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Controlling Institutions
International Organizations and the Global Economy

$31.99

  • Date Published: March 2011
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9780521183062

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About the Authors
  • How is the United States able to control the IMF with only 17% of the votes? How are the rules of the global economy made? This book shows how a combination of formal and informal rules explain how international organizations really work. Randall W. Stone argues that formal rules apply in ordinary times, while informal power allows leading states to exert control when the stakes are high. International organizations are therefore best understood as equilibrium outcomes that balance the power and interests of the leading state and the member countries. Presenting a new model of institutional design and comparing the IMF, WTO and EU, Stone argues that institutional variations reflect the distribution of power and interests. He shows that US interests influence the size, terms and enforcement of IMF programs, and new data, archival documents and interviews reveal the shortcomings of IMF programs in Mexico, Russia, Korea, Indonesia and Argentina.

    • An explanation of how international organisations operate, arguing that institutional design depends on informal influence which often undermines the credibility and legitimacy of international organizations
    • Explains the variations in institutional designs between the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization and European Union
    • Features data, archival documents and interviews to form an interpretation of the crises and shortcomings of IMF programs in Mexico, Russia, Korea, Indonesia and Argentina
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    Prizes

    • Winner of the 2012 Chadwick F. Alger Prize, International Studies Association

    Reviews & endorsements

    Controlling Institutions develops an original and persuasive theory about informal governance and power in world politics. Anyone who wants to understand how international organizations really operate should read this book.”
    – Robert O. Keohane, Princeton University

    “The United States has long exercised disproportionate power within key international institutions. In this rigorous and compelling account, Randall Stone explains, for the first time, the sources of America's informal influence over global governance.”
    – Miles Kahler, Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations, University of California, San Diego

    “Cogently combining innovative theory, statistical analysis, and case studies, Stone pries open the black box of how the United States has gained so much influence over the behavior of international organizations such as the IMF.”
    – Thomas D. Willett, Horton Professor of Economics at The Claremont Colleges

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    Product details

    • Date Published: March 2011
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9780521183062
    • length: 274 pages
    • dimensions: 229 x 152 x 16 mm
    • weight: 0.41kg
    • contains: 8 b/w illus. 28 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    1. Introduction: international organization and US power
    Part I. Theory:
    2. A theory of international organization
    3. A model of informal governance
    Part II. Cases:
    4. Informal governance in the IMF
    5. The World Trade Organization
    6. The European Union
    Part III. Hypotheses:
    7. Access to IMF resources
    8. Conditionality under IMF programs
    9. Enforcement
    10. Conclusions.

  • Author

    Randall W. Stone, University of Rochester, New York
    Randall W. Stone is Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester. He is the author of Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition (2002) and Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade (1996). His articles have appeared in the American Political Science Review, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, the Review of International Organizations and Global Environmental Politics.

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