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Making Votes Count

Making Votes Count
Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems

$40.99 (C)

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Part of Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

  • Author: Gary W. Cox, University of California, San Diego
  • Date Published: March 1997
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9780521585279

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About the Authors
  • This book investigates strategic coordination in elections worldwide. Although the classics of electoral studies have dealt with issues of coordination, this is the first book that employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination--including both strategic voting and strategic entry--worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws.

    • Use of a unified game-theoretic model to generate theoretical propositions
    • Use of constituency-level electoral data to test theoretical propositions
    • Worldwide comparative perspective considers samples of 131 polities drawn from all regions of the world
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    Awards

    • Winner of the Wilson Prize for the best book in politcal science published in 1997 The Luebbart Prize awarded to the best book in comparative politics The prize from the American Political Science association for the best book in political economy

    Reviews & endorsements

    "Every serious scholar of political systems should read this book....Cox is a master when it comes to explaining ideas generated by a logic-based theory....this book is a very important contribution to our knowledge about electoral systems. It will be the major book in this area for some time to come." Melvin Hinch, American Political Science Review

    "...this is a great book, a must for all those interested in the study of elections. Cox powerfully demonstrates the fruitfulness of looking at the impact of electoral systems from the perspective of formal theory, provided this is combined with solid empirical analysis." André Blais, Canadian Journal of Political Science

    "This book is a unique contribution to the fields of comparative politics and formal political theory. It offers a model integrating many diverse aspects of electoral competition that together bring into existence systems of national poltical parties. Gary Cox combines social choice theory, public choice theory, spatial theory, and the institutional approach to electoral studies to reach a new level of understanding of political competition in democracies. Gary Cox's new book is not only a theoretical study, but also a useful reference on comparative electoral institutions. ...the suthor also draws attention to such often overlooked institutions as rules of candidate nomination and party registration." Olga Shvetsova, Political Science Quarterly

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    Product details

    • Date Published: March 1997
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9780521585279
    • length: 360 pages
    • dimensions: 229 x 152 x 23 mm
    • weight: 0.54kg
    • contains: 12 b/w illus. 16 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    List of tables and figures
    Series editor's preface
    Preface
    PART I. INTRODUCTION:
    1. Introduction
    2. Duverger's propositions
    PART II. STRATEGIC VOTING:
    3. On electoral systems
    4. Strategic voting in single-member single-ballot systems
    5. Strategic voting in multimember districts
    6. Strategic voting in single-member dual-ballot systems
    7. Some concluding comments on strategic voting, PART III. STRATEGIC ENTRY:
    8. Strategic voting, party labels and entry
    9. Rational entry and the conservation of disproportionality: evidence from Japan
    PART IV. ELECTORAL COORDINATION AT THe SYSTEM LEVEL:
    10. Putting the constituencies together
    11. Electoral institutions, cleavage structures and the number of parties
    PART V. COORDINATION FAILURES AND THE DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE:
    12. Coordination failures and representation
    13. Coordination failures and dominant parties
    14. Coordination failures and realignments
    PART VI. CONCLUSION
    15. Conclusion
    Appendices
    References
    Subject index
    Author index.

  • Author

    Gary W. Cox, University of California, San Diego

    Awards

    • Winner of the Wilson Prize for the best book in politcal science published in 1997 The Luebbart Prize awarded to the best book in comparative politics The prize from the American Political Science association for the best book in political economy

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