconsin, Madison

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    Product details

    • Edition: 2nd Edition
    • Date Published: October 2014
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9781107434288
    • length: 164 pages
    • dimensions: 216 x 139 x 10 mm
    • weight: 0.25kg
    • contains: 5 b/w illus. 1 table
    • availability: In stock
  • Table of Contents

    Preface to the second edition
    Preface to the original edition
    Acknowledgments
    1. Sex and justice
    2. Fairness and commitment
    3. Mutual aid
    4. Correlated convention
    5. The evolution of meaning
    Postscript
    Notes
    References
    Index.

  • Author

    Brian Skyrms, University of California, Irvine
    Brian Skyrms is Distinguished Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science and of Economics at the University of California, Irvine and Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University, California. His publications include The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure (Cambridge, 2004), Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information (2010), From Zeno to Arbitrage: Essays on Quantity, Coherence, and Induction (2012) and Evolution of the Social Contract (Cambridge, 1996), which won the 1999 Lakatos Award in Philosophy of Science.

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