Skip to content
Cart

Your Cart

×

You have 0 items in your cart.

Register Sign in Wishlist

Anarchy Unbound
Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

$30.99 (P)

Part of Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society

  • Date Published: April 2014
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9781107629707

$ 30.99 (P)
Paperback

Add to cart Add to wishlist

Other available formats:
Hardback, eBook


Looking for an examination copy?

If you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an examination copy. To register your interest please contact collegesales@cambridge.org providing details of the course you are teaching.

Description
Product filter button
Description
Contents
Resources
Courses
About the Authors
  • In Anarchy Unbound, Peter T. Leeson uses rational choice theory to explore the benefits of self-governance. Relying on experience from the past and present, Professor Leeson provides evidence of anarchy “working” where it is least expected to do so and explains how this is possible. Provocatively, Leeson argues that in some cases anarchy may even outperform government as a system of social organization, and demonstrates where this may occur. Anarchy Unbound challenges the conventional self-governance wisdom. It showcases the incredible ingenuity of private individuals to secure social cooperation without government and how their surprising means of doing so can be superior to reliance on the state.

    • Challenges conventional thinking about anarchy, offering new and provocative theories for self-governance
    • Nontechnical, accessible, and of interest to academics from across the social sciences and law, as well as laypersons
    • The inaugural book in Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society, a new interdisciplinary series of theoretical and empirical research focusing on individual choice, institutions, and social outcomes
    Read more

    Reviews & endorsements

    "In the best tradition of Coase, Peter Leeson shows how, in most surprising times and places, individuals managed to organize their lives and affairs cooperatively without any help from government. The history in this book is fascinating; the economics is powerful; and the writing is beautiful."
    Andrei Shleifer, Harvard University

    "With compelling arguments and examples from many different times and societies, Leeson shows how bottom-up institutions of governance work and why their results are often better than what governments achieve. The book is fascinating reading for all economists, and will be an eye-opener to many."
    Avinash Dixit, Princeton University, author of Lawlessness and Economics

    "A lively, insightful, and masterly work. In taking aim at Thomas Hobbes’ view that governments are invariably essential, Leeson invokes historical examples such as the institution of Caribbean pirates and sociological concepts such as social distance. It is rare for an economist to offer riches to social scientists of every stripe."
    Robert C. Ellickson, Meyer Professor of Property Law, Yale Law School

    See more reviews

    Customer reviews

    Not yet reviewed

    Be the first to review

    Review was not posted due to profanity

    ×

    , create a review

    (If you're not , sign out)

    Please enter the right captcha value
    Please enter a star rating.
    Your review must be a minimum of 12 words.

    How do you rate this item?

    ×

    Product details

    • Date Published: April 2014
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9781107629707
    • length: 270 pages
    • dimensions: 226 x 150 x 18 mm
    • weight: 0.36kg
    • contains: 4 b/w illus. 5 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    1. Anarchy unbound
    Part I. Self-Governance and the Problem of Social Diversity:
    2. Social distance and self-enforcing exchange
    3. The laws of lawlessness
    Part II. Self-Governance and the Problem of Violence:
    4. Trading with bandits
    5. Efficient plunder
    Part III. Social-Governance and the Problem of 'Bad Apples':
    6. Pirates' private order
    7. Criminal constitutions
    Part IV. Self-Governance as Superior to the State:
    8. Efficient anarchy
    9. Better off stateless
    10. An argument for anarchy in LDCs
    11. A future for thinking about self-governance.

  • Author

    Peter T. Leeson, George Mason University, Virginia
    Peter T. Leeson is a Professor of Economics and BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism at George Mason University, Virginia. He is also the North American editor of Public Choice. Previously, he was a Visiting Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, the F. A. Hayek Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a Visiting Fellow in Political Economy at Harvard University, Massachusetts. Professor Leeson is the author of The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates (2009) and a recipient of the Fund for the Study of Spontaneous Order's Hayek Prize, which he received for his research on self-governance.

Sign In

Please sign in to access your account

Cancel

Not already registered? Create an account now. ×

Sorry, this resource is locked

Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email lecturers@cambridge.org

Register Sign in
Please note that this file is password protected. You will be asked to input your password on the next screen.

» Proceed

You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.

Continue ×

Continue ×

Continue ×

Find content that relates to you

Are you sure you want to delete your account?

This cannot be undone.

Cancel

Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.

If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.

×
Please fill in the required fields in your feedback submission.
×