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The Political Economy of Property Rights

The Political Economy of Property Rights
Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies

$128.00

Part of Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

David L. Weimer, Daniel Diermeier, Joel Ericson, Timothy Frye, Steven Lewis, Barry R. Weingast, Nikolai Mikhailov, Adam Przeworski, John M. Litwack, Brendan Kiernan, Francis X. Bell, Steven S. Smith, Jole Meyer Ericson, Anthony Jones, Mariusz Mark Dobek, Sharon Wolchik, Lorene Allio, Bartlomeij Kaminski, László Urbán, Kálmán Mizsei, Victor Nee, Hannes Wittig, Susanne Lohmann, Lorene Allio, Mariusz Mark Dobek, Nikolia Mikhailov, Jack Knight, Douglass C. North
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  • Date Published: April 1997
  • availability: In stock
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9780521581011

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About the Authors
  • The Political Economy of Property Rights investigates the transformation of property rights in post-communist countries and China. The movement to effective market economies requires the creation of more effective supporting institutions, especially systems of property rights that decentralize the control of economic resources. This process is inherently political, and thus should be studied from the perspective of political economy.

    • The discussants include senior 'stars' in political economy, like Barry Weingast, Adam Przeworski, and Douglass North
    • Introduces important conceptual tools from modern political economy in non-technical ways
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    Reviews & endorsements

    "...recommended to anyone dealing with privatization strategies in the transformation economies or with the political economy of institutional change." Thomas Wagner, Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics

    "...nothing could be more than a book on the interaction between the political insitutions of democracy and economic transformation. IThe Political Economy of Property Rights was the result of comparative studies made by the respective country specialists." Slavic Reviews

    "This volume examines why the countries have followed the policy courses that they did. Weimer describes the basic principles of property rights, in particular, security against appropriation by others, emphasizes the close connection between private property and democracy, and then summarizes the other contributions. ...a major step toward developing such a full model, as it confronts the modesl with many empirical cases. We can then see what data and techiniques are most successful in testin the theory." Kenneth Koford, Journal of Comparative Economics

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    Product details

    • Date Published: April 1997
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9780521581011
    • length: 384 pages
    • dimensions: 235 x 158 x 26 mm
    • weight: 0.746kg
    • availability: In stock
  • Table of Contents

    1. The political economy of property rights David L. Weimer
    2. Credible commitment and property rights: the role of strategic interaction between political and economic actors Daniel Diermeier, Joel Ericson, Timothy Frye, and Steven Lewis
    3. The political commitment to markets and marketization: comment on 'Credible commmitment and property rights' Barry R. Weingast
    4. Political determinants of the success of economic transition Nikolai Mikhailov
    5. Comment on 'Political determinants of the success of economic transition' Adam Przeworski
    6. Russian privatization and the problem of credible commitment Timothy Frye
    7. Three issues of credible commitment and Russian privatization John M. Litwack
    8. Legislative politics and the political economy of property rights in post-Communist Russia Brendan Kiernan and Francis X. Bell
    9. Commitment, coordination, and the demise of the post-Communist parliament in Russia Steven S. Smith
    10. Private firms, city governments, and arbitration: enforcing economic legality in St. Petersburg Jole Meyer Ericson
    11. Comment on 'Private firms, city governments, and arbitration: enforcing economic legality in St. Petersburg' Anthony Jones
    12. Property rights and institutional change in the Czech and Slovac Republics Mariusz Mark Dobek
    13. Comment on 'Property rights and institutional change in the Czech and Slovac Republics' Sharon Wolchik
    14. Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving privatization bargains in Poland Lorene Allio
    15. Comment on 'Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving privatization bargains in Poland' Bartlomeij Kaminski
    16. Privatization as institutional change in Hungary László Urbán
    17. Comment on 'Privatization as institutional change in Hungary' Kálmán Mizsei
    18. Marketization and government credibility in Shanghai: federalist and local corporatist explanations Steven Lewis
    19. Federalist and corporatist theories: a comment on an empirical test Victor Nee
    20. Learning about the economy: property rights and the collapse of the East German industrial economy Hannes Wittig
    21. Misinformation, insecure property rights, and the collapse of the East German economy Susanne Lohmann
    22. Post-Communist privatization as a test of theories of institutional change Lorene Allio, Mariusz Mark Dobek, Nikolia Mikhailov, and David L. Weimer
    23. Explaining the complexity of institutional change Jack Knight and Douglass C. North.

  • Editor

    David L. Weimer, University of Rochester, New York

    Contributors

    David L. Weimer, Daniel Diermeier, Joel Ericson, Timothy Frye, Steven Lewis, Barry R. Weingast, Nikolai Mikhailov, Adam Przeworski, John M. Litwack, Brendan Kiernan, Francis X. Bell, Steven S. Smith, Jole Meyer Ericson, Anthony Jones, Mariusz Mark Dobek, Sharon Wolchik, Lorene Allio, Bartlomeij Kaminski, László Urbán, Kálmán Mizsei, Victor Nee, Hannes Wittig, Susanne Lohmann, Lorene Allio, Mariusz Mark Dobek, Nikolia Mikhailov, Jack Knight, Douglass C. North

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