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Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism
The Puzzle of Distributive Politics

$29.99

Part of Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

  • Date Published: September 2013
  • availability: In stock
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9781107660397
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About the Authors
  • Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable – and illegal – to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation.

    • Demonstrates that leading theories of distributive politics are fundamentally unable to explain how vote buying, pork-barrel politics, and machine politics operate in reality, and develop an original theory that explains these things
    • Uses original and imaginative data and cutting-edge empirical techniques to test theory
    • A broad study that reviews an enormous secondary literature and delves deeply into four contemporary developing democracies (Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, and India)
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    Prizes

    • Winner of the 2014 Gregory Luebbert Book Award, Comparative Politics Section, American Political Science Association

    Reviews & endorsements

    "This book advances a single broad theoretical point: vote brokers are central to any system of vote buying in mass elections. While many previous scholars have considered the role of vote brokers from one angle or another, what sets this book apart is that it provides a unified theoretical model of vote brokers. It is grounded effectively in the modern economic theory of agency, and the authors run it through a series of tests using both original primary and secondary sources. Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism will be a landmark for the next generation of studies."
    Gary W. Cox, Stanford University

    "This book is a landmark contribution to positive as well as normative political economy of redistribution. Its treasure trove of facts, ideas, and analyses changes our understanding of this key issue and will reorient future research."
    Avinash Dixit, Princeton University

    "More than a decade in the making, this volume was worth the wait. It brings together years of meticulous empirical work in several countries, careful theorizing, and a deft use of historical cases to produce what will surely be the most definitive and influential study of clientelism in the field."
    Allen D. Hicken, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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    Customer reviews

    18th Sep 2013 by RDHolmes

    Though i have yet to get a full copy of the book, the available material manifest excellent scholarship employing a mix of methods to describe the puzzle of distributive politics

    Review was not posted due to profanity

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    Product details

    • Date Published: September 2013
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9781107660397
    • length: 338 pages
    • dimensions: 228 x 152 x 19 mm
    • weight: 0.47kg
    • contains: 50 b/w illus. 16 tables
    • availability: In stock
  • Table of Contents

    Part I. Modalities of Distributive Politics:
    1. Between clients and citizens: puzzles and concepts in the study of distributive politics
    Part II. The Micro-Logic of Clientelism:
    2. Gaps between theory and fact
    3. A theory of broker-mediated distribution
    4. Testing the theory of broker-mediated distribution
    5. A disjunction between the strategies of leaders and brokers?
    6. Clientelism and poverty
    Part III. The Macro-Logic of Vote-Buying: What Explains the Rise and Decline of Political Machines?:
    7. Party leaders against the machine
    Part IV. Clientelism and Democratic Theory:
    8. What's wrong with buying votes?

  • Authors

    Susan C. Stokes, Yale University, Connecticut
    fm.author_biographical_note1

    Thad Dunning, Yale University, Connecticut
    fm.author_biographical_note2

    Marcelo Nazareno, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina
    fm.author_biographical_note3

    Valeria Brusco, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina
    fm.author_biographical_note4

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