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Political Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America
Stealing for the Team

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Part of Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

  • Date Published: April 2016
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9781107656093

$ 34.99 (C)
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About the Authors
  • An important question for the health and longevity of democratic governance is how institutions may be fashioned to prevent electoral victors from drawing on the resources of the state to perpetuate themselves in power. This book addresses the issue by examining how the structure of electoral institutions – the rules of democratic contestation that determine the manner in which citizens choose their representatives – affects political corruption, defined as the abuse of state power or resources for campaign finance or party-building purposes. To this end, the book develops a novel theoretical framework that examines electoral institutions as a potential vehicle for political parties to exploit the state as a source of political finance. Hypotheses derived from this framework are assessed using an unprecedented public employees' survey conducted by the author in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile.

    • Presents a novel theoretical framework for understanding the link between political institutions and corruption in political financing
    • Develops an original methodology for studying the determinants of corruption within the public sector
    • Evaluates the theoretical framework using an unprecedented survey of federal public bureaucrats in Bolivia, Brazil and Chile
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    Awards

    • Honourable Mention, 2014 William H. Riker Book Award, Political Economy Section, American Political Science Association

    Reviews & endorsements

    "Gingerich’s book is a valuable addition to studies on corruption and serves as an excellent example of high-quality institutional analysis. By showing that ballot structure affects corruption, he demonstrates that institutions affect the outcome of interest through different mechanisms. Assessing their overall impact, therefore, requires taking all of them into consideration. Gingerich collected new data for the book and offers what is probably the most sophisticated treatment of corruption I have seen in the comparative literature. The chapter "Institutional Design and the Case for Mechanism-Based Analysis" is the best exposition I have ever seen of what comparative institutional analysis should be. This is a great book!"
    José Cheibub, Boeschenstein Professor of Political Economy and Public Policy, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

    "Political corruption is the art of stealing the money of citizens to win their vote. Daniel W. Gingerich provides brilliant portraits of how these two activities are connected, writing with both great precision and flair about how bureaucratic recruitment and ballot designs shape the fate of political incumbents. With an impressive design that combines case studies, formal models, and survey data, Gingerich’s book is both substantively important and a blueprint of how to conduct research in political science today."
    Ernesto Calvo, Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland

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    Product details

    • Date Published: April 2016
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9781107656093
    • length: 304 pages
    • dimensions: 228 x 152 x 20 mm
    • weight: 0.48kg
    • contains: 25 b/w illus. 2 maps 20 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    1. Institutions and political corruption: a framework
    2. Institutional design and the case for mechanism-based analysis
    3. Ballot structure, political corruption, and the performance of proportional representation
    4. An approach to overcoming the fundamental problem of inference in corruption studies
    5. Political career paths in the bureaucracy and the use of institutional resources in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile
    6. Conclusion.

  • Author

    Daniel W. Gingerich, University of Virginia
    Daniel W. Gingerich is Assistant Professor of Politics specializing in comparative politics at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. He received his PhD from Harvard University, Massachusetts and has held fellowships in Princeton University's Center for the Study of Democratic Politics and the Inter-American Development Bank's Visiting Scholar's Program. Professor Gingerich's research focuses on understanding the causes and consequences of corruption and clientelism in Latin America as well as developing new methodologies to study these phenomena. He has published various articles in journals such as Political Analysis, the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of Theoretical Politics. His scholarship has been funded by organizations such as the National Science Foundation.

    Awards

    • Honourable Mention, 2014 William H. Riker Book Award, Political Economy Section, American Political Science Association

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